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Within the natural-language research community it has long been acknowledged that the conventions and 
pragmatics of natural-language communication often oblige dialogue systems to consider and address 
the underlying purposes of queries in their responses rather than answering them literally and without 
further comment or elaboration. Such systems cannot simply translate their users' requests into 
transactions on database or expert systems, but must apply many more complex reasoning mechanisms 
to the task of selecting responses that are both appropriate and useful. This idea has given rise to a 
broadly-defined program of research in cooperative response generation (CRG). 
Research in CRG carried on over more than a decade has yielded a substantial body of literature. Analysis 
of that literature, however, shows that investigators have focused primarily on modeling manifestations of 
cooperative behavior without directly considering the nature and motivations of the behavior itself. But if 
we want to develop natural language dialogue systems that are truly to function as cooperative 
respondents instead of serving only as models of particular kinds of cooperative responses, a different 
approach is required. 
I identify two opposing perspectives on the process of cooperative response generation: the questioner-
based and the respondent-based perspectives. I argue that past research efforts have largely been 
questioner-based, and that this view has led to the development of theories that are incompatible and 
cannot be integrated. I propose the respondent-based view as an alternative, and provide evidence that 
taking such a perspective might allow several interesting but otherwise poorly-understood aspects of 
cooperative response behavior to be modeled. 
The final portion of the dissertation explores the computational implications of a respondent-based 
perspective. I outline the architecture of a Cooperative Response Planning System, a dialogue system that 
raises, reasons about, and attempts to satisfy high-level cooperative goals in its responses. This 
architecture constitutes a first approximation to a theory of how a system might reason from the beliefs it 
derives from a questioner's utterances to choose a cooperative response. The processing of two sample 
responses in this framework is described in detail to illustrate the architecture's capabilities. 
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Abst rac t  
Within the natural-language research community it has long been acknowledged that 
the conventions and pragmatics of natural-language communication often oblige dialogue 
systems to consider and address the underlying purposes of queries in their responses 
rather than answering them literally and without further comment or elaboration. Such 
systems cannot simply translate their users' requests into transactions on database or 
expert systems, but must apply many more complex reasoning mechanisms to the task 
of selecting responses that are both appropriate and useful. This idea has given rise to a 
broadly-defined program of research in cooperative response generation (CRG). 
Research in CRG carried on over more than a decade has yielded a substantial body 
of literature. Analysis of that literature, however, shows that investigators have focused 
primarily on modeling manifestations of cooperative behavior without directly considering 
the nature and motivations of the behavior itself. But if we want to  develop natural- 
language dialogue systems that are truly to function as cooperative respondents instead of 
serving only as models of particular kinds of cooperative responses, a different approach is 
required. 
I identify two opposing perspectives on the process of cooperative response genera- 
tion: the questioner-based and the respondent-based perspectives. I argue that past 
research efforts have largely been questioner-based, and that this view has led to  the 
development of theories that are incompatible and cannot be integrated. I propose the 
respondent-based view as an alternative, and provide evidence that taking such a perspec- 
tive might allow several interesting but otherwise poorly-understood aspects of cooperative 
response behavior to  be modeled. 
The final portion of the dissertation explores the computational implications of a 
respondent-based perspective. I outline the architecture of a Coopera t ive  Response  
P l ann ing  Sys tem,  a dialogue system that raises, reasons about, and attempts to  satisfy 
high-level cooperative goals in its responses. This architecture constitutes a first approx- 
imation to  a theory of how a system might reason from the beliefs it derives from a 
questioner's utterances to choose a cooperative response. The processing of two sample 
responses in this framework is described in detail to illustrate the architecture's capabili- 
ties. 
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This dissertation focuses on the design of natural-language dialogue systems that are to  
be conceived of as cooperative respondents. A distinction between questioner-based and 
respondent-based perspectives on cooperative response behavior is developed, and the im- 
plications of the latter framework for dialogue system design are explored. 
1.1 Cooperative Response Generation 
Within the natural-language research community it has long been acknowledged that 
the conventions and pragmatics of natural-language communication often oblige natural- 
language dialogue systems to consider and address in their responses the underlying pur- 
poses of queries rather than answering them literally and without further comment or 
elaboration. These systems cannot simply translate their users7 queries into transactions 
on database or expert systems, but must apply many more complex reasoning mechanisms 
to  the task of selecting appropriate and useful responses. Researchers have argued that if 
question-answering systems are to  be perceived by their users as acceptable dialogue part- 
ners, they must be able to provide cooperative responses (also called extended responses 
[Wahlster 83, Finin 86, Webber 861) that may include such general elements as: 
a the so-called direct answer: the information literally requested; 
a information or action related to the direct answer; 
a information or action i n  place of the direct answer; 
information or action that is related to  one or more of the questioner's stated, inferred, 
or assumed goals. 
The idea that responses may need to  address concerns that are well beyond the explicit re- 
quest has spawned a broadly-defined program of research in cooperative response generation 
(CRG). 
Research in CRG over more than a decade has yielded a substantial body of results. 
Many of these efforts have been based on analyses of examples found in transcripts of 
naturally occurring dialogue. A commonly-employed research approach follows these steps: 
r identifying forms or patterns of response behavior that seem to follow from principles 
of cooperation, 
r characterizing the properties of those responses that correlate with people's judg- 
ments of their cooperativeness, 
r circumscribing the conditions under which those responses are typically produced, 
and 
a developing computational methods that dialogue systems can employ to produce 
(or to  support the production of) responses having the desired properties in the 
predefined situations. 
The research to  be presented in this dissertation is not an addition in kind, but rather is 
set against a backdrop composed of this body of accumulated results. I will argue that 
when we evaluate past efforts in light of the possible long-term goals of CRG research, it 
becomes less than clear whether any real progress has been achieved. 
1.1.1 Long-range research goals 
There are two long-range goals toward which research in CRG might be directed. One is a 
goal of engineering, the other a goal of science. The engineering goal is to  develop computer 
technology and algorithms that enable dialogue systems to respond to  requests in ways that 
their users perceive to  be satisfactorily informative, clear, and helpful. Researchers have 
taken steps in this direction by specifying inference procedures that support different kinds 
of cooperative response decisions, characterizing different knowledge sources that dialogue 
systems draw upon in the process of computing their responses, and identifying properties 
of different applications and/or domains of discourse that affect the kinds of cooperative 
responses that must be produced. When evaluating engineering solutions, we typically 
apply such criteria as domain independence, computational feasibility, and scalability. 
The scientific goal is to identify the underlying principles and cognitive mechanisms of 
cooperation and cooperative discourse. As a scientific enterprise, the study of CRG leads 
us t o  investigate questions of a more philosophical kind: 
a What are the characteristics that define a "cooperative" response? 
r What does it mean for one agent to  cooperate with another? 
r How does cooperation among agents affect their behavior in a dialogue? 
r What are the general principles that drive cooperative behavior? 
Scientific results are typically evaluated in terms of their breadth of coverage of naturally 
occurring data and the degree to  which they accord with known theories of cognition. 
As part of this dissertation I will show that past work on CRG has been directed 
almost exclusively toward the engineering goal, while the scientific goal has received scant 
attention. It has been implicitly assumed that these goals can be pursued independently; 
however, two conclusions we will draw from the present research are that (1) progress in 
the engineering of cooperative response behavior has not significantly increased scientific 
understanding of cooperation, and (2) without scientific progress, our engineering efforts 
will be limited to the development of systems that are able only to reproduce fixed patterns 
of cooperative response behavior, rather than to reason and act as true cooperative dialogue 
partners. 
1.1.2 Background: the integration problem 
As originally conceived, this research project was an attempt to take the next logical step 
toward the engineering goal by addressing what I have previously called the integration 
problem [Cheikes 871. This is the problem of combining restricted models of cooperative 
responses to form more capable dialogue systems. 
We have the intuition that cooperation manifests itself in language in many ways, both 
subtle and blatant. In the past, researchers have studied cooperative response generation 
largely by characterizing regular patterns of "helpful" question-answering behavior, then 
developing computational techniques that could be employed to  reproduce those patterns. 
There seems to have been a presumption that enough research of this kind would lead to 
the development of dialogue systems able to demonstrate a realistic range of cooperative 
response ability, a range approximating that of human cooperative respondents. Gal ex- 
pressed this presumption most succinctly in the introduction to her doctoral thesis [Gal 88, 
p. 231: 
All [approaches to cooperative question answering] are generally complemen- 
tary to  each other, since they each solve particular problems, among the numer- 
ous ones which must be faced in building a truly cooperative interface-that is, 
an interface cooperative enough to  allow the user to forget that he is questioning 
a machine. 
This comment suggests a view in which researchers are solving important subproblems 
along the route to constructing "truly cooperative" interfaces. But after a review of nu- 
merous systems that all purported to  generate "cooperative responses," it was not obvious 
how (or if) the different problems and proposed solutions related to  one another and to 
the design of "truly cooperative" interfaces. I thus set out to investigate this question: 
how could the results of past research be integrated to form dialogue systems possessing a 
repertoire of cooperative talents? 
1.1.3 Difficulties encountered 
Research up to the time at which this project commenced had generally treated the study 
of CRG as a process of naming and modeling distinct forms of cooperative response behav- 
ior. Kaplan, for example, had designed a system that generated what he called "corrective 
indirect responses" when it detected an extensional query failure [Kaplan 821. Mays had 
investigated both corrective responses to intensional query failures [Mays 801 and monitor 
offers on dynamic databases [Mays 84bl. Various kinds of misconception-correction strate- 
gies had been considered [McCoy 85, Quilici 881, and Allen had developed a model of plan 
inference to support "obstacle elimination" [Allen 831. These are just a few examples; we 
will see more in the next chapter. 
Given the foundation that all this research provided, the most obvious approach to 
achieving integration at the time was to  design a blackboard system [Nii 86b] in which the 
different theories of cooperative question answering would be implemented as modules of 
some sort. Early efforts along this line are discussed in [Cheikes 871 and [Cheikes 891. 
After several unsatisfactory attempts to define the architecture of a blackboard-based 
cooperative response generation system, it became clear that there were subtle difficulties 
with the way CRG research had been approached, the effect being that the accumulated 
results resisted integration efforts. The integration work foundered for several reasons: 
Research projects had been conducted in isolation from one another, and thus they 
lacked a common conceptual framework. 
Different assumptions had been made about what information was available to the 
system (in terms of both what was contained in systems' general knowledge bases 
and what knowledge was derived from user input). 
Each system assumed that it was responsible for producing the entire response to 
the user's input in some particular dialogue context. 
The cooperativeness of many response forms seemed to depend on unstated assump- 
tions about the goals that the user was pursuing. 
The conclusion that I drew was that the various systems, when considered individually, 
seemed to  neatly solve some useful problems along the way to "truly cooperative" dialogue 
systems, but, when considered as complementary efforts leading toward some common end, 
represented incompatible theories. 
This conclusion raised a new crop of discomfiting questions: 
If previous efforts were not leading to "truly cooperative" dialogue systems, where 
were they leading? 
Why were the results of those efforts so incompatible? 
What changes of approach were called for in order to  make progress in cooperative 
question answering? 
It seemed that the whole approach to studying and modeling cooperative response be- 
havior required complete rethinking. This dissertation presents the results to date of my 
reconsideration of the CRG problem. 
1.2 Summary of Research 
My rethinking of the problem of cooperative response generation proceeded through four 
stages. First, I returned to the literature and undertook an in-depth analysis and critique. 
That work is reported in Chapter 2. Next, I developed an abstract characterization of 
past work that explained the conclusions of my literature critique. This characterization 
is called the questioner-based perspective, and is described in Section 3.1. The insights 
provided by this characterization, together with my analyses of examples of naturally 
occurring request-response pairs (described in Section 1.3), led to the development of a new 
theoretical perspective on the process of cooperative question answering, the respondent- 
based perspective. This new perspective is described in Section 3.2. Finally, I explored the 
consequences of the respondent-based perspective by sketching an architecture design for 
respondent-based dialogue systems. I summarize the results of these stages next. 
1.2.1 Literature analysis and critique 
The literature analysis and critique presented in Chapter 2 focuses on a representative 
sample of the large body of work relating to the mechanical generation of cooperative 
responses. I found that it was possible to divide the literature into three general categories: 
1. cooperative question answering for database-query systems; 
2. cooperative question answering in task-oriented domains; 
3. general theories of cooperative response behavior. 
This categorization made it easier to understand the context of individual efforts and to 
see how that context affected which kinds of responses were considered cooperative. 
The critique leads to the conclusion that previous research has been concerned not 
so much with understanding and modeling cooperative response behavior as it has with 
designing computer systems that can manifest such behavior. That is, the systems are 
all able to give the appearance of being "cooperative respondents" in the particular query 
situations for which they were designed, but their behavior does not actually rest on stated 
principles of cooperation. In fact, for most researchers, theories of cooperation and coop- 
erative question answering are at  best only peripheral concerns. Furthermore, the utility 
of the resulting models has often been dependent on ill-defined properties of particular 
domains or applications. Because only fixed forms of behavior have been modeled, little 
attention has been paid to the question of how cooperative behavior is constrained. 
1.2.2 The questioner-based perspective 
Chapter 3 distinguishes two distinct theoretical perspectives on the general CRG prob- 
lem, each with a unique research methodology. In Section 3.1, I characterize the first 
of these-the questioner-based perspective, a view of CRG through the eyes of the ques- 
tioner. The term questioner-based model is used to describe theories of CRG that view the 
response-generation task from the questioner's perspective. For questioner-based models, 
the primary goal is to devise mechanisms that enable dialogue systems to  live up to the 
expectations of the questioner in a given query situation. Principles of cooperation are 
used primarily as justification for why dialogue systems should behave in the various ways 
that have been studied and modeled. These principles, however, are hardly ever stated 
precisely, and they have never played a direct role in determining the behavior of a given 
system. I argue that, to the extent that researchers have actually proposed accounts of 
CRG behavior, their theories have all been questioner based. 
After characterizing the questioner-based perspective and its associated research meth- 
odology, I show that the general questioner-based approach has undesirable theoretical 
consequences. First, I argue that the results yielded by the questioner-based approach to 
the CRG problem have turned out to be models of highly specialized response situations 
rather than theories about the causes and motivations of the different examples of cooper- 
ative response behavior. Second, I claim that all of the principles of cooperation that have 
been proposed (or that can be abstracted from previous research reports) to date have 
been purely descriptive, that is, they describe what systems are doing but not why they 
are doing it. 
Taken together, these problems explain the resistance of questioner-based models to 
integration attempts. Such models show how to provide cooperative responses only in 
restricted dialogue situations, or in the context of particular question-answering applica- 
tions. The theoretical results resist integration either because the situations in which they 
apply are incomparable or because the underlying applications implicitly make different 
assumptions about the kinds of response behavior their users find helpful. Thus I conclude 
that the questioner-based approach is of limited usefulness for reaching the long-term en- 
gineering goal. Moreover, the questioner-based approach by its very nature ignores the 
questions whose answers would further the scientific effort. 
1.2.3 The respondent-based perspective 
In Section 3.2, I develop an alternative view on the problem of cooperative question answer- 
ing: the respondent-based perspective. I argue that if we want t o  be able t o  build systems 
that are truly to  serve as cooperative respondents rather than as models of particular ex- 
amples of cooperative responses, we must attempt to  model the respondent's knowledge 
and reasoning i n  a dialogue, instead of her behavior as perceived by the questioner. 
The characterization of the respondent-based perspective centers on the principle that 
responses reflect the respondent's goals. This means that the utterances of a natural- 
language response should be viewed as the observable result of the respondent's execution 
of a plan she had formed to  achieve some set of goals. (These goals, however, may not 
be immediately evident in the response, but rather constitute high-level nodes in the plan 
that underlies the actual response.) This idea leads to  the dissertation's fundamental 
hypothesis: 
In order to  build dialogue systems that are to be generally capable of acting as 
cooperative partners in a conversation, we must view their responses as actions 
planned to  achieve one or more goals. 
Providing evidence for this hypothesis is a major aim of this research. 
In the process of contrasting the two theoretical perspectives, I argue that in all 
questioner-based models, the goal that the system is attempting to  achieve is never defined 
or formalized. Using Kaplan's coop system [Kaplan 821 as a case study, I distinguish five 
elements of a respondent-based model of cooperative response generation: 
1. the goals that respondents adopt and try to  achieve in their responses; 
2. the conditions of the conversation that motivate various response goals; 
3. the knowledge and reasoning resources needed to  determine the status of the goal- 
motivating conditions; 
4. the reasoning processes and principles by which response goals are actually adopted; 
5. the strategies that may be used to achieve a given response goal. 
I suggest that a program of research aimed at  fleshing out the details of these five theoretical 
elements will help us both to build more capable cooperative dialogue systems and to  better 
comprehend the nature of cooperative behavior. Section 3.2 concludes with a discussion 
of several examples that illustrate many complexities of cooperative interaction that can 
be neither studied nor modeled in a questioner-based framework. 
1.2.4 Cooperative response planning systems 
If responses are to be viewed as attempts to  achieve the respondent's goals, it follows that 
cooperative respondents should be viewed as planning agents. This idea is the theme of 
Chapter 4. In that chapter I outline a general architecture for a Cooperative Response 
Planning System (CRPS), a system whose core component is an agent capable of forming 
and adopting goals and developing plans to  satisfy them. 
While the case that Section 3.2 builds in favor of the respondent-based perspective is 
a strong one, i t  also raises difficult computational questions. It does not explain how one 
could actually implement a respondent-based dialogue system. That turns out to be a 
complex and multi-faceted research problem, and the work in Chapter 4 is thus intended 
as an attempt t o  identify the theoretically significant parts of that problem. 
The architecture I describe is intended to  be a first approximation to a theory of 
cooperative response planning. The divisions that it imposes on the process of cooperative 
response planning are derived from observations and analyses of numerous examples of 
naturally occurring request-response pairs. 
At the most general level of detail, I divide the response-planning process into three 
sequential stages: a process of building a "conversation model" containing beliefs derived 
from the questioner's utterances (Section 4.2), a process of building a "response plan7' * 
comprising a set of goals to  be achieved through the response (Section 4.3), and a language- 
generation process. The chapter concentrates on characterizing conversation models and 
the process of constructing them, and on the process of constructing response plans. 
Although the architecture is not yet sufficiently fleshed out to  be used as a blueprint 
for an actual implementation, it is nevertheless useful in that it seems to expose signif- 
icant theoretical problems that from a questioner-based perspective would be invisible. 
Identifying these problems is a useful step toward both the engineering and the scientific 
goals. 
1.3 Data Used In Research 
Many of the research results presented herein are derived from the study of a wide range 
of examples of naturally occurring cooperative response behavior. Some of these examples 
were observed first hand, others were reported to  me by friends and colleagues who knew 
of my interest in the subject, and still others were found in the literature of related work. 
But by far my richest source of example data has been two sets of transcripts of natu- 
rally occurring dialogue. The first set of transcripts, which will henceforth be referred to  
as the U N I X  transcripts, consists of a body of 103 question-response pairs extracted from 
a larger corpus of electronic mail messages recorded as they were sent between users and 
consultants of the UNIX' operating system at  the University of California, Berkeley. The 
original transcripts were compiled at UC Berkeley by Lisa Rau. 
The U N I X  transcripts were compiled in this manner: a central electronic mail address 
was established ("consult7'), to  which U N I X  users were permitted to  send queries. Messages 
sent to this address were both recorded in a file and distributed to  a group of consultants 
(staff members at the academic computing center). Each recipient could independently 
l u n ~ x  is a trademark of AT&T. 
choose whether to respond. All responses were sent both to the originator of the query 
and to the consultant distribution list. Thus all consultants were privy to all responses 
generated to each query. While this usually had the effect of discouraging multiple re- 
sponses to a given query, in several cases two or more consultants would respond. Those 
latter few cases, by making it possible to compare responses, have provided an especially 
rich source of insight into the phenomenon of cooperative dialogue. 
The second set of transcripts, hereinafter called the EMACS transcripts, was collected as 
part of a project for a natural-language seminar during the Spring of 1982 at the University 
of Pennsylvania [Lewis 821. Eight dialogues were recorded, each taking place between two 
people, one acting as an expert and the other as a novice as they communicated via a 
computer terminal. The user (novice) was assigned a set of text-editing tasks to perform 
using the EMACS text editor. The user interacted with the expert to obtain information, 
advice, and assistance on the proper performance of the assigned tasks. 
1.4 Dissertation Outline 
Chapter 2 presents my review and analysis of a representative portion of the literature 
pertinent to cooperative response generation. Chapter 3 discusses the two opposing per- 
spectives on CRG and argues that a respondent-based approach offers the most hope of 
research progress in the long term. Chapter 4 examines a proposed architecture design for 
a cooperative response planning system. Chapter 5 illustrates the architecture's capabili- 
ties by describing in detail the processing of two sample responses. The thesis concludes 
in Chapter 6 with a summary of both some broad conclusions that can be drawn from 
this work and some specific results, along with discussion of some open questions and 
interesting directions for further research. 
Chapter 2 
Literature Review and Analysis 
One of the many concerns of researchers in natural-language processing has been the 
development of computational methods to enable natural-language dialogue systems to 
produce cooperative responses. For these researchers, the term "cooperative response" has 
usually meant a reply that, for a given question in a particular discourse context, is more 
helpful or informative than the simple direct answer. 
Research in this area over more than a decade has yielded a substantial body of litera- 
ture. This chapter presents a survey and analysis of a representative portion of that body, 
the goal being to  gauge the amount of progress the field as a whole has made towards a 
theory of cooperative communication. We will see, however, that any such assessment of 
progress is surprisingly difficult to  make. As the chapter demonstrates, our cumulative un- 
derstanding of the cooperative response generation process as reflected by the literature is 
confined to a few informal descriptive principles, a few models of inference, and an assort- 
ment of computer programs each simulating a different form of purportedly "cooperative" 
response behavior, usually in a specific domain or application. The evidence provided in 
this chapter will three claims: 
Research has focused on modeling manifestations of cooperative behavior and rarely 
considered the nature of that behavior itself. 
These behavior models have often been characterized in ways that are closely tied to  
a particular domain or application. 
Our comprehension of the constraints on cooperative behavior is marginal at best. 
The body of literature relevant to cooperative response generation is both extensive 
and highly diverse. It covers a spectrum of problems arising in different domains of dis- 
course and in the context of different applications. Nevertheless, at least as  an organizing 
principle, the various contributions can generally be divided into three categories: (1) 
cooperative responses in database-query applications, (2) cooperative responses in task- 
domain applications, and (3) general theories of cooperative interaction. These are not 
precise categories, since research efforts do not always fit in a single category (and some 
do not fit neatly in any category), but they will be helpful a t  least for distinguishing the 
general trends of past research. But before proceeding with discussion according to that 
categorization, I will introduce the Gricean framework in a separate section due to its 
central role in much of the work on cooperative interaction. 
The Maxim of Quantity 
Make your contribution as informative as is required. 
Do not make your contribution more informative than is required. 
The Maxim of Quality 
Do not say that which you believe to be false. 
Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence. 
The Maxim of Relation 
Be relevant. 
The Maxim of Manner 
Avoid ambiguity and obscurity of expression. 
Be brief and orderly. 
Figure 2.1: Grice's Maxims 
2.1 The Gricean Framework 
Grice's "cooperative principle" (CP) and its attendant maxims [Grice 751 have had a pro- 
found influence on the development of theoretical and computational models of cooperative 
response generation, perhaps more so than any other theory. The CP is stated as follows 
[Grice 75, p. 451: 
Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which 
it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which 
you are engaged. 
This principle is elaborated in four maxims, named QUANTITY, QUALITY, RELATION, and 
M A N N E R ,  shown in Figure 2.1. Both the CP and the maxims are broadly stated and thus 
subject to  interpretation. At best, they characterize some forms of discourse that arise 
when agents are acting cooperatively; they do not, however, tell us much about what it 
means, in a prescriptive sense, to be cooperative. For example, while it is generally true of 
cooperative interaction that respondents avoid saying things that are false (that is, they 
appear to  obey the maxim of QUALITY), it seems odd to  think of that as an axiom of 
cooperative behavior. Truthfulness should follow from a theory of what i t  means to  be 
cooperative rather than be a principle partially defining cooperation.' 
It should also be understood that using the Gricean framework to justify a system's 
behavior misses the point of Grice's analysis and misunderstands the intended purpose 
of the CP and maxims. The intent of Grice's seminal article was to reconcile the logic- 
based approach to formulations of sentence meaning with the wide variety of non-logical 
'In other words, "I am truthful because I am cooperative", not "I am cooperative because I am truthful." 
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meanings-implicatures, as Grice called them-that sentences can carry. The maxims 
were actually proposed as "trip wires7'-not rules to  be followed per se but rules that, 
when violated ("flouted," in Grice's term), trigger a very logical inferential process2 of 
"working out" the meaning implicated by the violation. Thus rather than being a set of 
constrained generative principles, the maxims are stated broadly in order to  account for 
as much non-logical inference as possible. 
2.2 Category 1 : Database- Query Applications 
Database-query systems have long been a popular application area for natural-language 
processing technology. They are so attractive largely because (1) the query task is well 
understood (and in many cases is supported by a well-developed mathematical theory), 
(2) the database structure provides a complete and precise definition of the domain of 
discourse, and (3) the majority of the queries can be handled with relatively small lexicons 
and grammars. One of the notable early successes in this area was L U N A R ,  a natural- 
language interface to  a database of chemical analyses of lunar rock samples [Woods 721. 
Users of database-query systems are treated as simple information seekers: they engage 
the system in a dialogue solely to  obtain information. Any external purpose they might 
have in obtaining information is just that: external, inaccessible to  the system's reasoning, 
with no influence on either how the question is interpreted or how the answer is found 
or presented. The user provides to the system a natural-language characterization of the 
desired result set-the elements to be retrieved from the d a t a b a s e a n d  may also propose 
requirements for how that result set is to  be presented. The system then analyzes the user's 
input and dynamically constructs a procedure that, when executed against the database, 
should retrieve all and only those elements fitting the user's characterization. That set of 
retrieved elements constitutes the direct answer to the query. 
Research in this area has focused primarily on problems in mapping from natural- 
language structures to  formal query languages (e.g., Woods' work [Woods 771 on quantifi- 
cation) and on related issues such as the transportability of interfaces across databases 
[Grosz 871. Some investigators, however, have observed that the connection between a 
natural-language question and an appropriate answer is not always a direct one, and that 
database interfaces consequently have significant responsibilities in an interaction above 
and beyond translating the language of the user to the language of the database. This 
section examines several proposed extensions to the basic interface-as-translator model 
intended to enable database interfaces to provide extended answers that are not only 
correct but also useful, helpful, and informative. 
2.2.1 Presumption failure 
Kaplan was one of the first researchers to show that it is often insufficient and even inap- 
propriate to  give only literally correct answers to natural-language questions [Kaplan 81, 
Kaplan 821. He distinguished the presumptions of a question from its presuppositions. The 
presuppositions of a question are those propositions that must be true for any direct answer 
2~ process that Grice specified only in very general terms. 
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to be meaningful. Viewed another way, they are conditions on the felicitous utterance of a 
question. For example, consider the question shown in (l)a, below [Kaplan 81, p. 1281:~ 
(1) a. Q: What day does John go to his weekly piano lesson? 
b. John takes weekly piano lessons. 
c. R: Tuesday. 
The question in (1)a presupposes the truth of (1)b. If (1)b is false, there can be no valid 
direct answer such as (1)c. This is in contrast with a presumption, a proposition whose 
falsehood entails that at most one correct direct answer exists. The proposition in (2)b is 
presumed but not presupposed by the question in (2)a, for if (2)b is false, (2)c is a literally 
correct, direct answer (and in fact, it is the only answer). 
(2) a. Q: Did Donald divorce Marla? 
b. Donald was married to Marla. 
c. R: No. 
Kaplan suggested that when people pose questions, they ordinarily do so in the belief that 
they have left the respondent with a choice of direct answers. Thus questions can implicitly 
convey to a respondent some of the questioner's beliefs. For instance, a questioner who asks 
(2)a implies that he believes (2)b. As Kaplan noted, a problem arises when a respondent 
provides only the literally correct answer (2)c to (2)a. That answer implicitly confirms 
the proposition (2)b and thereby misleads the questioner. A query having one or more 
false presumptions is said to exhibit presumption failure. Kaplan proposed, as a general 
rule of cooperative behavior, that when respondents detect presumption failure in a query, 
they are obliged to respond in a way that at  the very least establishes the presumption's 
fa l~ehood.~  
Kaplan noticed that it was not uncommon for natural-language queries on databases 
to exhibit presumption failure. His COOP system was designed to detect and respond 
appropriately to one typical class of presumption failure in database queries, namely, those 
that arise when a constituent of a query is found to have an empty result set. Consider 
query (3)a: 
(3) a. Q: Which programmers from the Windows group are in department 67? 
b. R: None. 
c. R: I don't know of any programmers in department 67. 
The query literally requests a list of the members in the intersection of two sets: program- 
mers from the Windows group, and programmers in department 67. If either set is empty, 
the literal answer to the question would be (3)b. But this answer is misleading; (3)c is 
far more helpful and informative. These failures-which Kaplan called extensional query 
failures-were the kinds of presumption failures that c o o p  handled. 
Although not emphasized in Kaplan's work, COOP was also capable of two other forms 
of helpful behavior: suggestive indirect responses, and paraphrases. In certain cases when a 
3Throughout this dissertation, when referring to the individual participants in a question-answering 
exchange, I will use the symbol 'Q' to denote the questioner and 'R' to denote the respondent. When it is 
necessary to pronominalize them, Q and R will be treated as male and female respectively. 
4An alternative approach, in which answers rather than questions are tested for provably false presup 
positions, is presented in [Mercer 841. 
valid query (i.e., one without a presumption failure) had an empty result set, coop would 
try to  "generalize" the query by removing a restriction, as illustrated in (4). 
(4) Q: Which projects in oceanography does NASA headquarters sponsor? 
R: I don't know of any projects in oceanography that NASA headquarters 
sponsors. But you might be interested in any projects that NASA head- 
quarters sponsors: (list of projects) 
Here COOP removed the "in oceanography" restriction on "projects". This process of query 
generalization was later formalized and extended by Motro (see Section 2.2.3). 
coop also routinely paraphrased each query before generating the answer, as shown 
below. 
(5) Q: Who doesn't sponsor projects in the oceanography area? 
P: (I am assuming that "oceanography" is an AREA OF INTEREST.) As- 
suming that there are projects that are in the oceanography area, who 
doesn't sponsor those projects? 
The paraphrase is useful in that it demonstrates both that the query was understood and 
how it was interpreted. For ambiguous queries, the paraphrase brings both the nature 
of the ambiguity and the system's resolution of it to  the user's attention. An extended 
discussion of the coop paraphraser can be found in [McKeown 791. 
2.2.2 Intensional query failures 
Influenced by Kaplan's work, Mays identified a more general class of presumption failure 
which he called intensional query failure [Mays 801. According to  Mays, a query fails 
intensionally if it presumes a world model that does not accord with the database schema. 
For example, the query "Which students teach courses?" presumes that the relation TEACH 
holds between entities of type S T U D E N T  and entities of type COURSE. But given a database 
schema in which that relation did not hold, the description "students who teach courses" 
would be malformed, and thus the literal answer to  such a query would be "zero" or "nil". 
To deal with this, Mays developed a system that could reason from the database model 
to  validate all the relationships that the query presumed. This testing was performed 
before the query was passed to the database system. If an error was detected, the system 
generated an appropriate corrective response and aborted the database transaction. This 
is in contrast with COOP, which was triggered only when a database transaction yielded a 
null answer. 
2.2.3 Query generalization 
Motro suggested that users of database-query systems usually interpret a null answer 
(correctly or not) as an indication that their query was improperly constructed [Motro 841. 
This has two unfortunate consequences: first, null answers offer the user no assistance in 
correcting a truly ill-formed query, and second, if the query was in fact well formed, users 
tend to  misinterpret the null answer as an error. In light of this, Motro proposed three 
requirements on how database-query systems should respond when the result set is empty: 
such systems should (1) assure the user that the query was meaningful if in fact it was, 
(2) delimit the scope of a failure, and (3) anticipate possible follow-up queries. 
Motro claimed as a general principle that while a questioner might reasonably expect 
his direct question to have a null answer, he would not expect any generalization of that 
query to  have a null answer. One way to generalize a query is to eliminate a restriction (as 
was done in COOP): the query shown in (6)b is generalized from (6)a in this manner. 
(6) a. Q: Which female programmers are assigned to the Frobozz project? 
b. Q: Which programmers are assigned to the Frobozz project? 
According to  Motro7s theory, a questioner who asks (6)a might be willing to accept an 
answer of zero, but would not expect such a reply to  the related query (6)b which omits 
the gender restriction. Consequently, a system should be able to detect misconceptions by 
testing the generalizations of a query. If a generalization returns a zero or null answer, that 
generalized query reveals one of the user's misconceptions. So if the user asks (6)a and both 
i t  and its generalization (6)b return nil, it can be deduced that the user incorrectly believes 
that there is a set of programmers assigned to  the Frobozz project. This has an important 
corollary: if all immediate generalizations (since queries can be repeatedly generalized) 
succeed, the original failure was genuine, i.e., the original query was well formed. 
Motro developed a query-generalization mechanism and proposed to  add it to  the 
database-query processor. Triggered by a null answer, the generalizer can apply various 
generalization techniques to  the original query, such as eliminating restrictions, general- 
izing along type hierarchies (e.g., generalizing beer to alcoholic beverage in a query like 
"Which supermarkets sell beer?"), and relaxing specific numeric values to  ranges. If all 
immediate generalizations succeed, the system can both assure the user that the original 
query was well formed (in line with Motro's first requirement) and offer the generalizations 
and their answers as "partial answers" (in line with the third requirement) in the manner 
of Kaplan7s suggestive indirect response, e.g., "No supermarkets sell beer, but the following 
five sell alcohol", followed by a list. If any generalization fails, that new query is recur- 
sively generalized until a non-failing query is reached. The system meets Motro7s second 
requirement by using the most general failing query to  form a misconception correction. 
2.2.4 Exploiting integrity constraints 
In some database systems, domain-specific constraints are defined and used both to  main- 
tain database consistency across updates and to  improve query optimization. Gal observed 
that these integrity constraints can be exploited t o  answer questions cooperatively and 
informatively [Gal 85, Gal 881. The particular application she studied was a question- 
answering system on a university course-registration database. 
Suppose that the system has a constraint to  the effect that Professor Jones teaches 
only in the Ancient History department. Ordinarily a query like (7)a would have to be 
answered as in (7)b, but that is not very helpful. Instead, Gal suggested that the known 
semantic constraint be used to produce a more cooperative response such as (7)c. 
(7) a. Q: How many Middle East Studies courses does Jones teach? 
b. R: None. 
c. R: None, because Jones only teaches Ancient History courses. 
Unlike the systems of Kaplan, Mays, and Motro discussed earlier, Gal's use of integrity 
constraints is potentially helpful whether the query succeeds or fails, as in example (8). 
(8) Q: How many courses does Jones teach? 
R: He teaches only in Ancient History; this semester, he teaches 4 courses. 
Here the query has succeeded (the system was able to  determine the number of courses 
taught by Jones), but the system was able to incorporate the known semantic constraint 
to produce a more informative response. 
Gal's system is capable of several other forms of cooperative response behavior as well. 
One of these involves pragmatically interpreting yes/no questions as wh-questions when 
the answer is affirmative, as shown in (9). 
(9) Q: Do some history courses have an enrollment of more than 50 students? 
R: Yes, courses 120 and 220. 
This behavior is an aspect of what was previously called over-answering yes/no questions 
in [Wahlster 831. In another form of cooperative behavior (also described previously as 
providing additional case-role fillers in [Wahlster 83]), the focus of wh-questions is enlarged 
to  incorporate other variables, as in (10). 
(10) Q: Which courses does Mudbrick teach? 
R: SC301 in Digital Design, and SC550 in Software Engineering. 
The principle here is that the query implicitly requests the department as well as the course 
number. Lastly, the system is able to replace lists by more general descriptive responses 
(a desirable feature also noted in [Finin 861): 
(11) Q: Which graduate courses are taught by professors? 
R: All graduate courses are taught by professors. 
By exploiting the semantic constraint, the system not only provides a concise reply, but 
also avoids misleading the user: a list of all the graduate courses might imply to the user 
that one or more graduate courses exist that are not taught by professors. 
2.2.5 Monitor offers on dynamic databases 
Mays's doctoral thesis [Mays 84a] investigated cooperative question answering on a dy- 
namic database: a database that both records its history of modification and incorporates 
a model of possible future ~ h a n g e . ~  In particular, Mays noted that question-answering 
systems built on dynamic databases could provide monitor offers: offers to  provide infor- 
mation in the future when it becomes available (see also [Mays 821). Consider Example 
(12): 
(12) Q: Is the U.S.S. Scorpion within 50 miles of Portsmouth? 
R: No, but would you like me to  let you know when it is? 
5See also [Clifford 881, which presents a model of question answering (although without considering 
cooperativeness) for hastorical relational databases, databases that  record their history bu t ,  unlike dynamic 
databases, do not model their possible futures. 
The system answers the question and additionally offers to  monitor the database and notify 
the user when the event of interest occurs. 
Mays observed that only certain kinds of queries could merit monitor offers in response. 
The query in (13), while it has the same structure as the one in (12), illustrates a case in 
which a monitor offer would be inappropriate: 
Mays suggested that monitor offers could be classified as either competent or incompetent, 
and developed a modal temporal logic for axiomatizing database change, thereby making 
it possible to compute whether or not a potential monitor offer was competent. A monitor 
offer was judged incompetent when it could be proved (from the temporal axiomatization 
and the current state of the database) that the expected event would never occur. 
2.2.6 Anticipating follow-up questions 
While not strictly a database application like those we have already seen, the HAM-ANS 
system of Wahlster et al. nevertheless dealt with issues that are equally pertinent to  those 
systems [Wahlster 831. HAM-ANS was a natural-language interface to  a vision system, 
permitting users to ask questions about scenes and visual events processed by the vision 
component. 
The particular cooperative behavior examined here was called over-answering yes/no 
questions by anticipating possible follow-up questions. Two forms of this behavior were 
identified: (1) responding with a more specific quantifier, and (2) providing additional 
case-role fillers. Both of these were later used by Gal, and having discussed them earlier, 
I will leave it to the interested reader to  seek out Wahlster et al.'s original e ~ ~ o s i t i o n . ~  
The same authors did, however, recognize the potentially unconstrained nature of over- 
answering, and proposed an informativeness-simplicity trade-ofl as a bounding principle. 
The trade-off was specified in three  heuristic^:^ 
1. Avoid superfluous complexity, i.e., complexity not justified by any increase in infor- 
mativeness. 
2. Do not allow a certain maximum degree of complexity t o  be exceeded. 
3. Within these limits, maximize the amount of information presented. 
The main difficulty with these heuristics is that there does not seem to be any principled 
methodology for implementing them in a given domain. The second heuristic, for example, 
implies the use of an arbitrary fixed threshold value. There is a question as to  whether the 
choice of this value is domain dependent. Indeed, it is probably more realistic for such a 
value to  be computed dynamically; how that might be done for a given query in a given 
domain, however, is an open question. While these heuristics describe how the response 
behavior of HAM-ANS is constrained, i t  is not at all obvious how they might be used or 
how helpful they might be for other systems. 
6An extensive application of over-answering is also discussed in [Eugenio 871. 
' ~ h e s e  heuristics were characterized as "possible instantiations of the Gricean Maxim of Quantity" 
[Wahlster 83, p. 6451. 
2.2.7 Answering questions about database structure 
In its final form, McKeown's T E X T  system concerned matters of cooperative behavior only 
peripherally; first and foremost it was a contribution to the study of natural-language 
generation [McKeown 851. However, the motivation for TEXT came from the desire to find 
ways to extend the usefulness of natural-language interfaces to d a t a b a ~ e s . ~  
McKeown suggested that, at least in complex database applications, users should not 
be expected to know the database schema. Rather, interface systems should permit users 
to ask questions not only about the database's contents, but also about its structure. The 
TEXT system was able to answer three kinds of questions: 
a requests for the definition of a database concept C; 
a requests for a description of the information available about a concept C; 
a requests for a comparison of two database concepts. 
These query types correspond to queries like, "What's a submarine?", "What do you know 
about submarines?", and "What's the difference between a missile and a bomb?" 
2.2.8 Describing the result set: levels of abstraction 
In all the database systems that have been described so far, the notion of what consti- 
tutes an individual was taken as a given. For example, in a university course-registration 
database such as Gal's, the individuals are the courses and the professors. Database queries 
then request different sets of individuals. 
Corella has demonstrated that the concept of an individual is not always so clear 
[Corella 851. He studied a database system that tracked inventories of TTL semiconductor 
devices. In this database, each TTL device entry consisted of a serial number, a version 
(standard, high power, low power, schottky, or low-power schottky), a grade (military or 
commercial), and an ordering code. Working in this framework, Corella evaluated possible 
responses to the request, "List the flip-flops." 
This request can be answered in various ways, for example, as a list of serial numbers 
(14)) as a list of codes combining serial number and version (15)) or perhaps as a list 
showing serial number, grade and version (16). 
In other words, the notion of an individual is no longer fixed. Rather, it varies according to 
what Corella called the relevant level of abstraction. The idea is that, given a query, there 
is a particular level of abstraction at which the system should make its reply. Corella was 
'McKeown's work began a s  a study of cooperation in database-query applications. Her early studies of 
transcripts collected by Malhotra [Malhotra 751 showed that users frequently requested both definitions of 
terms and comparison of terms. TEXT was originally an attempt to build that capability into a database- 
query system. But a s  often happens in research, the final product made its main contribution in an entirely 
different area, in this case, natural-language generation (Bonnie Webber, personal communication). 
able to provide a formal definition for the level of abstraction of an answer, but he suggested 
that determining from a query the appropriate level of abstraction for the response is a 
very difficult task indeed. This remains an open problem. 
2.2.9 Summary and comments 
As we have seen, research on cooperative question answering in database-query applications 
has focused mainly on the development of techniques to make system responses more 
useful, helpful, and informative, with several efforts aimed at preventing the generation of 
misleading answers. The following principles either were proposed in or can be abstracted 
from the work discussed in this section: 
1. Correct false presumptions (intensional, extensional) to avoid misleading the user. 
2. Offer partial answers when the direct answer is zero or null. 
3. Delimit the scope of query failures. 
4. Anticipate follow-up questions. 
5. Respond at the appropriate level of detail. 
As encouraging as these results might seem, it is not clear how they could be applied 
outside the confines of database query to more general models of discourse. Stenton's 
comment in this regard is apropos [Stenton 86, p. 1031: 
The aim of [research on cooperative question answering] is to improve the com- 
munication capabilities of expert and database systems in order to  facilitate 
the problem solving tasks for which they are used. To achieve this within AI, 
at tempts have been made to exploit the conventions of human dialogue. These 
have not always been principled. That is, it is unusual for the underlying 
principles of co-operative communication to be fully specified in the analysis. 
A common approach seems to comprise: the identification of certain dialogue 
structures as "co-operative"; and the subsequent development of programnzing 
techniques which generate them. 
Indeed, it is often difficult to see how the different efforts relate to one another. Some of 
the contributions seem to depend upon unique assumptions about the underlying database 
(e.g., Mays's dynamic database, Gal's integrity constraints). To what larger purpose, if 
any, do these results then contribute? 
Simply put, because the domain of database querying is so restricted, researchers are 
able to engineer "helpful" and "cooperative" response behavior. This domain does not, 
however, force researchers to probe beneath the surface into the causes and motivations 
of that behavior. It also does not encourage researchers to investigate what limits might 
need to  be placed on their models of cooperative behavior: any needed limits are provided 
implicitly by the application. 
2.3 Category 2: Task-Domain Applications 
One of the most important conceptual entities missing from database-query applications 
is the user's goal. As was pointed out earlier, database-query systems never consider why 
a given query is being asked. But the true nature of cooperation seems fundamentally to  
relate to  how agents help each other achieve goals. Database-query applications equate the 
user's goal with knowing the correct answer to  the question (and perhaps also to not being 
misled). Systems that provide extra "helpful" information (as in Gal's system and HAM- 
ANS) are able to  do so only because their designers have exploited a priori knowledge of 
the typical relationship between queries and users' higher goals. This knowledge, however, 
is never represented or reasoned from explicitly in these systems. 
In task-domain applications, the execution of some underlying task is central to  the 
purpose of the interaction. The most common experimental task-domain application is the 
expert advisor. These systems are typically intended to  provide "expert" advice to people 
engaged in tasks of various sorts, like assembling a complex mechanical device, filling 
out a tax return, or planning a university course schedule. Unlike database-query systems, 
expert-advisor systems must explicitly represent and reason about goals and users' progress 
towards them in order to help users complete their tasks. Task-domain applications that 
demand natural-language interaction are fruitful domains for research into the nature of 
and constraints upon cooperative behavior in general and cooperative response generation 
in particular. 
Various task-domain applications have been described in the literature. They have dif- 
fered from one another in terms of the characteristics of the underlying task (e.g., physical 
tasks versus mental tasks), the discourse roles of the system and user (expert/apprentice, 
advisor/client, etc.), the time at which the task is to be executed (co-temporal with the 
dialogue versus after it), and the relative amounts of knowledge held by system and user. 
We will find that the work reviewed in this section (with the exception of Kidd's research 
discussed in Section 2.3.5) has mostly focused on identifying and modeling new aspects of 
cooperative behavior that are desirable in task-domain applications. 
2.3.1 Correcting ob ject-related misconceptions 
In virtue of the more con~plex domains in which they typically operate, expert-advisor 
applications engage in discourses that are considerably more elaborate than those engaged 
in by database-query applications. As a result, the variety of misconceptions that can 
possibly be detected and corrected during a conversation is correspondingly richer. One 
new type of misconception, called an object-related misconception, has been identified by 
McCoy [McCoy 85, McCoy 881. As she observed, dialogue participants sometimes explic- 
itly or implicitly reveal that they have a misconception about a conceptual object (as 
opposed to a specific instance of an object) in the domain. Two kinds of object-related 
misconceptions were distinguished: misclassifications and misattributions. 
McCoy characterized these misconception types in terms of a taxonomic domain model 
defining the domain concepts, their attributes and subsumption relationships. According 
to  this model, a misclassification misconception exists when a user incorrectly believes that 
some entity E is of type C, when in fact E is actually of type C such that the classes of 
objects C and C' are disjoint. For example, a user might misclassify a whale as a fish 
when the domain model records it as a mammal. A misattribution occurs when a user 
incorrectly ascribes a property to  an object that according to the domain model does not 
have that property. So a user might err by attributing the property "has gills" to  whale^.^ 
McCoy's ROMPER system was conceived of as a module in a larger dialogue system, 
a module called upon to generate a corrective response should some other (unspecified) 
process detect an object-related misconception of either of the two kinds studied. The 
core of the system is a set of correction schemas to  be instantiated in the context of 
the misconception. Besides the schemas themselves, McCoy's principal contribution in 
this area is the development of a technique called object perspective, used to  highlight the 
context-relevant concepts and attributes of the domain model to be used when instantiating 
the appropriate schema. 
McCoy's work was inspired by consideration of some of the novel demands that will be 
placed upon discourse systems operating in task domains. The work focuses, however, on 
only a single manifestation of cooperative response behavior: the correction of a particular 
kind of misconception. No claims are made about when object-related misconceptions 
occur, how they might be detected, when a correction is required, or how a corrective 
response might be integrated with other response goals that a larger dialogue system 
(within which R O M P E R  is supposed to  be but one of many modules) might be trying to  
achieve. 
2.3.2 Correcting plan-related misconceptions 
Quilici et al. describe an explanation-based approach for detecting and responding to mis- 
conceptions about plan applicability conditions, enablements, and eflects [Quilici 881. The 
authors' claim is that "a cooperative response is one that not only corrects the user's mis- 
taken belief, but also addresses the missing or mistaken user beliefs that led to  it" (p. 38). 
Their AQUA system is conceived of as an expert advisor to  help users solve problems they 
have encountered while using the U N I X  operating system. Users describe t o  the system a 
problem they have encountered while trying to  achieve some goal. A typical example is 
shown in (17). 
(17) Q: I tried to  remove a file with the "rm" command. But the file was not 
removed and the error message was permission denied. I checked and I 
own the file. What's wrong? 
R: To remove a file, you need to  be able to write into the directory containing 
it. You do not need to own the file. 
From the description,10 AQUA infers a set of beliefs that account for why the user thought 
the given file-deletion command he used was an appropriate means for achieving the goal. 
The set of inferred beliefs is then used to  identify the underlying abstract cause of the 
problem, permitting the system to produce a corrective response such as the one in (17). 
Their approach is to define a small set of predicates for encoding the plan-related beliefs 
of an advice seeker (shown in Figure 2.2) and then to  combine those predicates to  form 
'This is a case in which the misattribution follows from a deeper misclassification: once the user mis- 
classifies whales as fish, he proceeds to wrongly attribute piscine properties to them. 
''The AQUA system does not actually deal with natural-language input. Instead, the relevant beliefs are 
hand coded. 
causes (A, S) 
!causes(A,S) 
enables (S1 ,A, S2) 
!enables (Sl ,A,S2) 
applies (A, S) 
! applies (A ,S) 
precludes(SI,S2) 
!precludes (Sly S2) 
goal (A, S) 
Executing A has effect S. 
Executing A does not have effect S. 
S1 is necessary for A to  have S2 as an effect. 
S1 is unnecessary for A to  have S2 as an effect. 
A is a correct or normal plan for achieving state S. 
A is not a plan for achieving S. 
S1 and S2 cannot hold simultaneously. 
S1 and S2 can hold simultaneously. 
Actor A wants to  achieve S. 
Figure 2.2: Representation of planning relationships in AQUA 
explanation patterns-schematic configurations of user and system beliefs that represent 
different general categories of plan-related misconceptions. These patterns can be applied 
both to  identify the misconception (by matching the abstract configurations against the 
inferred explanatory beliefs) and to  highlight the (correct) advisor beliefs that should be 
presented to  the user as a corrective, "cooperative" response. 
The product of Quilici et a1.k research is a classification of some general mistakes that 
users might make in forming their plans. But "being cooperative" is equated here solely 
with correcting misconceptions (as their claim implies). The detection by AQUA of a plan- 
related misconception is considered sufficient reason for it t o  instantiate and generate a 
corresponding response pattern. There is no reasoning about how the existence of the 
misconception relates to the questioner's goals or how his goals might be furthered by the 
correction; the system's response to  a detected misconception is "cooperative" only in the 
eyes of an outside observer. 
2.3.3 Intelligent agents as the basis for dialogue systems 
Chin has argued in his dissertation that in order to  take the initiative in dialogue, t o  
be able to  do such things as correct misconceptions and volunteer information instead of 
answering queries passively, a dialogue system must be constructed as an intelligent agent 
with its own goals and plans [Chin 88aI. His UCEGO system was designed to  provide a 
capacity for intelligent agency in UC (the UNIX Consultant), an expert advisor for tasks 
in the u NIX domain [Wilensky 881. 
UCEGO makes three main contributions: (1) it identifies several different ways in which 
cooperative response goals are formed and adopted during response processing, (2) it sug- 
gests some of the ways in which the responding agent's own goals might interact with the 
goals ascribed to the questioner and thereby influence the choice of response, and (3) it 
shows how a multi-variable user model (called KNOME) can be used to  help the system 
identify misconceptions and make text-planning decisions. 
The UCEGO program itself can be thought of as a blackboard systeml1 [Nii 86b]. An 
encoding of the input (in the KODIAK semantic-network formalism [Wilensky 87]), along 
"This analysis of UCEGO as a blackboard system is entirely my own. 
with the inferred plan and goal of the user, is placed in "working memory" (i.e., on the 
blackboard). Various knowledge sources, which Chin terms if-detected daemons, are then 
triggered by patterns of the system's beliefs stored there. All the system's behavior is 
implemented by the operation and interaction of if-detected daemons. 
Chin divided if-detected daemons into five categories: themes, foreground and back- 
ground goals, sub-goab, and meta-goals. Themes are very general goals such as "act like 
a consultant" and "be polite." By default, the "consultant role theme" is in effect when 
UCEGO is invoked, giving rise to  a foreground goal of greeting the user and offering assis- 
tance. While foreground goals are planned for directly, background goals are planned for 
only when demanded by conversation-specific conditions. For example, UCEGO has a gen- 
eral "self-preservation" theme; under certain triggering conditions, this theme causes one 
or more background goals to  reach foreground-goal status. That is, UCEGO never directly 
plans to  achieve self-preservation goals, but instead holds self-preservation as a background 
goal. When its existence is threatened (e.g., the user asks, "how do I crash UCEGO?"), self 
preservation becomes a foreground goal that the system then works to achieve. 
Sub-goals in UCEGO are what one would expect them to  be: goals to be achieved in 
the process of achieving a more general goal. Meta-goals are the means by which UCEGO 
deals with goal conflicts. For example, when the user asks, "how do I crash UCEGO?", a
conflict arises between the system's goal of answering the question (which follows from its 
consultant-role theme) and its goal of self preservation. When such conflicts occur, the 
system adopts meta-goals t o  resolve them. In the self-preservation case, UCEGO decides to 
abandon its goal of answering the user's question and adopt instead a goal of refusing to 
answer. Once the system has selected its goals, a planner is invoked to  achieve them by 
means of natural-language expressions. 
Examples (18)-(21) demonstrate some of UCEGO'S response abilities. 
How can I delete a file? 
Typing "rm filename" will delete the file filename from the current direc- 
tory. 
What does 1s -v do? 
There is no -v option to  1s. 
Does 1s -r recursively list subdirectories? 
No, it reverses the order of the sort of the directory listing; 1s -R recursively 
lists subdirectories. 
How can I delete my supervisor's files? 
You shouldn't be deleting other people's files. 
The approach embodied in UCEGO is a step in the right direction. There can be no 
question that  cooperative dialogue systems will have to  model both their own goals and 
the goals of their users in order to achieve generality. It is important to  understand how 
these goals interact and how that  interaction leads to cooperative behavior. Unfortunately, 
Chin does not develop any principled theoretical basis for defining if-detected daemons. 
Although the daemons appear to be declaratively specified (in the KODIAK representation 
formalism [Wilensky 87]), the only motivation for their design seems t o  be that  they make 
the chosen set of example dialogues work. 
As a particular illustration, UCEGO is claimed t o  have an ability t o  act "ethically." 
This cashes out operationally as follows: suppose the user asks how he might crash the 
computer. The user's goal of crashing the system gets posted on UCEGO'S blackboard. 
UCEGO has an "ethics" theme, encoded in an if-detected daemon, that gives rise to  goals of 
preventing users from damaging the computer system. When the user asks to  be informed 
how to crash the system, UCEGO adopts the goal of preventing him from acquiring that 
information. This ultimately leads the program to issue a refusal to answer the question. 
But is the system really acting ethically, or is it only giving the appearance of ethical 
behavior? I would argue that the latter is the case. The "ethics" daemon is a domain- 
dependent condition-action rule that makes the system act in the desired way but otherwise 
lacks generality and hence cannot be transferred straightforwardly to other domains. The 
point is that UCEGO has no idea why it should prevent users from achieving crash-system 
goals; rather, an if-detected daemon checks for the K o D I A K  equivalent of "user wants to 
crash the system," and, when such a pattern is found, yields the goal "UCEGO prevent 
user from crashing the system." But a general theory of ethical behavior must at  least be 
grounded in an understanding of the possible consequences of various actions. The other 
rules (daemons) in the system suffer from a similar lack of generality. 
The explanation for the weakness is simple: the research focus is on different issues. 
UCEGO is designed to exploit a single computational mechanism: the if-detected daemon. 
All of the system's functionality is implemented by rules encoded as daemons. The research 
investigates not the principles that might be used to identify the daemons that are needed 
to support cooperative interaction, but rather the kinds of interactions that might occur 
between daemons (via their modifications to the blackboard). Thus no particular effort 
was made to motivate or justify the actual daemons used, beyond the fact that they made 
the system behave as desired. 
2.3.4 Knowledge-intensive planning 
Luria, also working within the U N I X  Consultant framework, has described the design of a 
commonsense planner and outlined its role in cooperative question answering [Luria 881. 
According to Luria, commonsense planners differ from other kinds of planners in that 
they are knowledge intensive, having access to a great deal of domain-specific information. 
The main problem in knowledge-intensive planning is determining the information that is 
relevant to the problem-solving task at hand. His program, called KIP, has three tasks 
within UC: 
1. to select the set of user goals for which a plan is to be developed; 
2. to synthesize a plan that the user can carry out to achieve those goals; and 
3. to check the resulting plan for potential execution failures. 
KIP'S initial goal or goals are derived from the user's utterance. It is assumed that these 
goals are achievable, and that the user simply lacks a plan for them. Goals for KIP are 
relatively simple sorts of things that one might want to do in a computing environment, like 
spool a file to a printer, edit a file, or delete a file. Plans are sequences of operating-system 
commands. 
The research focuses on how the planner builds plans and, in particular, on how during 
its operation the planner can identify sources of potential execution failure and cause 
them to be brought to the user's attention. KIP is able to distinguish between actual and 
potential sources of failure. As an example of the former, the planner might notice while 
constructing a plan for printing a file on a given printer that the printer is out of paper 
(the planner must have access to knowledge about the dynamic state of the printer in order 
to  detect this). Here, KIP would not only present the plan but also would advise the user 
to first refill the printer's paper tray. As an example of the latter, the mv command, used 
to rename (move) files, is known to have a possibly undesirable side effect: if one moves a 
file filel to  a file filed, and file2 exists at the time of the move, it will be lost and replaced 
by filel. KIP  is aware of this, and so when presenting mv plans to  the user, it is able to 
provide appropriate warnings. 
KIP  operates by instantiating and manipulating data structures called concerns. Con- 
cerns encode the system designer's domain-specific knowledge about likely sources of plan 
failure. During both plan synthesis and checking, KIP  searches its library of concerns for 
any that are relevant to the current plan. When found, a concern may cause KIP  to adopt 
an additional goal for which to  construct a plan. Example (22) exhibits a typical response 
that KIP  is able to  produce. 
(22) Q: How do I print Jim's file on the lineprinter? 
R: Print Jim's file foo by typing lpr foo. This plan will not work if you don't 
have read permission on Jim's file or if the printer is out of paper. 
The issue relevant to  the purposes of this chapter is the nature of KIP'S contribution to 
our comprehension of cooperative interaction. That,  I think, can be summarized as follows: 
in task-oriented domains, respondents are often called upon to synthesize and present plans 
of action to the questioner (most often when responding to  "how" questions). During this 
process, they might notice ways in which the plan they intend to propose either might 
fail (if certain conditions hold) or will fail (unless certain conditions are eliminated). The 
(implicit) claim is that under such circumstances, the respondent is obliged to  bring the 
relevant conditions to the user's at tention. 
2.3.5 Deriving principles experimentally 
Kidd is noteworthy in this area for her effort (the only one of which I am aware) to  verify 
experimentally that people do indeed consistently generate different classes of coopera- 
tive response in different situations [Kidd 901. Her experiments were conducted in the 
computer-configuration domain; ten test subjects played the role of expert in configuring a 
particular model of computer. In order for them to be actual experts (or at least to  make a 
good show of i t) ,  they were provided with all necessary guidebooks and reference materials 
for configuring a particular computer and given some time to familiarize themselves with 
the task. 
The test subjects were then run through a series of configuration problems. They were 
presented with various initial configurations and in those contexts were asked questions 
taken from three question categories (shown in Figure 2.3). The subjects were told that 
these questions came from salespeople, but in fact they were designed by Kidd. The 
experiments yielded interesting patterns of cooperative response behavior. For example, 
consider the Category 1 question shown in (23). Test subjects were asked this question in 
a context where the proposed action was not possible. Kidd found that the simple negative 
1. Verify that some action is possible (e.g., "can I do X?") 
2. Given some proposed action, verify whether some other action is necessary (e.g., "if 
I do X, do I have to do Y?") 
3. Elicit the number of times a proposed action is possible or necessary (e.g., "how 
many X?") 
Figure 2.3: Question Categories in Kidd's Experiment 
answer was often (73% of the time) augmented to  include information about the condition 
preventing the action, as it was in this case: 
(23) Q: Can I add 80Mb of memory? 
R: No, you are already at the limit of added memory. 
The experiment generally showed a strong correlation between the initial state of the 
planning space and the ways people chose to  modify or augment their responses. Her 
results, Kidd argued, suggest that it should be possible to formulate a predictive theory of 
cooperative response for this task domain. She also claimed her results show that for such 
well-defined reasoning tasks as computer configuration, systems can generate cooperative 
responses without having to  dynamically recognize the user's goal or maintain an extensive 
dialogue history. 
Once more it should be clear that we are dealing here only with manifestations of 
cooperative behavior. When Kidd speaks of a "predictive theory", she means a set of 
condition-action rules that can be used to  engineer "cooperative responses". These rules 
are to be derived from experimental observations. But the question is: will these rules 
tell us anything about cooperative response behavior, or will they merely help us build 
systems that appear t o  be cooperative? If the latter, it becomes a matter of concern as to 
how well the rules will carry over to other domains. 
It is significant that the computer-configuration problem considered by Kidd is about 
as well structured as any task-domain problem could be. The plan library (of configuration 
rules) is both complete and finite, and there is only one goal: to  reach a valid configu- 
ration. Both advisor and user share complete knowledge a t  all times of the state of the 
configuration: there is no possibility for a belief discrepancy or misconception. The user's 
knowledge of the configuration rules is assumed to be a proper subset of the advisor's, 
and it is the missing knowledge that motivates the dialogue. Questions in Category 1 
are asked because the user does not know whether all the preconditions of the proposed 
action are satisfied; questions in Category 2 concern the effects and ramifications of par- 
ticular actions; questions in Category 3 inquire into general domain-imposed limits. Given 
these restrictions, i t  should not be too surprising that specific cooperative principles can 
be stated. In the general case, however, the user is likely to  have other goals that impose 
constraints on the configuration process. For example, the user might want to  minimize 
cost, maximize processing capacity, or evaluate different trade-offs. Once we allow some 
of the natural complexities to enter the picture, it seems less likely that response rules will 
be simple functions of the question and the initial configuration, or that the resulting rules 
can be transferred straightforwardly to other domains. Nevertheless, the work is promising 
and it would be helpful to see more studies like it. 
2.3.6 Summary and comments 
We have evaluated several research projects conducted in task domains. The first two 
systems reviewed-ROMPER and AQUA-considered how some new kinds of misconceptions 
that arise in these domains might be detected and corrected. UCEGO explored the proposal 
that cooperative response systems be designed as goal-driven agents. KIP showed how 
various forms of domain-specific knowledge about plans and actions could be encoded 
and used to increase the informativeness of answers to  "how" questions. Finally, Kidd 
analyzed a particular task domain experimentally and identified regularities in the kinds 
of cooperative responses given to  various question types under different conditions. 
It should be evident from the discussion that all these efforts have modeled cooperative 
response behavior from the questioner's point of view. This is to say that they have iden- 
tified particular forms or ranges of forms of response behavior desirable to  the questioner, 
then designed the computations needed to generate them. The goal was to  reproduce the 
behavior, not to specify the reasoning that might have motivated it. As a result, it was 
never important or necessary to state the principles from which the behavior followed; it 
was sufficient to characterize the "cooperativeness7' of the responses in terms of how they 
might affect or be perceived by the questioner. (I will elaborate on this point in Chapter 
3.) 
The next section focuses on projects that have attempted to probe more directly the 
nature of cooperative interaction, either by studying the properties of general reasoning 
mechanisms and formalisms or by developing theories that account for sonie range of 
examples of cooperative behavior. 
2.4 Category 3: Theoretical Approaches 
All research efforts reviewed in this section, while many are framed in terms of examples 
drawn from particular task domains, are more correctly regarded as attempts to  develop 
domain-independent models of different aspects of cooperative communication. I begin 
with a discussion of several projects that have developed plan-based theories of cooperative 
interaction. A few less easily categorized projects are discussed in the remainder of the 
section. 
2.4.1 Models based on planning and plan recognition 
It has long been an accepted hypothesis that cooperative interaction between agents is 
intimately connected to their ability to  recognize and accommodate each other's goals and 
plans. Some of the first steps toward formalizing this principle in a manner sufficient for 
use in a computational setting were taken by Allen and Perrault [Allen 78, Allen 801, Co- 
hen [Cohen 781, Cohen and Perrault [Cohen 791, Sidner and Israel [Sidner 811, and Sidner 
[Sidner 831. The first two of these, Allen and Perrault, developed a theory in which speech 
acts [Searle 711 were used as the formal basis for inference of the speaker's intentions. 
(This work later developed into Allen's dissertation, to  be discussed shortly.) Cohen and 
Perrault [Cohen 791 outlined a formalization of speech acts in a planning framework (to 
be discussed next). Sidner and Israel introduced the notion of the intended meaning of 
an utterance in a discourse, and considered how recognition of that meaning might influ- 
ence the response. I begin with a discussion of Cohen and Perrault's plan-based model of 
speech acts, then review several efforts that have fleshed out the role of plan recognition 
in cooperative question answering. 
A plan-based model of speech acts 
Austin claimed that speakers use their utterances t o  perform actions, such as requesting, 
promising, and asserting [Austin 621. Searle elaborated Austin's theory and attempted to 
specify sets of necessary and sufficient conditions on the felicitous performance of several 
general categories of speech acts, including directives (e.g., request, command), commis- 
sives (promise, threaten), declarutives (utterances like " I  now pronounce you man and 
wife" that have the effect of changing the state of the world), representatives (inform, 
deny), and expressives (thank, apologize) [Searle 691. Cohen and Perrault further for- 
malized these ideas by developing the first competence theory of speech acts-a theory 
modeling the possible intentions that underlie speech acts [Cohen 791. 
In general, human problem-solvers can be viewed as agents who form and execute plans. 
These plans specify action sequences that transform an initial world state to a desired goal 
state. The approach that Cohen and Perrault have taken is to model speech acts as actions 
in a planning system. One advantage of this approach is that it enables the planning of 
both linguistic and nonlinguistic acts to be treated uniformly. 
Formal models of planning usually represent actions as operators that are defined in 
terms of three elements: 
Preconditions The preconditions of an action are those states of the world that must be 
true for that action to be executable. 
Effects The effects of an action are those states of the world that are made true as a 
result of the successful execution of the action. 
Body The body of an action describes, a t  an increased level of detail, the method by which 
the action's effects are achieved. Actions that an agent can execute directly, without 
further decomposition into substeps, are said to be atomic. 
Cohen and Perrault hypothesize that people maintain symbolic descriptions of the world 
and that those models contain descriptions of the world models of other people. They view 
speech act operators as primarily affecting the models that speakers and hearers maintain 
of each other. They limit their formalization of a plan-based theory of speech acts to 
REQUEST acts, INFORM acts, and questions. They claim that these acts (a) appear to 
be definable solely in terms of speakers' and hearers' beliefs and goals, (b) have a wide 
range of syntactic realizations, and (c) are thought to comprise a significant proportion of 
ordinary discourse. My review will focus only on their formalization of REQUEST and 
INFORM acts, for in that work can be found all the theoretical elements that are relevant 
t o  the present concerns. 
The authors distinguish between competence and process theories of speech act plan- 
ning. Competence theories, in their view, attempt to characterize the structure of well- 
formed plans that might underlie speech acts, whereas process theories focus on the steps 
speakers might follow when choosing their speech acts and the mechanisms that hearers use 
to  recognize those acts. Cohen and Perrault claim to have developed an initial competence 
theory of speech act planning. 
The models that agents maintain of each others' beliefs are represented (following 
[Hintikka 691) using the modal operator BELIEVE, where "A BELIEVE(P)" means that 
agent A believes the proposition P. Goals are represented using the WANT predicate: "A 
BELIEVE B WANT P" represents agent A's belief that agent B has goal p.12 
Operator schemata in the proposed planning theory record the operator's effects and 
distinguish two kinds of preconditions: "cando" and "want" preconditions. CANDO.PRs 
schematize propositions that, when instantiated with the values bound to the parameters 
of the operator instance, yield conditions that must be satisfied in the world model for that 
operator instance to be executable. WANT.PRs are used to characterize the intentional 
nature of actions; they formalize the conditions that define the planning agent's intention 
to  perform the action. Note that both CANDO.PRs and WANT.PRs can be recursively 
planned, i.e., a planning agent can extend her plan with actions whose effects correspond 
to  the CANDO.PRs and WANT.PRs of other actions. 
In elaborating Austin's theory, Searle defined different sets of necessary and sufficient 
conditions on the successful performance of speech acts. These conditions fall into the 
following categories: 
Normal 1 / 0  Conditions These conditions aim to ensure that the communication situ- 
ation is "normal," e.g., the speaker can speak and the hearer can hear, the speaker 
and hearer are not actors in a play, and so forth. 
Propositional Content Conditions Only certain kinds of propositions are appropri- 
ate for each type of speech act. For example, the propositions communicated by 
comrnissive acts must predicate some obligation of the speaker. 
Preparatory Conditions Preparatory conditions define the world states that must hold 
for the speech act to  be felicitously performed. 
Sincerity Conditions Sincerity conditions distinguish sincere performances of speech 
acts from insincere performances. 
Essential Condition The essential condition specifies what the speaker is trying to  ac- 
complish by performing the speech act. 
Force Condition The force condition (Cohen and Perrault's term) is used ensure that 
speech acts are uttered only if the speaker intends to communicate that he is per- 
forming that act. 
In Cohen and Perrault's formalization, propositional content conditions are implicit in the 
schematization of speech act operators. Preparatory conditions are mapped to the precon- 
ditions and essential conditions to the effects of speech act operators. Normal input/output 
''The authors note that the formal semantics of WANT are problematic. 
conditions are assumed, and the force condition is ignored, since that depends on a better 
understanding of the process of speech act recognition. 
REQUEST(S ,H,ACT) 
CANDO.PR: S BELIEVE H CANDO ACT 
AND 
S BELIEVE H BELIEVE H CANDO ACT 
WANT.PR: S BELIEVE S WANT request-instance 
EFFECT: H BELIEVE S BELIEVE S WANT ACT 
INFORM(S,H,PROP) 
CANDO.PR: S BELIEVE PROP 
WANT.PR: S BELIEVE S WANT inform-instance 
EFFECT: H BELIEVE S BELIEVE PROP 
Figure 2.4: Initial definitions of REQUEST and INFORM acts 
The authors7 initial definitions of the speech acts operators for REQUEST and IN- 
FORM are shown in Figure 2.4. The parameter S denotes the speaker, H the hearer. Note 
that as defined the effects of the two speech act operators are not the ones for which such 
acts would typically be selected. A speaker makes a request not only to cause a hearer to 
believe that the speaker wants some act to be performed, but also to cause the hearer to 
decide to perform that act. Similarly, inform acts are performed to cause hearers to believe 
the asserted propositions. To mediate between the speech act definitions in 2.4 and such 
desired effects-called perlocutionary effects-Cohen and Perrault define the intermediate 
step CAUSE-TO-WANT for REQUESTS and CONVINCE for INFORMS. These two steps 
are shown in Figure 2.5. 
CAUSE-TO-WANT(A,B,ACT) 
CANDO.PR: B BELIEVE A BELIEVE A WANT ACT 
EFFECT: B BELIEVE B WANT ACT 
CANDO .PR: B BELIEVE A BELIEVE PROP 
EFFECT: B BELIEVE PROP 
Figure 2.5: Mediating between REQUEST/INFORM and perlocutionary effects 
The definitions shown in Figures 2.4 and 2.5 are the authors7 first formalization of 
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Searle's theory of speech acts. They proceed to evaluate these definitions with respect 
to  various adequacy criteria and discover that some revisions are necessary. First, they 
compare the planning of a REQUEST to the planning of an INFORM of a WANT, pointing 
out that "please do x" and "I want to you do x" can have the same force as directives. 
They find that in the latter case, their formulation allows the speaker to overlook her 
beliefs about the hearer's beliefs about his ability to perform the act. This motivates a 
redefinition of both REQUEST and its mediating CAUSE-TO-WANT step. 
Second, they explore the consequences of composing REQUESTS to  form third-party 
requests such as "Ask Tom to tell me where the key is". They discover that when such 
an utterance is issued to an intermediary, say John, their formalism places unnecessary 
requirements on John's beliefs. In particular, their formalism demands that John believe 
that Tom (the target agent) knows the location of the key. This condition should not be 
required since John is performing the REQUEST act on the speaker's behest; all John 
need believe is that the speaker believes that Tom knows where the key is. 
This problem is overcome by a combination of two tactics. First, Cohen and Perrault 
rightly note that the performance of speech acts causes hearers to acquire certain beliefs 
about the speaker's beliefs. That is, the performance of a speech act may have side eflects. 
For example, one side effect of a REQUEST act is that the hearer H comes to believe that 
the speaker believes that H CANDO the specified act. 
As their second tactic, the authors adopt a neutral "point of view" for defining the 
CANDO.PRs and EFFECTS of speech act operators. They call this the point-of-view 
principle: 
The "Cando" preconditions and effects of speech acts should be defined in a 
way that does not depend on who the speaker of that speech act is. That is, 
no CANDO.PR or EFFECT should be stated as a proposition beginning with 
"SPEAKER BELIEVE." (p. 206) 
The revised definitions of REQUEST, CAUSE-TO-WANT, and INFORM are shown in 
Figure 2.6. 
Summary Cohen and Perrault were the first to formally model the goals that hearers 
(as respondents) adopt in reaction to speakers' utterances. By formalizing speech acts in 
a planning framework, they provide a tidy and illuminating model of the beliefs and goals 
that speakers must have for them to felicitously choose to perform request and inform acts 
or to issue certain wh questions. It should be clear, however, that the issues they address 
are largely orthogonal to those which are of concern to developers of cooperative natural- 
language dialogue systems. It is true, for example, that their formulation of REQUEST 
precludes speakers from requesting a hearer to perform an act that the speaker believes 
the hearer cannot do (or that the speaker believes the hearer believes he cannot do). But 
this is a theory of utterances' felicity rather than their cooperativeness. 
Central to any theory of cooperative interaction is the question of how a speaker arrives 
at  her intentions to perform the kinds of speech acts that Cohen and Perrault model. In 
their plan-based formalization, REQUEST and INFORM acts have certain WANT.PRs. 
Theories of cooperative response behavior need to elucidate the principles from which 
cooperative conversational partners come to have the goals that WANT.PRs express, that 
is, the theories must explain why and how speakers decide to WANT to perform REQUEST 
REQUEST(S,H,ACT) 
CANDO.PR: H CANDO ACT 
WANT.PR: S BELIEVE S WANT request-instance 
EFFECT: H BELIEVE S BELIEVE S WANT ACT 
CAUSE-TO-WANT(A,B,ACT) 
CANDO.PR: B BELIEVE A BELIEVE A WANT ACT 
AND 
B BELIEVE B CANDO ACT 
EFFECT: B BELIEVE B WANT ACT 
CANDO.PR: PROP 
WANT.PR: S BELIEVE S WANT inform-instance 
EFFECT: H BELIEVE S BELIEVE PROP 
Figure 2.6: Revised definitions of REQUEST, CAUSE-TO-WANT, and INFORM 
and INFORM acts. Cohen and Perrault's work should therefore be understood as taking 
over where theories of cooperative reasoning leave off, as defining the linkage between 
intentions to communicate and speech act utterances. 
Plan-based reasoning for obstacle detection 
Allen's model [Allen 831 has been as influential on the development of plan-based theories 
of cooperative behavior as Grice's maxims have been on theories of cooperative interaction 
in general. Allen proposed a theory of plan recognition intended t o  explain (1) how people 
choose to provide more information in a response than the questioner explicitly requested, 
(2) how people interpret sentence fragments, and (3) how people understand indirect speech 
acts [Searle 751. It is how the model relates to  the first item that is of interest here. 
Allen defined an obstacle as a situation preventing an actor from achieving a goal, 
and claimed that "many instances of helpful behavior arise because the observing agent 
recognizes an obstacle in the other agent's plan, and acts to remove the obstacle" [Allen 83, 
p. 1081. One class of obstacles was considered: those related to an agent's lack of knowledge. 
For example, not knowing the telephone number constitutes an obstacle to calling someone 
by telephone. Two kinds of knowledge obstacles were identified: explicit and implicit. 
Explicit obstacles are indicated by the user's question, since it identifies knowledge that 
the user lacks and that he needs in order to  successfully execute his plan. Implicit obstacles 
are detectable only by inspecting the agent's underlying plan of action; e.g., from a request 
for a train's time of departure, a respondent might recognize that the questioner is planning 
to board the train and from that deduce that he needs to know both the train's departure 
time and its departure gate. 
The core of Allen's recognition system was a set of domain-independent plan inference 
and plan construction rules. A heuristically-guided algorithm searched for an inference 
chain connecting the user's utterance to one of a set of domain-specific expected goals. The 
prototype system played the role of an information-booth attendant in a train station, a 
domain which admitted two possible expected goals: boarding a train and meeting a train. 
At first glance it would appear that Allen concentrated on three very specific forms of 
language behavior, but in fact the work should be regarded as a general theory on account 
of its domain-independent formulation of plan recognition as an information provider for 
cooperative response generation. The main limitation of this theory is one shared by all 
that have come after: the basic task performed by plan recognition systems is searching, 
and no one has found principles for controlling the search in anything but small domains 
with representations of limited expressive power.13 This remains a challenging open prob- 
lem. 
The general cooperative principle proposed here, namely, that cooperative agents detect 
and act to eliminate obstacles detected in other agents' plans, has substantial intuitive 
appeal. It accounts for many examples of both linguistic and non-linguistic cooperation.14 
It is worth noting, however, that it assumes that the "other agent" has a valid plan (see the 
discussion of Pollack's work in the following section). If the other agent's plan is not useful 
(for instance, i t  will not achieve the desired goal), it surely makes no sense to attempt to 
remove obstacles from it, if indeed the concept of an "obstacle" is well defined in such a 
situation. 
It is also worth noting that the principle offers little guidance as to how much effort a 
respondent is required to expend in her search for obstacles. Plans are, a t  least in principle, 
infinitely decomposable. How thoroughly should an inferring agent check an actor's plan 
for obstacles? This question will most likely be answered when legitimate search control 
techniques are found. I conjecture that the answer will at least partly depend upon an 
understanding of the extent to  which the respondent is responsible for acting on behalf 
of the questioner. For example, a train information clerk need not consider a passenger's 
(potential) lack of a ticket to be an obstacle, as both participants understand that she is 
not responsible for providing one.15 
Recognizing ill-formed plans: plans as mental phenomena 
In her dissertation, Pollack criticized earlier models of plan recognition (such as Allen's) 
that made what she dubbed the valid-plan assumption-the assumption that the actor's 
plan is valid [Pollack 861. She argued that this assumption must be abandoned if natural- 
language systems are to achieve human-level competence in cooperative dialogue. Consider 
the paradigm example shown in (24)-(25). 
131ndeed, the standard "search control technique" is not really a technique at all: one merely defines a 
limited knowledge base and allows the inference mechanism to search it exhaustively. 
14Here is a typical example of non-linguistic cooperation: one agent, observing another agent approach 
a door with her arms full, opens the door for her to pass through. 
15She may, however, need to treat as an obstacle the passenger's lack of knowledge about how or where 
to obtain a ticket. 
(24)a. Q: I want to prevent Ira from reading my personal mail files. 
b. How do I change the access codes to private? 
(25)a. R: Give the command 'chmod go-rwx file.' 
b. Unfortunately, you cannot stop Ira from reading your files. Because he's the 
system manager, he can override file permissions. 
In (24)a, the questioner establishes his immediate domain goal: denying Ira access to  Q's 
mail files. The query in (24)b is well formed since plans exist in the domain for changing 
file-access codes to private; R could, for example, synthesize a plan for that goal and 
supply it to  Q, saying something like (25)a. But the query must be interpreted in light of 
the stated goal rather than in isolation.16 Plan recognition here serves to relate the two 
utterances via an underlying plan in which Q intends to achieve the deny-access goal by 
achieving the change-permission goal. 
The significant point here is that the plan underlying the question is ill formed. Were R 
unable to recognize this situation (because she reasoned using a plan recognition formalism 
that made the valid-plan assumption), she would be able to  answer the question only as 
in (25)a, without giving the more informative response in (25)b. 
Pollack's solution starts from the view that plans are mental phenomena, configurations 
of beliefs and intentions that an inferring agent ascribes to an actor. By viewing plans this 
way, plan recognition models can treat ill-formed plans as plans in which discrepancies exist 
between the beliefs of the inferring agent and those that she ascribes to the actor. In other 
words, plan inference becomes a process of belief ascription (an idea that [Konolige 891 
explores further).17 
Pollack's particular approach was to formalize the theory of action generation proposed 
by Goldman [Goldman 701. Informally, an action ct is said to  generate another action ,f3 
if by performing ct an agent performs ,f3 as well. For example, the act of flipping a light 
switch can, under the right conditions, generate the act of turning on a light. 
Pollack focused on simple plans-plans in which all actions are related by generation- 
and defined what it means for a simple plan to be ill formed as opposed to well formed, 
what it means for an action in her framework to be unexecutable, and what it means for 
a query to  be incoherent. Given a stated domain goal (as in (24)a) and a request to  be 
informed how to do a particular act (as in (24)b), Pollack's SPIRIT  system infers the simple 
plan that relates them, then identifies any discrepancies that exist between the beliefs of 
the system and those ascribed in the simple plan to the user.'' The system presents all 
relevant information in its response: (1) if the queried act is doable, the user is informed 
how to do it, otherwise the fact of its unexecutability is asserted; (2) each invalidity found 
in the plan is noted; (3)  if the plan was ill formed but SPIRIT  knows of another way to 
achieve the goal, it presents that information. 
161t is usually argued that  this claim follows from general principles of rationality. T h a t  is, believing the 
questioner to be a "rational agent", we expect his utterances t o  cohere. We therefore prefer interpretations 
tha t  find a relationship between utterance pairs such as  (24)a-b over interpretations tha t  treat them as 
unrelated. 
171n general, this approach raises difficult theoretical problems, most having t o  d o  with how the  inferring 
agent comes by her knowledge of the actor's beliek, and, in particular, how the inferring agent makes 
well-motivated decisions about whether a belief discrepancy exists. 
laSome of these discrepancies were detected with the assistance of a user model. See [Rich 791 and 
[Kass 881 for some thorough treatments of user modeling issues. 
SPIRIT and its corresponding theory were motivated by the general idea that a respon- 
dent's awareness of the invalidities in a questioner's plan influences her choice of cooperative 
response. The work contributes to  our understanding of how cooperative respondents come 
to  notice those invalidities, i.e., how they acquire the knowledge they need to meet their 
cooperative responsibilities. Pollack makes this explicit [Pollack 86, p. 76-77]: 
I take the intuitively perceived regularities in, and differences between, re- 
sponses found in naturally occurring discourse to be evidence for structural 
regularities in, and differences between, the plans that are inferred to underlie 
queries. In other words, I am willing to make assertions of the following form: 
if a response to  some query exhibits a certain feature (say F), one can account 
for that response by claiming that the plan inferred to  underlie the query is 
invalid in some particular way (say, it has an invalidity of type I). However, 
I will not make converse assertions: I do not claim that whenever the plan 
inferred to underlie a query is invalid in some particular way (I), a cooperative 
response to it must exhibit a particular feature (F) .  
Thus Pollack's efforts add to our understanding of the reasoning mechanisms that support 
cooperative behavior, but they tell us very little about the principles that drive that 
behavior.lg 
Adapting plan-recognition theories t o  discourse 
Carberry, noting that models of plan recognition such as Allen's and Pollack's are limited to 
isolated utterances, has been adapting these theories to extended discourse [Carberry 83, 
Carberry 88, Carberry 901. She has concentrated on task-oriented domains in which users 
ask questions that are related to  plans to  be executed after the discourse concludes (she calls 
these information-seeking dialogues). Her examples are largely in the domain of course- 
advising for university students. For example, an undergraduate might ask questions about 
particular courses, their prerequisites, instructors, and so on, in order to  find out how to 
obtain a bachelor's degree. 
The central insight of this work is that plan recognition during a discourse must be 
performed incrementally. No longer can it be assumed that a complete plan is inferred 
from a single utterance. Instead, each utterance provides clues only to  a portion of that 
plan. The problem, then, is discovering how to integrate the information derived from 
successive utterances into an evolving model of the user's goals and plans (which Carberry 
terms the context model). 
Carberry's inference system builds context models using a two-step approach. First, 
after each input utterance, Allen-style inference rules [Allen 831 are applied to  hypothesize 
a set of candidate focused goals (cfg's) and corresponding candidate focused plans (cfp's), 
the domain-dependent goals and plans that each utterance indicates the user's attention 
may be focused on. Focusing heuristics are then used to  decide where in the context model 
to attach a given cfp. The derivation of multiple cfp's from a single utterance signals that 
several underlying plans could account for the utterance. In this situation, the context 
''For a completely different take on the problem of recognizing ill-formed plans, one based on probabilistic 
reasoning, see [Calistri 901. 
model is copied for each cfp, and the attachment procedure is run separately for each pair 
of context model and cfp.20 
Because the user's plan is to  be executed at  some later time, his line of questioning 
is not tightly bound to  some underlying task-execution order (as in the kind of expert- 
apprentice dialogues studied by Grosz and Sidner [Grosz 77, Grosz 81, Grosz 861). Instead, 
the user can shift his attention among various substeps in a larger plan. Happily, there do 
appear to be constraints on possible shifts, and that is where the focusing heuristics come 
into play. They reflect these constraints and provide guidelines that help the system to 
relate each new utterance to  the context established by previous utterances. 
There is, however, an interesting flaw in Carberry's model. Recall the purpose that peo- 
ple have in engaging in the kind of dialogue at  issue here. As Carberry says [Carberry 88, 
p. 21: 
We are interested in a class of information-seeking dialogues in which the 
information-seeker is attempting to construct a plan [emphasis mine] for a task 
that will be executed after the dialogue terminates. 
A user who is attempting to construct a plan for a given goal (such as obtaining a degree 
a t  a university) by definition does not have that plan fully formed in his mind. Thus his 
questions may be more likely to  suggest parts of plans under considemtion than parts of a 
plan the user might actually be intending to execute. For example, an inquiry into when 
a particular course meets might be less of an indication of an intention to take that course 
than an indication that the meeting time of the course will affect whether the user will 
decide to  take that course (for example, the user might sensibly prefer afternoon courses to  
morning courses). In order to cope with such discourses, a plan recognition model would 
seem to have to  distinguish the language used to talk about the user's task plan from 
that task plan itself. In other words, it would need a language in which plans and their 
components were first-class objects.21 
But Carberry's system has no such meta-language. Lacking the means to  reason about 
different elaborations of the underlying plan, the model ends up assuming-being forced 
to assume-that the user enters the discourse with a plan that is complete (at least struc- 
turally) rather than under construction. Consequently, the model in fact only allows queries 
about parameter bindings at  nodes in this plan. This problem is reflected in the focus- 
ing heuristics: consider the example in (26)a-c (assume that (26)a-b constitute a single 
"turn", and that (26)c is the questioner's subsequent question): 
(26)a. I want to  major in computer science. 
b. When does CS120 meet? 
c. How about CS180? 
After (26)b, the system will infer that the user intends to  take CS120 as part of a plan 
to  satisfy a major in computer science. The focusing heuristics (specifically, Carberry's 
20Carberry's model has little to say about how this ambiguity might be resolved in general. In her 
system, ambiguous context models are only eliminated when a subsequent utterance causes the system 
to detect an inconsistency. She states that in designing her system this way she has made the valid-plan 
assumption (see Section 2.4.1, page 36), though she later discusses how this assumption might be relaxed 
in her framework. More recently, Eller has proposed a meta-rule approach to error recovery [Eller 901. 
"Litman has taken steps toward the development of such a language [Litman 84b], but with an entirely 
different motivation. 
I-Ieuristic 2 [Carberry 88, pp. 7-81) will cause the succeeding utterance (26)c to  be attached 
in the context model as a sibling of the "take CS120" goal. There is no way in the model 
to treat "taking CS1207' and "taking CS18O7' as alternatives under considemtion. What if 
both courses met at the same time? In principle, the plan inferred by the system would 
be inconsistent. The detection of such an inconsistent plan could very well induce the 
system to make an inappropriate reply along the lines of "You can't take both CS120 and 
CS180." None of Carberry's later proposals for how the system might recover from errors 
introduced into the model avoid this problem: it is an inherent property of the system. 
Of course, adding a meta-language would complicate the theory. It is not obvious how 
the system might be able to  distinguish intended plans from plans under c~ns ide ra t i on .~~  It 
is also not clear how important such a distinction would be. The only way I see to  determine 
that would be to apply Carberry's theory to  some naturally occurring discourses and check 
at each turn whether the contents of the system's context model squared reasonably well 
with the observed response. 
It also seems interesting that the model does not account for the role of the system in 
the discourse. It would seem that, at the very least, the answers the system supplies to 
the user's queries should influence its expectations (encoded in the focusing heuristics) of 
future utterances. In this regard, Litman7s discourse model may be helpful [Litman 84bl. 
Finally, we turn again to considering the contribution this work makes to  the theory 
of cooperative behavior. Clearly, for advisory systems in task domains, the ability to 
generate helpful, "cooperative" responses is essential. Carberry has cogently made the 
point that such systems realistically must be thought of as engaging in discourse rather 
than as answering isolated questions. From this view it follows that plan recognition, widely 
believed essential to both discourse understanding and cooperative response generation, 
must be adapted to the discourse model of interaction. But it is plain from its omission 
of the system as a discourse participant that Carberry's model, like all the other work on 
plan recognition, makes no commitments as to where plan recognition fits in the larger 
model of system-as-respondent, as to  how the derived knowledge influences the choice of a 
cooperative response, or as to what "being cooperative" is really all about. 
Coping with ambiguity 
An interesting contribution to  theories of both plan recognition and cooperative response 
generation has recently been made by van Beek and Cohen [vanBeek 901. The authors 
claim that a questioner's utterances may not always be consistent with only a single plan. 
For example, they argue that a questioner who asks, "Can I drop Numerical Analysis?", 
may be trying to avoid failing, trying to eliminate a scheduling conflict, or trying to  switch 
to  a more interesting course. Other models of plan recognition have tended instead to 
return only single plans, a condition often enforced by heuristic means (e.g., Allen's system 
[Allen 83]), by using measures of likelihood (e.g., Calistri's probability-based PATH F I N D E R  
system [Calistri 901)' or even by implicit design (e.g., Pollack's SPIRIT system ends its 
search when the first complete plan is found [Pollack 861). 
Van Beek and Cohen argue that it may be possible to  generate cooperative responses 
"The theory of meta-plans developed by Ramshaw [Ramshaw 891, which he applied to  the task of 
interpreting ill-formed utterances, may be helpful in this regard. His more recent work on modeling plan 
ezpzploration [Ramshaw 911 looks especially promising. 
without necessarily having to  determine the exact plan the questioner intends t o  execute. 
To this end, they provide a procedure to  decide whether resolution of the ambiguity matters 
t o  the response. 
Their model presumes a plan-recognition system based on the theory developed by 
Kautz [Kautz 871. Given a query, the system infers a set of possible underlying plans. Next, 
the plans in this set are critiqued, that is, examined for faults and annotated accordingly if 
any are found. The decision procedure is then applied to  determine whether the ambiguity 
must be resolved before the system may try to  compute a response. Should the ambiguity 
need to  be resolved, the authors propose that a clarification subdialogue be entered (and 
they provide an algorithm for the clarification procedure). 
As far as theories of cooperative response generation are concerned, van Beek and 
Cohen can be seen as claiming that cooperative response generation systems need to be 
able (1) to  recognize cases in which the questioner's utterances are consistent with several 
plans, (2) to determine whether any ambiguity affects the system's choice of a response, 
and (3) if necessary, engage the questioner in a clarification subdialogue to  resolve the 
ambiguity. 
The paper has a number of theoretical weaknesses (which is neither unreasonable nor 
unexpected in a workshop submission). For example, although the authors suggest that 
the process of resolving plan ambiguity partly depends on reasoning about the query, 
their definition of the decision procedure makes no reference to it. The paper also fails to 
maintain a careful distinction between intended plan recognition and keyhole recognition 
[Cohen 8 1 1 . ~ ~  It is generally accepted that intended recognition is the appropriate model 
for cooperative interaction, since questioners try to make as much of their plans and goals 
recognizable to a respondent as they believe the respondent needs to  provide a helpful 
answer. Kautz' theory, however, is a keyhole recognition model. Thus the authors' decision 
to  base a theory of cooperative question answering on Kautz' system is a questionable one. 
Despite the weaknesses in the underlying theory, the claims of the paper are moving 
in the right direction. However, I would frame the problem rather differently. I believe 
that we ought to  maintain the principle that questioners aim to make their pertinent goals 
and plans recognizable unambiguously to a respondent, and thus that the plan-inference 
model appropriate t o  cooperative question-answering situations is intended recognition. 
Consequently, it is eminently reasonable for the plan-inference component in a question- 
answering system to return a single plan-exactly the plan that the respondent believes 
the questioner intended her to recognize. In fact, this is actually a desirable behavior, since 
some queries (e.g., "Do you have change for a dollar?") are potentially consistent with a 
huge number of plans. Given this view, the problems that the authors attribute to plan 
ambiguity should be modeled differently. 
Let's consider the authors' example, "Can I drop Numerical Analysis?" If this query 
were uttered in a neutral context, a respondent could do no more than infer that the 
questioner would like to  drop the course and wants to know if i t  is possible (for example, to 
verify that the deadline for dropping courses has not passed). The respondent's problem 
is deciding whether there are any reasonable higher goals that the questioner could be 
23Briefly, intended recognition describes cases in which one agent makes a deliberate attempt to convey 
his plans and goals to another. Keyhole recognition describes situations in which one agent infers the goals 
and plans of another agent by observation, where the observed agent is unaware of the observation and 
thus makes no attempt to make his plans and goals apparent. 
trying to achieve (such as not failing the course) which might be thwarted or simply not 
achieved by the inferred plan. Computationally, this is equivalent to the respondent's 
making controlled extensions to  the inferred plan, rather than generating and testing all 
possibilities as the authors propose. In other words, I am suggesting that the problem be 
viewed not as one involving "plan ambiguity" but as a situation in which a respondent 
actively considers, based on her more complete knowledge of the domain, the possible 
undesired consequences of the questioner's inferred plan. 
General comments on plan recognition 
This section has considered several different models of plan recognition. They differed 
partly according to  whether plan recognition was to be used as a theory of understanding 
or as a knowledge-acquisition process for responding. 
Allen's work is interesting in that it relates plan recognition to both understanding 
and responding. He takes "understanding" an utterance to  mean being able to construct 
a representation of a plan reflecting the underlying intentions. Reasoning from that rep- 
resentation, the system should be able to respond helpfully. Allen focused on a particular 
aspect of helpful response behavior based on the notion of obstacle elimination (although 
obstacles were never defined more formally than as unbound variables found along the 
direct inference chain connecting the utterance to the expected domain goal). 
More so than the others, Pollack seems to have been primarily concerned with devel- 
oping a plan inference formalism to meet the putative needs of the cooperative response 
generation task. She recognized that the choice of a cooperative response is often influ- 
enced by the inferring agent's beliefs about errors present in the actor's domain plan. But 
her work suggests only how an agent might come to acquire some of those beliefs, and ex- 
plicitly avoids detailed consideration of how those beliefs might influence the formulation 
of a response. Instead, SPIRIT says everything that could possibly be relevant. 
Carberry focused entirely on plan recognition as a theory of discourse understanding. 
In her system, the evolving context model represents the system's understanding of the 
discourse. The question of how that model affects the system's choice of response is not 
considered. 
Van Beek and Cohen raised some interesting points about how cooperative response 
generation systems might reason about plans but, as we saw, some theoretical difficulties 
need to  be resolved before their proposal can be thoroughly evaluated. 
My conclusion about the work on plan recognition is that while all the efforts provide 
insight into the kinds of knowledge about an actor's plan that might be inferred and 
represented by a system, none offer good general principles guiding how that information 
should be used to help a system decide how to respond. 
2.4.2 Preventing false inferences 
As I have been arguing, little progress has been made toward identifying the principles that 
drive cooperative response behavior. The plan-recognition efforts are unique in their at- 
tempt to characterize an information-bearing reasoning process that is intended to  support 
a wide range of behavior, even if those efforts have in practice been restricted to  carefully 
chosen (or constructed) examples in tiny domains. 
Besides Allen's suggestion that cooperative agents act t o  eliminate obstacles detected 
in agents' plans, only one other principle of cooperative behavior stands out in importance. 
This principle has shown up so often in the literature that it has become a de facto axiom 
of cooperative interaction. Although its influence can be seen in earlier efforts, Joshi 
was the first to propose it explicitly. Claiming that successful communication depends in 
part on the maintenance of consistent mutual beliefs between the discourse participants 
[Joshi 821, Joshi suggested that when one discourse participant comes to  believe that there 
is or might be a discrepancy in mutual beliefs-a discrepancy that might interfere with 
successful communication-that participant should take the initiative to "square away" 
(that is, ensure agreement on) the relevant beliefs. This process of "squaring away" mutual 
beliefs was claimed to  account for certain instances of clarification subdialogues. 
Joshi noticed that some of the necessary response behavior supporting mutual-belief 
maintenance was not covered by Grice's theory. Rather than abandoning that theory, Joshi 
instead proposed an accommodating revision to  Grice's maxim of QUALITY [Joshi 821 : 
If you, the speaker, plan to say anything which may imply for the hearer some- 
thing that you believe to be false, then provide further information to block 
that inference. 
Without this revision, the act of "squaring away" mutual beliefs would constitute an 
apparent violation of the maxim of QUANTITY, as it leads to  additional information not 
motivated by any other maxim. Joshi argued that the revision to QUALITY was a more 
principled solution to  this problem than some kind of ad hoc alteration of QUANTITY. 
Joshi's revision, a directive that question-answering systems act to  "prevent false in- 
ferences", justifies ex post facto the behavior of numerous systems. For example, the 
corrective responses generated by Kaplan's system COOP (Section 2.2.1) block false infer- 
ences concerning the non-emptiness of entity sets implicit in the query. Mays's system 
(Section 2.2.2) blocks false inferences about relationships between database entities, and 
Gal's system (Section 2.2.4) uses integrity constraints to  similar ends. All the work on mis- 
conception correction in task domains can be motivated in terms of this principle. Indeed, 
Pollack's model of plan inference (Section 2.4.1, page 36) supports response behavior that 
is motivated by Joshi's principle. 
Joshi, Webber, and Weischedel [Joshi 84a, Joshi 84b, Joshi 871 have characterized sev- 
eral reasoning tasks that question-answering systems may need to perform in order to 
keep their replies from being m i s c ~ n s t r u e d . ~ ~  These include blocking false conclusions 
that might arise from misapplication of default rules (also discussed in [Stenton 861) and 
blocking false conclusions in task environments based on expectations about how an expert 
would respond. In considering these behaviors they rightly note [Joshi 84b, p. 1341: 
The problem is that a system neither can nor should explore all conclusions a 
user might possibly draw: its reasoning must be constrained in some systematic 
and well-motivated way. 
Unfortunately, neither they nor anyone else has been able to  make progress on this problem. 
This is primarily because research remains restricted to domains that are insufficiently rich 
for any such constraints to  be meaningful or useful. 
24See also [vanBeek 871 for a discussion of some extensions to this work to accommodate the user's more 
general goals, plans, and preferences. 
2.4.3 Search spaces 
Allport and Kidd have recently argued [Allport 891 that cooperative response behavior in 
planning domains can be usefully characterized as reasoning about search spaces. They 
take a "planning domain" to be a domain in which the basic task is to reason about 
precondition-action-postcondition sequences and answer queries about the relevance of var- 
ious actions to a user's goals. Examples drawn from the domain of computer configuration 
(see also Section 2.3.5) are used to  bolster their claims. In this domain, users ask about the 
possibility, usefulness, and consequences of actions (adding/removing components to/from 
a computer configuration) with respect to  the goal of specifying (for purchase) a properly- 
configured computer system. Sample query/response pairs are shown in (27)-(29). 
(27)a. Q: If I add 4 HP-FL cards, do I have to  configure CIB adaptor 0-2? 
b. A: No, you can place one in CIB 0-1 and the remaining three in CIB 1-1. 
(28)a. Q: Can I add 2 HP-IB cards in CIB 0-l? 
b. A: Yes, but the system performance will be better if you add them in CIB 1-1 
which is less full. 
(29)a. Q: If I add 1 device on the HP-IB card in CIB 0-1, do I have to  specify option 
393? 
b. A: Only if that device is a page printer. 
They analyze the reasoning underlying each question-response pair as a search problem. 
The initial state of the world is modeled as a node in the search space. The query is then a 
problem statement, mapping to "some number (zero, one or many)" (p. 1) of other nodes 
in the search space (solution states). In addition, domain or task-specific knowledge may 
permit other nodes t o  be designated "of interest to  the user", relevant somehow to the 
user's stated problem. In other words, the query together with any available background 
knowledge yields a set of nodes in the search space (goal worlds) of interest to the user. 
There will then be zero or more paths connecting the initial node to  the goal nodes. About 
this Allport and Kidd make the following claim (p. 1): 
A concise but informative description of this set of paths (i.e., this part of the 
search space) is precisely what constitutes a co-operative response [in examples 
(27)-(29) above]. 
It is understandable why this theory of search spaces should be a reasonable way to  think 
about question answering in the domain of computer configuration: Allport and Kidd 
have found that it is possible t o  model computer configuration in terms of a STRIPS-style 
[Fikes 711 state-space planning paradigm. Each world state consists of a description of the 
user's partially-configured computer (one could easily use a first-order language for this). 
In the domain there is a set of actions (adding/removing a component) each of which can 
be modeled as a function between world descriptions (configurations). There is only one 
goal (a  valid configuration), and it can be modeled as a set of propositions that must hold 
in a world state. Queries become tests on the set of proofs of the goal, starting either 
from the current configuration a s  in (28) or from a proposed configuration derived from 
the current one as in (27) and (29). 
While the search-space theory may provide an interesting conceptualization of the com- 
puter-configuration problem, it does not seem as helpful as the authors would like to claim 
for understanding the basic problems of cooperative response generation. For example, 
while plan recognition can undoubtedly be viewed as a process of finding the relevant 
paths between an initial state and a goal state (or possibly a set of goal states), does that 
help us understand its role in the formation of a response, or give us a better idea of the 
kinds of information plan-recognition systems should yield? In other words, how does the 
search-space view pay off? My conclusion is that more problems are swept under the rug 
here than are addressed. Certainly the theory does not bring us closer to an understanding 
of the nature of cooperative behavior; it only relabels the problems. 
2.5 Concluding Remarks 
As the reader will recall, the declared purpose of this chapter was to  defend, based on a 
literature review and critique, these claims: 
a Research has focused on modeling manifestations of cooperative behavior and rarely 
considered the nature of that behavior itself. 
a These behavior models have often been characterized in ways that are closely tied to 
a particular domain or application. 
a Our comprehension of the constraints on cooperative behavior is marginal a t  best. 
I return to these claims now and argue that they are in fact reasonable conclusions to draw 
from the preceding discussion. 
Focus on manifestations 
When I say that researchers modeled "manifestations" of cooperative behavior, I mean 
that they designed systems that were able to behave, from the user's point of view, in a 
cooperative, natural manner. But the systems did not actually reason about what "being 
cooperative" in the given situation involved. The investigator had already identified the 
distinguishing features of a query context (e.g., a direct answer of "zero" or "nil") that, in 
the interests of cooperativeness, motivated some particular modification to or augmentation 
of the system's default response. The system merely implemented the feature detection 
and corresponding response alteration. 
We saw this approach in the database-query applications. In each case (except in 
McKeown's and Corella's work), the query coupled with the state of the database comprised 
a context that could be tested for various features. When the feature of interest was found, 
the response was appropriately modified (e.g., a monitor offer was provided). 
The situation was the same for the task-domain applications. Both ROMPER and AQUA 
were designed to enable systems to appear cooperative, but neither's behavior followed 
from cooperative principles. UCEGO did at least make some interesting claims about how 
intelligent interfaces should reason, but it was rather casual in providing a principled basis 
for that reasoning. K I P  focused on cooperative aspects of responses to L L h o ~ "  questions, 
but when it modified its responses to warn about potential or actual plan failures, it did 
so only because the program was designed to perform the required checks, not because 
it had reasoned that such warnings would be cooperative. Lastly, Kidd proposed that 
cooperative response behavior be engineered based on observations of human question- 
answering behavior, an approach that pointedly ignores the issue of why a t  an abstract 
level cooperative respondents choose to  reply in the ways they do. 
To the extent that the more theoretically-oriented efforts led to  actual response-pro- 
ducing systems, we saw that they too gave only the outward appearance of being cooper- 
ative. 
At the risk of beating a dead horse, I will conclude this part of the argument with a 
quote from [Clifford 88, p. 16-17]: 
Approaching [the issue of the semantics of questions] from an entirely different 
perspective, researchers in artificial intelligence (AI) have over the years de- 
veloped and implemented automatic question-answering theories and systems 
to varying degrees of success. These have ranged from some early experi- 
mental programs [Green 631 to database querying programs bound to  a par- 
ticular database domain [Woods 72, Waltz 781 to  some rather sophisticated 
[database query] systems today that are designed to  be general and easily 
portable [Harris 73, Hendrix 781. The research behind these systems seems 
to  share a goal common to much of the work in A1 (as distinct from cognitive 
science), i.e., an interest more in getting a system to "work" than in developing 
a formal theory that explains its behavior. 
It is precisely because in most systems a rational theoretical basis for their behavior is 
conspicuously absent that I contend they at best model only manifestations of cooperative 
interaction. 
Domain-dependent characterizations 
For obvious reasons, only the application-oriented efforts in the first two categories have 
tended to  depend on properties of the domain or of the application itself. 
For example, in the database-query domain, we saw that Gal's database-query system 
relied on domain-specific knowledge in the form of integrity constraints. Mays developed a 
general-purpose modal temporal logic that was to be used to encode a domain-dependent 
axiomatization of database change, from which it would be possible to  reason about the 
competence of monitor offers. HAM-ANS'S filling of optional case-slots in verb case-frames 
was particularly domain dependent. If, for example, the user asked "Has a yellow car 
gone by?", HAM-ANS would respond (assuming a yellow car had in fact gone by) "Yes, one 
yellow one on Hartungstreet." In trying to  verify whether an instance of the particular 
type of locomotion had occurred in the analyzed image sequence, HAM-ANS necessarily had 
to  identify the spatial location of the event, i.e., "the LOCATIVE slot in the case frame 
for 'to go by7 is filled as a side eflect of the search for an answer7' [Wahlster 83, p. 6431. 
This information was then added to  the response. But this L'cooperative" act is not based 
on any reasoning about the questioner's goals, and so there is no guarantee that the extra 
information will be of any actual interest to  the q~estioner. '~ In truth, the act is only 
cooperative because users who ask such questions tend also to  be interested in knowing 
- 
the location of the event, as opposed to, say, the car's license number or velocity. But this 
is domain-specific knowledge that is not encoded anywhere in the system. 
25Noted also by Chin [Chin 88b, p. 2581. 
In the task-domain applications, both McCoy and Quilici claimed to  have developed 
domain-independent models of misconception correction. McCoy's claim in this regard is 
more credible than Quilici's, however. The representation used in AQUA (see Figure 2.2) is 
presented without any motivation beyond the fact that it works and expresses relationships 
useful to the theory. The predicate semantics are informally defined, and it is not clear that 
the predicates actually provide a reasonable way to encode the requisite domain knowledge 
(certainly no principled encoding method is ever described). 
Neither UCEGO nor KIP make any claims to domain independence. Although the general 
ideas in both efforts (goal-driven agency for UCEGo and KIP'S notion of concerns) are not 
particularly tied t o  their U N I X  application domain, the theoretical details as embodied 
by the respective implementations are unquestionably so. In UCEGO'S case, the domain- 
specific knowledge is encoded in the if-detected daemons, the rules defining all the system's 
behavior. In KIP,  it is the concerns that are explicitly domain dependent. In neither system 
are there any significant domain-independent parts. 
Lack of constraints 
The point about lack of constraints is simply that past efforts never had to consider how a 
system's cooperative behavior might need to be limited. We have a sense that in general 
discourse there is a highly context-dependent line that, when crossed, causes an otherwise 
cooperative response to seem uncooperative, or at the least undesirable. This intuition is 
captured in Grice's Maxim of QUANTITY (Section 2.1). Yet in none of the systems we have 
reviewed in this chapter was there ever a practical possibility that this boundary might 
be exceeded; thus there was never a need to consider how a system might recognize it 
mechanically and alter its response behavior accordingly. As discussed earlier, Wahlster et 
al. at least faced the issue (see Section 2.2.6), but their solution appears to engender more 
questions than it puts to rest. 
Chapter 3 
Two Perspectives on Cooperative 
Response Generat ion 
In the previous chapter, I examined a wide range of research projects all of which were to 
some extent concerned with modeling cooperative communication. These efforts primarily 
described techniques that were developed to improve the LLcooperativeness'7 of responses 
from natural-language dialogue systems. The review demonstrated, however, that "being 
cooperative" rarely meant more than simulating a single form or restricted range of forms 
of response behavior. Moreover, what made these forms of behavior "cooperative" was a 
matter more often of intuition than of definition: the general principles underlying a given 
behavior were usually left unstated. 
Why do we study cooperative response generation (CRG)? To their credit, other re- 
searchers have made useful contributions by classifying, cataloging, and developing com- 
putational models of the myriad ways in which respondents accommodate questioners7 
needs, goals, preferences, etc., in their responses. But if, as I believe, our ultimate goal 
is to build natural-language systems that are to be more generally capable of acting as 
cooperative conversation partners, the entire research problem must be approached from 
a new direction. 
In this chapter, I will characterize two opposing perspectives on cooperative response 
generation, distinguished by the point of view-questioner's or respondent's-from which 
principles of cooperative reasoning are defined. I will argue that questioner-based models 
define cooperation in terms of kinds of question-answering behavior desired by the ques- 
tioner, while respondent-based models define cooperation in terms of the goals a respondent 
is trying to  achieve in a given interaction. The thesis of this chapter is that in studying 
CRG we should adopt the respondent-based perspective if our goal is to  develop dialogue 
systems that truly are "cooperative respondents" rather than models of particular kinds 
of cooperative responses. 
3.1 The Questioner-Based Perspective 
I will say that a model of CRG is questioner-based if it characterizes cooperative interaction 
in terms of how the system's responses affect the questioner in a particular query situation. 
All judgments of cooperativeness are made from the questioner's point of view; i.e., a 
response is "cooperative" in a given situation if and only if it is perceived as such by 
the questioner. Consequently, it is typically not considered important for the reasoning 
activities of a dialogue system to be defined in terms of abstract concepts such as the 
beliefs, desires, and intentions of a language user; rather, all that matters is that the 
program manifests behavior that questioners find acceptable. 
A fundamental premise of questioner-based investigations of cooperative behavior is 
that a questioner in a given dialogue situation has various needs, desires, preferences, and 
expectations, some of which may be directly evident in his query (and its accompanying 
utterances), and others of which may require more complex reasoning chains t o  detect. A 
questioner may judge a dialogue system uncooperative if i t  fails to  meet his needs, satisfy his 
desires, accommodate his preferences, and live up to  his expectations in a particular query 
situation. These ideas have given rise to a research program with three main components: 
r informally identifying the needs, desires, preferences, and expectations of questioners 
that are potentially relevant to  the processing of a query in a given situation; 
r identifying response strategies that can be used to meet the needs, satisfy the desires, 
accommodate the preferences, and live up to the expectations of a questioner in a 
given query situation; 
r developing models of query situations and designing reasoning procedures on those 
models that can enable dialogue systems in those situations to  respond using the 
desired response strategy. 
I call the three-step methodology suggested by the above research program the questioner- 
based approach; models of CRG resulting from this approach will be called questioner- 
based models. I will discuss next a categorization of questioner-based models and then 
consider the computational and theoretical consequences of the questioner-based approach. 
Finally, I will argue that questioner-based models are of little help in building more complex 
cooperative dialogue systems. 
3.1.1 Categories of questioner-based models 
As noted, the first step of the questioner-based approach to  CRG theory involves char- 
acterizing (informally) different kinds of response behavior that questioners might want 
or find desirable from a dialogue system in a given conversation situation. Based on my 
review of the literature, I have identified three general behavioral goals that past CRG 
models have had with respect to  the questioner: 
1. avoiding adverse effects on the questioner; 
2. improving a natural-language interface's ease of use; 
3. adding useful functionality to  a question-answering system. 
These goals serve as an abstract categorization of the motivations that researchers have 
offered (or that have been implicit in their work) for dialogue systems to  produce the 
various forms of cooperative question-answering behavior that were studied. I will discuss 
each goal in turn. 
Avoiding adverse effects 
One of the key hypotheses of questioner-based investigations of CRG is that questioners 
tend to make various kinds of assumptions about the ways in which different knowledge 
states of a respondent may influence her choice of reply. Questioners consequently interpret 
the responses given them in light of these assumptions. To borrow a classic example from 
[Grice 751, suppose Q, carrying an empty gas can, approaches R and asks, 
(30) Q: My car has run out of gas. Where's the nearest gas station? 
If R were to reply, 
(31) R: There's one a quarter-mile up the road, on your left. 
Q would probably not feel any urge to ask, as a follow-up question, "Is it open?" Rather, 
he would assume that R had understood the thrust of the question and would not have an- 
swered as she did if she believed the gas station was closed. Furthermore, Q would assume 
that if R were in any doubt as to  whether the station was open, she would have indicated 
as much in her reply (and, perhaps, would have gone on to identify an alternative). As 
a result, R's simple reply combined with Q's assumptions leads Q to draw a number of 
conclusions about R's beliefs. 
The idea that the questioner's assumptions affect his interpretation of and conclusions 
drawn from a response is discussed at considerable length in [Joshi 84al. In that article, 
the authors examine a scenario in which a questioner asks to be informed how to perform 
an action a so that he might achieve some goal y .  They argue that, should it not be 
possible to execute a (due to, say, the failure of one of a 's  enabling conditions), it may 
be insufficient for the respondent to do no more than point that out. They claim that 
additional response acts may be required because of the questioner's expectations of the 
respondent. For example, the authors suggest that a questioner might expect the respon- 
dent to  identify an alternative to a, if she knew of one that the questioner could use to 
achieve y. Because of this expectation, as the authors contend, a respondent who says 
only "you cannot do a" communicates more than she has explicitly stated. In particular, 
her statement is said to convey by omission that the respondent does not know of (or does 
not believe there exists) another way for the questioner to achieve y. 
The fact that what is omitted from a response can be as important as (if not more 
important than) what is included in it is particularly troublesome for dialogue systems. It 
suggests that the absence of certain kinds of language-understanding abilities in a given 
system may in fact have adverse effects on a questioner as opposed to merely reducing the 
system's utility. This is partly due to  the fact that when people interact with machines 
using natural language, they tend to make the same sorts of assumptions about the ma- 
chines' understanding and response abilities as they make when they interact with other 
people. It is therefore no surprise that a major line of theoretical inquiry has come to focus 
on finding different kinds of assumptions questioners make that must be accommodated 
during response generation. 
Kaplan observed that some of a questioner's assumptions are accessible to  a respondent 
purely from domain-independent knowledge of the conventions of language [Kaplan 811 (see 
also Section 2.2.1). He characterized language-driven inferences this way (p. 132): 
[Language-driven inferences] are based on the fact that a story, dialogue, ut- 
terance, and so on, is a description, and that the description itself may exhibit 
useful properties not associated with the thing being described. These additional 
properties are used by speakers to encode essential information-a knowledge 
of language-related conventions is required to  understand [natural language]. 
Kaplan's COOP system employed language-driven inferences t o  detect (and then verify) the 
presumptions implicit in a query. The motivation for doing so was to  prevent the system 
from inadvertently confirming a proposition that it knew (or could prove) was false. The 
three-part hypothesis was that (1) questioners are aware of the assumptions they encode 
in their queries, (2) they believe that these encoded assumptions are accessible to their 
interlocutors, and (3) they expect that respondents will notify them of any assumptions 
that are believed (by the respondent) to be false. A dialogue system that is unable to  live 
up to  this third expectation is thus liable to confirm false propositions by omission. 
In general, all the work on detecting and correcting misconceptions has been moti- 
vated at some level by this desire to  prevent dialogue systems from exhibiting behavior 
that is, from the questioner's point of view, undesirable. Of course, other work besides 
misconception correction per se has had similar motivations. Motro, for example, was 
partly concerned with preventing users of database-query systems from falsely concluding 
that correct queries, because they returned "zero" or "nil" as their result, were actually 
ill formed (Section 2.2.3).' And Pollack's plan-inference formalism was an attempt to  
increase the range of a questioner's beliefs accessible to  a respondent, ultimately to  per- 
mit respondents to  detect misconceptions and modify their responses accordingly (Section 
2.4.1, page 36). 
Improving ease of use 
Several models of CRG have had the goal of making dialogue systems easier in some 
sense t o  interact with. For example, questioners are seen as preferring systems that do 
not unnecessarily prolong information-retrieval dialogues. Some researchers have therefore 
tried to exploit both domain-independent characteristics of questions and domain-specific 
knowledge to  enable systems not only to  answer questions, but also to provide additional 
related information in their responses. 
In the literature review we saw three efforts (Gal's in 2.2.4, Motro's in 2.2.3, and 
Wahlster et a1.k in 2.2.6) in which one of the goals of the system was to  provide responses 
that were said to "anticipate likely follow-up questions". One oft-repeated point has been 
that questioners tend to  ask questions of the form, "is it the case that P' , not because they 
are interested in the truth value of P per se, but because they are interested in the answer to 
a related wh-question whose felicity depends on the truth value of P. The general research 
problem involves finding a principled connection between the yes/no query, its answer, and 
the follow-up question (or questions) that the questioner could be expected to ask given 
that answer. Gal showed that anticipatory question-answering behavior may be applicable 
to  other kinds of questions as well (such as "how many" questions), which suggests that 
some general question-independent underlying reasoning process must be involved. 
'This might be an example of a meta-misconception: a misconception that one has a misconception. 
Models of anticipatory question answering have varied widely in their details. In Gal's 
system, domain-specific integrity constraints were indexed during query processing; the 
theory of what information a questioner might find useful in addition to the answer was 
encoded in the indexing strategies. In Motro's system, failing queries were generalized 
until a non-failing query was found; this non-failing query was then treated as a likely 
follow-up question and its answer was provided. HAM-ANS augmented its responses with 
the values of case-slots that were filled as a side effect of determining the answer to the 
query. Others have shown that more general inference mechanisms may be needed to 
determine appropriate additions. Allen, for example, observed that it seems necessary to 
reason about the questioner's goals in order to determine the most appropriate addition 
[Allen 831: 
(32) Q: Is John a senior? 
(33) a. R: No, he's a junior. 
b. R: No, but Sam is. 
The choice between (33)a and (33)b hinges upon whether R believes that Q is interested 
in John's class rank, or whether he needs to know the name of someone of senior standing. 
All these efforts are motivated by the recognition that dialogue systems that are able 
to provide additional information on their own initiative will be found to be considerably 
more pleasant to use than those that require each "obvious" follow-up query to be posed 
explicitly. This motivation is quite different from that of the work on misconception cor- 
rection (and related behavior). Here it is not that a user could or would be harmed by a 
system's failure to volunteer information, but rather that systems able to "over-answer" 
questions will appear to communicate more helpfully and in a manner more in accord with 
the expectations people have of the question-answering behavior of other people. 
Adding useful functioizality 
The third group of questioner-based models has focused on enabling systems to exhibit 
useful response behavior of which a questioner might not ordinarily expect them to be 
capable. Mays's development of a logic to support the offering of monitors by database- 
query systems is perhaps the best example (Section 2.2.5). The principle is that a user 
might not be aware that a database system could keep track of changes to  the database 
and perform actions when certain conditions became true. That, coupled with the notion 
that a questioner who inquires about the truth status of a (currently false) time-varying 
proposition P might be interested in being notified when P becomes true, inspired Mays's 
research into a mechanism for distinguishing potentially useful monitor offers from useless 
or nonsensical ones.2 
Luria's system for identifying possible plan failures (Section 2.3.4) is another attempt at 
adding useful functionality to dialogue systems. The idea is that when responding to  "how 
do I do X" questions, it is often in the questioner's interest to inform him of conditions he 
might have to rectify before the plan that the system gives him can be executed. In other 
work, research on constructing examples and integrating them into responses to requests 
for on-line help has been reported by Rissland [Rissland 841. Chin's UCEGO is also able 
'Mays had little t o  say, however, about how to distinguish relevant from irrelevant monitor offers. 
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t o  add examples to  the responses it gives [Chin 88a] (and see also Section 2.3.3). Finally, 
I have already pointed out that McKeown7s work on TEXT was originally conceived of as 
part of a larger effort to  make it unnecessary for users of database-query systems to  have 
to  know the details of the database system's structure and terminology (Section 2.2.7). 
Summary 
I have distinguished three general behavioral goals that past models of CRG have at- 
tempted to  achieve. Each goal defines a class of specific cooperative goals that systems 
have been designed to achieve. "Avoiding adverse effects", for example, circumscribes a 
class of more specific goals pertaining to the prevention of various kinds of adverse effects 
on the questioner. Correcting a presumption failure (or any misconception) can be con- 
ceived of as but one of many ways of avoiding an adverse effect (that of being misled) on 
the questioner. 
There are two important problems to  be recognized in this regard. First, in no case 
have the specific cooperative goals of a CRG system been precisely stated. In other words, 
the actions performed by the various systems were all done for reasons that were external 
to  the systems. Second, as a consequence of the first, no domain-independent motivation 
for a given response action was ever provided. That is, not only were the goals of the 
systems extra-theoretical, but the reasons for adopting those goals were extra-theoretical 
as well. These ideas will be explored further in the next section. 
3.1.2 Consequences of questioner-based approach 
Computational consequences 
I claim that the questioner-based approach to  investigations of CRG has led to  the devel- 
opment of computational models of what might be called cooperative response situations- 
situations in which a particular response or kind of response is said to  be cooperative. 
The systems that have been implemented to  validate the results of these investigations can 
be viewed abstractly as functions from carefully restricted question-answering contexts to  
responses claimed (always on intuitive grounds) to  be cooperative in those contexts. 
The general technical approach goes roughly like this: after analyzing a set of examples- 
either constructed or taken from transcripts of naturally occurring dialogue-in a particular 
domain, the researcher identifies a kind of response behavior desired from some hypothet- 
ical dialogue system. Next, the question-answering situation is specified. This involves 
selecting the range of questions or question types to  be handled by the system and defining 
all the knowledge sources (and their contents) available to the system at query-processing 
time, such as concept taxonomies, database schemas, factual knowledge, plan libraries, 
user models, etc. This collection of knowledge sources will be referred t o  as the domain 
knowledge base. In some cases, domain knowledge bases have possessed properties that 
were essential t o  the needs of the particular response-processing task, e.g., the domain 
model augmented with an "object perspective" mechanism in ROMPER (Section 2.3.1) and 
the temporal database axiomatization in Mays's theory of monitor offering (Section 2.2.5). 
The third step involves specifying the input to  the response-computing component of 
the dialogue system. This input precisely defines the conditions in effect a t  the start of 
response processing. I will call this input the query model. In COOP, for example, the query 
model consists of an MQL representation of the input query [Kaplan 821; in ROMPER,  it 
is a description of a particular object-related misconception. In Allen's system, the query 
model comprises a logical-form representation of the information requested by the ques- 
tioner (e.g., a WANT to KNOWIF there is a train to  Windsor) [Allen 831. Thus the query 
model represents the knowledge state of the dialogue system with respect to  a given query 
just prior to response selection. There is usually some (often unspecified and/or unimple- 
mented) amount of processing interposed between the actual natural-language input and 
the response-computation machinery. The general architecture of the resulting dialogue 
system is shown in Figure 3.1. 
Once the domain knowledge base and query model have been specified, the rest of the 
research concerns the design of the component that is actually responsible for computing 
the system's response (labeled "CRG system" in Figure 3.1). At an abstract level, the CRG 
system consists of two components: the cooperative-response trigger and the response- 
generation procedure. (Note that research systems have often focused on the design of 
only one of these two components; ROMPER is an example of a system that focused on the 
generation procedure.) 
The cooperative-response trigger (labeled "CR trigger" in Figure 3.1) is a decision pro- 
cedure over the query model that determines when the particular form of cooperative 
behavior under study should be exhibited in the response. To illustrate, we will use Ka- 
plan's COOP as a case study. The desired response behavior is the act of producing a 
corrective indirect response. The domain can be any common database-query domain; 
this discussion will assume a database of department-store inventory. Questions of interest 
include those that (explicitly or implicitly) predicate over the results of various kinds of 
set intersections and restrictions. For example, the query in (34) requests that the sys- 
tem list the members of the set resulting from the intersection of two restricted sets: the 
set of departments restricted to  those that sell coffee makers and the set of departments 
restricted to  those that sell coffee filters. 
(34) Q: Which departments that sell coffee makers also sell coffee filters? 
The query model contains a representation of the user's query and the answer to  it as 
returned from the database. 
In COOP, the cooperative-response trigger performs two tests. First, the answer re- 
turned from the database is checked. If it is "zero" or "nil," the query in the query model 
is decomposed into its set components, and each of those sets is tested against the database 
for emptiness. If any of these sets are found to be empty, e.g., in Example (34) there are 
no departments at all (rather odd, but not inconceivable) or no departments that sell cof- 
fee makers, then the decision procedure returns true, indicating that the current query 
situation demands a corrective response. 
The response-generation procedure (labeled "RG proc" in Figure 3.1) is activated by 
the cooperative-response trigger and proceeds to construct and generate the cooperative 
response. This can be either a simple or a complex task, often depending upon what 
was involved in the triggering test. In COOP, the response-generation procedure uses 
data generated as a by-product of the cooperative-response trigger's processing: the set of 
sets embedded in the query that were found to be empty.3 The actual natural-language 








Figure 3.1: Cooperative Response Situation Architecture 
response produced is then a modest transformation away, involving little more than filling 
in and generating the pattern, "I don't know of any x", substituting each element of the 
least-failing set of descriptions for x, e.g., "I don't know of any departments that sell coffee 
makers." 
Note that researchers have tended to factor out the details of generating natural lan- 
guage, or have used template-filling or other simple methods for translating from the sys- 
tem's internal representations to natural language. The exceptions include ROMPER and 
TEXT, both of which focused almost entirely on the language-generation task (TEXT more 
so than ROMPER), and the UCEXPRESS component of the U N I X  Consultant [Wilensky 881. 
The diagram in Figure 3.1 should be viewed as an abstraction of the way questioner-- 
based models of CRG have processed queries and produced responses. The combination 
of query model and domain knowledge base constitutes a model of a particular question- 
answering situation. The CRG system (the combination of cooperative-response trigger 
and response-generation procedure) acts as a machine that, when placed in that situation, 
produces the prescribed "cooperative" response. 
With respect to  this overall approach, there are two significant points to be made. 
First, the responses, or at least the kinds of behavior desired in responses, have been 
"fixed targets" in each case. Once it was decided what the questioner needed or wanted 
in a particular situation, the computational problem boiled down to constructing the ma- 
chinery needed to "hit the target". Thus the computational mechanisms involved have 
been devoid of any notion of "cooperative behavior". Second, characterizations of situa- 
tion models (query model plus domain knowledge base) have varied widely from system 
to system. Disjoint sets of questions have been considered, knowledge sources have been 
defined differently and/or differed in the special properties they possessed, and both the 
amount and nature of the processing (implicitly) required to construct the query models 
presented to  the CRG systems have varied. This is because the focus was solely on building 
systems that manifested some desired behavior, thus leaving the researchers with many 
degrees of freedom in setting the problem up. I suggest that it is largely for this reason 
that the collective theoretical results to date are so incompatible. 
Theoretical consequences 
I claim that the theories of cooperative behavior yielded by the questioner-based approach 
are uniformly descriptive. That is, they describe in informal terms what it is that makes a 
particular response "cooperative" in a given situation and then concern themselves with the 
task of generating it. They rarely if ever attempt to  specify the factors that make a given 
response cooperative, and dialogue systems to date certainly have never been grounded on 
any theory of what it means to cooperate. 
Consider the act of correcting a misconception. Why and under what conditions should 
this be considered a cooperative act? Several systems have been designed to correct mis- 
conceptions, but they never had access to-were never able to reason about-why they 
were correcting a misconception. For example, no theory of misconception correction has 
ever involved explicit reasoning about, say, the possible effects on the questioner of con- 
tinuing to  hold a particular invalid belief. Such a theory would at least tell us something 
about the conditions under which it is not necessary to  correct a misconception (something 
no existing theory does). Instead, the context was always contrived so that the need for 
the corrective response was always "obvious" in the given context and never had to be 
considered explicitly. But it is exactly those elusive features of the interaction causing 
the corrective response to seem "obviously appropriate" that are essential to  a theory of 
cooperation. 
Because the desired response behavior was decided in advance (and the question- 
answering situation set up with that in mind), researchers were able t o  make a kind of 
single-fault assumption with respect to the response: that is, it could be assumed that the 
question-answering context would never motivate any kind of response behavior other than 
the one under study. Consider again the body of work on correcting misconceptions. The 
response situation models were always chosen so that no other act besides the corrective 
response could possibly be appropriate. But when we examine more realistic models of 
discourse, we see this to be an artificial restriction. Consider the example shown in (35), 
taken from the EMACS transcripts. 
(35) Q: Do I want a mark at the beginning and at  the end of the block? 
R: For right now, just go ahead and set a mark any old place. (Just t o  see 
how it works.) 
R is engaged here in teaching Q how to use "region" commands in the EMACS text editor. In 
order to change a block of text to lowercase, an EMACS user must set the "mark" (of which 
there is only one) a t  the beginning of the block, then move the "point" (corresponding 
to the cursor) to the end of the block. At this time, a region command (like "lowercase 
region") can be executed. In the discourse leading up to the example (as recorded in the 
transcripts), R has been trying to show Q how to set the mark. The query shown in the 
example comes after R has described the "set mark" command and has instructed Q to 
execute it. Q's query indicates a misconception: he seems to think that there is more than 
one mark. But R does not correct that misconception. 
I am not claiming that R in this example did, in fact, notice the misconception and 
decide not to correct it (that would be a highly speculative claim indeed).4 However, I am 
claiming that the example illustrates a situation in which more pressing concerns might very 
well lead a respondent to overlook a misconception. Since R is engaged in a teaching task, 
she might decide that Q will figure things out for himself later as the dialogue proceeds, 
or perhaps she might conclude that correcting the misconception now, given the current 
state of the discourse and her beliefs about Q's understanding of the task, would be difficult 
and/or distracting. The point is that the existence of a misconception in and of itself is not 
sufficient reason in general for carrying out a correction. An approach that only describes 
a situation and stipulates that a particular form of behavior is cooperative will not tell 
us anything about situations in which that behavior is unnecessary or inappropriate. In 
short, such an approach will not really tell us why a particular response act is cooperative. 
Ultimately, the questioner-based approach has given rise to theories of cooperation that 
are distinctly "Pavlovian" in the sense that the input situation-represented by the query 
model-serves as the "stimulus" driving a predetermined kind of response. It is for this 
reason that the nature of cooperative interaction is hardly better understood now than 
when research in this area began. Instead we have accumulated informal characterizations 
'In a subsequent exchange in the recorded transcripts, Q makes a reference to "the first mark." It is at 
this point that R explicitly corrects the misconception, but only in the context of a larger response. The 
relevant fragment is shown on page 58, in example (36). 
of user needs, desires, preferences, and expectations to  be addressed in different, literally 
incomparable situations. 
3.1.3 Questioner-based models: ultimately the wrong approach 
I have characterized questioner-based models and the questioner-based approach to  CRG 
theory, and have discussed the computational and theoretical consequences of that ap- 
proach. I now want to  argue that we must abandon the questioner-based approach if we 
intend eventually to  build dialogue systems that are not just models of particular kinds of 
cooperative responses but truly are "cooperative respondents7'. 
The toolbox metaphor 
My main point here is that for system designers developing new natural-language applica- 
tions that must be able to provide cooperative responses, questioner-based models provide 
no guidance except in those cases where an exact match can be found between an exist- 
ing questioner-based CRG model and a query situation that the application must handle. 
Unfortunately, due to  the artificial restrictions that have been placed on the question- 
answering situations handled by questioner-based models, such precise matches are likely 
to  be hard to find. Rather, natural-language systems in realistic domains can be expected 
to  face query situations that will cross the artificial boundaries that have been established 
by previous CRG models. Consequently, such systems will need to be able to  integrate 
their cooperative abilities when formulating their responses. But the incompatibility of 
questioner-based models makes solving this "integration problem" difficult, if not impos- 
sible. 
Why is that the case? As we saw in the literature review, past research has succeeded in 
identifying and labeling a great variety of forms of cooperative response behavior. Many of 
these pertain t o  misconception correction: examples include correcting so-called "object- 
related" misconceptions, "plan-related" misconceptions, or (intensional/extensional) pre- 
sumption failures. Other examples include "over-answering" questions, offering monitors, 
detecting and removing "knowledge obstacles" in plans, and so forth. One might be 
tempted to  view these forms of behavior as analogous to  tools in a kind of "cooperation 
toolbox". 
But this toolbox metaphor is of limited usefulness. To its credit, i t  helps us understand 
the questioner-based approach in a general way: each researcher defined a new "tool for 
cooperation" and applied it t o  query situations that were set up to  require that tool and no 
other. But it misleadingly suggests that we can solve the integration problem and produce 
more realistic kinds of responses by applying several tools a t  once in a given query situa- 
tion. The problem with that approach is that the tools simply are not designed to  be used 
in concert. For example, McCoy's R O M P E R  system for correcting object-related misconcep- 
tions assumed that it would be called upon to  generate the system's entire response. But 
as the following example from the EMACS transcripts shows, a misconception-correction 
may be only a small part (shown in boldface) of a response: 
(36) Q: Wait-I set the first mark at the bottom of what I wanted so I didn't want 
to  delete anything below that. I tried typing ESC-G a few lines below but 
saw no response. 
R: Hmmm. Let's do that again. Set the mark (there is only one mark- 
THE mark) move over one word or line, and type ESC-G. The point 
(cursor) should move back and forth. Yes? 
The example shows that in more natural discourse, cooperative acts such as misconcep- 
tion corrections must be integrated in some way into the respondent's overall response 
goals. The example also suggests that any attempt to generalize the response into a kind 
of cooperative response situation-by applying the questioner-based approach-would be 
completely ad hoe. 
Of course, the assumption made by ROMPER-that it was wholly responsible for com- 
puting the response-is shared by every other model of CRG to date. I call this the 
whole-response assumption. It is the assumption at the very heart of the questioner-based 
approach, and it has led to  theories that cannot be integrated. 
The questioner-based approach must be abandoned if we are to  make progress towards 
understanding cooperative response behavior. I have presented two arguments for this 
conclusion: first, more capable cooperative dialogue systems will need to  integrate their 
cooperative abilities in their responses, and the questioner-based approach is inimical to  
such integration. Second, by focusing on the design of systems that only manifest cooper- 
ativeness, questioner-based models provide precious little insight into what i t  means for a 
respondent to  "be cooperative". 
Caveat 
I have intentionally taken a strong position here in painting a diversity of research with 
the label "questioner-based model". I want to  emphasize that I do not believe that many 
past research efforts were truly concerned in any serious way with probing the nature 
of cooperative behavior. In fact, I doubt that any of them were. Rather, they were 
interested in mechanizing some of the many forms of useful and helpful response behavior 
found in real-world domains and question-answering situations. From that perspective, 
they have all been useful. The work in plan recognition (and in intention recognition more 
generally) has been particularly helpful in elucidating the representations and reasoning 
mechanisms that are essential to cooperative communication. My point, however, is that 
the artificial restrictions that have been imposed on models of question-answering situations 
have had the unfortunate effect of obscuring rather than illuminating the basic principles 
of cooperation. This has in turn made it very difficult to  see how past efforts might be 
extended, generalized, and used as building blocks in the construction of more capable 
cooperative natural-language systems. 
3.2 The Respondent-Based Perspective 
A model of cooperative response generation is respondent based if it characterizes both 
the knowledge and the decision-making process of the respondent that together account 
for her choice of cooperative response in a given query situation. Respondent-based mod- 
els attempt to  define the respondent's role as a cooperative conversational partner. When 
viewing CRG from the respondent's perspective, the theorist analyzes examples of coop- 
erative response behavior in an effort to uncover the general principles of reasoning that 
motivate the respondent's selection of the form and content of her response. 
In contrast, questioner-based models yield techniques by which dialogue systems can 
produce responses that lend those systems the appearance of behaving cooperatively. Those 
techniques, however, need not be (and have not been) grounded on principles of cooperative 
behavior and reasoning. The theoretical interest here is in how responses of a desired form 
can be produced rather than in why respondents might choose those forms of response. 
This section elaborates the characterization of the respondent-based perspective and 
examines several issues and examples that are best understood within a respondent-based 
theoretical framework. 
3.2.1 Responses reflect goals 
At the heart of the respondent-based perspective is the view of language as action that 
forms the foundation of speech-act theory [Searle 711. In short, responses reflect the re- 
spondent's goals. That is, the utterances composing a natural-language response represent 
the observable result of the respondent's execution of a plan she had formed to  achieve 
particular goals. (Those goals, however, may not always be immediately apparent in the 
response.) 
Consider the following example, taken from the U N I X  transcripts. 
(37) Q: Is there a way to  send mail to  ucbeuler from ucbcory? 
R: Yes, it is letter y on the Berknet. So mail user@y.CC. If you have further 
problems with it, mail to serge@cory. He is the euler system manager. 
The response in (37) might be modeled at the surface level as an attempt to achieve these 
five goals: 
1. Q believe that there is a way to send mail to  ucbeuler from ucbcory ("Yes.. . "). 
2. Q believe that the letter on the Berknet that corresponds to  ucbeuler is 'y' (". . .it is 
letter y on the Berknet.. . "). 
3. Q believe that because the letter on the Berknet that corresponds to ucbeuler is 'y', 
mail to  users on ucbeuler can be addressed using the syntax user@y.CC (". . . i t  is 
letter y on the Berknet, so mail user@y.CCV). 
4. Q believe that if he has difficulty sending mail to users a t  ucbeuler, he should send 
mail to  sergeQcory asking for assistance ("If you have further problems with it, mail 
to serge@coryn ). 
5. Q believe that asking assistance from serge@cory is reasonable because serge is the 
system manager for ucbeuler ("He is the euler system manager"). 
These are the goals that we might think of as lying "just beneath the surface" of the 
response, that is, the goals that the particular linguistic expressions are being uttered in 
an attempt to  achieve. At a deeper level, the response might be viewed as an attempt to 
achieve two more abstract goals: 
1. Q know that it is possible to  send mail to  ucbeuler from ucbcory. 
2. Q know how to  send mail to ucbeuler from ucbcory. 
While the attempt to achieve the first goal is straightforwardly evident in the surface 
form of the response (R's answer of "yes" to the literal question), the attempt to achieve 
the second takes several utterances. In order to achieve that second goal, R must-as a 
subgoal-cause Q to know the appropriate command syntax. In the process of describing 
the command, R finds that she must explain the appearance of the 'y' in the command 
and also must suggest an action for Q to  take in case of difficulty. R finally decides that 
her suggestion that Q send mail to  sergeQcory must be justified. 
I cannot claim that this is the actual goal structure underlying R's response, for that 
would be pure speculation. Rather, I am suggesting that R had certain goals in mind 
to achieve in her response, and showing how her actual utterances might arise from her 
attempt to  achieve those goals. 
It is the central hypothesis of this dissertation that: 
In order to build dialogue systems that are to be more generally capable of 
acting as cooperative partners in a conversation, we must view their responses 
as actions planned to achieve one or more goals. 
I want it to be clear that the above is a hypothesis, not a claim. It is not my intention in 
this dissertation to try to prove the hypothesis. However, by means of the discussion and 
examples presented herein I intend to argue that the hypothesis is both reasonable and 
useful from the point of view of CRG system design. 
The hypothesis clearly embodies the respondent-based perspective. As I have said, 
respondent-based models of CRG attempt to characterize the respondent's reasoning in 
cooperative interaction. This means that the respondent must play an explicit role in any 
theory of cooperative communication; according to the hypothesis, she does, being the one 
who selects her response goals and forms plans to achieve them. 
Comparing the perspectives 
Now that we have formulated our hypothesis, it is an appropriate time to compare the 
two perspectives on CRG and determine precisely what distinguishes them. My claim is 
that in all questioner-based models, the goal (or goals) that the system is attempting to 
achieve is left unspecified. That is, although the behavior that the systems exhibit are all 
attempts to achieve goals (in line with the hypothesis), those goals have never been defined 
or formalized (or, at  least, never in any general way). At best, the goals of the systems 
have been "defined" using natural-language descriptions. 
This point is best understood by example, for which we will again consider Kaplan's 
COOP system. COOP was described as being able to produce corrective indirect responses 
in order to correct false presumptions detected in queries. When COOP determined that 
a given query presumed the non-emptiness of some set S of database entities, rather than 
providing the zero or nil query result to the user, it would reply, "I don't know of any Ts", 
where T is the type of the elements of S. 
Using an intuitive logic of belief,5 we might represent the system's response as an 
attempt to achieve goals of the form: 
'See [Hintikka 621 for one formalization of a logic of belief. 
(BEL q (BEL R (EMPTY (THE S:SET (SETOF S T))))) 
That is, by uttering "I don't know of any Ts", R (that is, COOP) intends that Q (the user) 
believe that R believes the set S of all Ts is empty. I will call this the surface goal, the 
goal that the surface linguistic expression is intended to achieve. The surface linguistic 
expression actually used may be one of many different ways of attempting to achieve the 
surface goal. 
Now we might ask, what is the formal connection between the surface goal and coop's 
cooperative purpose of correcting presumption failures? First we must understand at an 
abstract level what operation coop's machinery is actually performing. I suggest that this 
operation is actually a process of bringing to COOP'S attention two beliefs of the form: 
(BEL R (EMPTY S)) 
(BEL R (BEL q (NOT (EMPTY S)))) 
for S denoting a set of database entities of type T (e.g., "French students", or "coffee 
makers"). Once COOP acquires such a belief, it essentially adopts the following goal: 
(GOAL R (BEL Q (EMPTY S))) 
I will call this the response goal, to distinguish i t  from the surface goal. The response 
goal is the most general goal that underlies the response. A relationship analogous to 
generation [Goldman 70, Pollack 861 exists between response goals and surface goals: each 
response goal is achieved by means of the satisfaction of some set of surface goals. In coop, 
each response goal gives rise to  exactly one surface goal, and these surface goals are then 
achieved using a fixed utterance form.6 
To summarize, coop's abstract reasoning behavior can be modeled as the following 
four-step procedure: 
1. Analyze query: identify all sets S such that the query presumes (NOT (EMPTY S) ) 
but COOP believes (EMPTY S). 
2. For each such S (of elements of type T)  such that it is not a subset of any other 
empty set, adopt response goal: (GOAL R (BEL q (EMPTY S) ) ) . 
3. To achieve each response goal, satisfy surface goal: 
(GOAL R (BEL q (BEL R (EMPTY (THE S:SET (SETOF S T)))) ) )  
4. Use utterance form "I don't know of any Ts" to satisfy surface goal. 
Somewhat more generally, the reasoning process can be described this way: 
1. Identify an issue to be addressed in the response (Q incorrectly believes that set S is 
non-empty). 
2. Adopt the goal of addressing that issue by generating a correction (cause Q to believe 
that the set S is empty). 
3. Form and execute a plan for that goal: cause Q to  believe that coop believes the set 
S of Ts is empty; realize using a simple assertional linguistic expression. 
'There is an implicit assumption that when COOP asserts P (thus indicating its belief that  P), Q will 
adopt P as one of his own beliefs. 
We are now in a position t o  make some interesting observations about both coop and 
the distinction between questioner-based and respondent-based theories. 
Most importantly, coop had no declarative representation of the issue it was address- 
ing, the goal it adopted as a way to  address that issue, or the plan it formulated for that 
goal. Instead, there was a direct procedural connection between the analysis of the query 
and the corrective response that the system generated. It is for this reason that I consider 
coop to be a questioner-based model. The purpose of the system is to  provide a desired 
corrective response when one particular analysis of the query detects the presence of cer- 
tain conditions. All the reasoning that a respondent might perform is factored out of the 
model. This of course raises questions concerning the sorts of reasoning that a respondent 
might want or need to perform. 
COOP had no understanding of what a "false presumption" is or why such things might 
need to be corrected. We see this in the model I developed above: once coop notices that 
(BEL R (EMPTY S)) 
AND 
(BEL R (BEL q (NOT (EMPTY S)) ))  
it reflexively adopts the goal of causing Q to believe that the set S is empty. But this be- 
havior is reasonable only because of the restricted nature of the interaction. For one thing, 
it is never possible in the domain of database querying for R to  have incorrect kn~wledge .~  
Consequently, given the above-mentioned belief, R need never consider whether she is 
mistaken in believing that the set S is empty. Moreover, because the whole purpose of 
dialogue in this domain is to inquire about sets and their members, it can be assumed that 
whenever it is discovered that Q incorrectly believes a particular set to  be non-empty, he 
would want to be informed of his error. 
Besides factoring out all the reasoning leading to  the decision to correct the questioner's 
incorrect belief, coop uses a canned plan to  achieve that goal of correction. COOP has no 
way to  decide whether that plan is a good one with a reasonable chance of success, nor can 
it decide to, e.g., justify or explain why it believes Q is mistaken. All of these decisions 
have been made in advance and hard-wired into the system. 
The criticisms that I have applied to  COOP can be equally applied to the other research 
efforts in CRG. All fail to declaratively state the systems' goals in responding in the ways 
they do, and consequently all fail to define a principled connection between their goals 
and the responses that are generated. For two more examples, consider that ROMPER'S 
misconception-correction goals are not defined, nor is it shown how the correction strate- 
gies, when executed, realize those goals; in Allen's plan-recognition system, there is no 
representation of what a knowledge obstacle is, why it should be eliminated, or how goals 
of obstacle elimination might be achieved. 
The point of the preceding discussion is not to  devalue the contributions of prior re- 
search. The work being described here would not have been possible if it were not for the 
existence of such a large and diverse body of scientific results in the area of CRG. Rather, 
my point is this: cooperative responses generated in natural conversational settings (e.g., 
interactions between users and consultants) often show that respondents attempt to achieve 
more than one goal a t  a time in their replies. If we want to  be able to  build dialogue sys- 
tems that have this ability, theorists must begin to  identify and specify declaratively the 
7 ~ o l l a c k  has called this the correct-knowledge assumption [Pollack 861. 
kinds of goals cooperative respondents attempt to achieve in their responses, the conditions 
of the conversation that lead them to adopt those goals, and the principles of reasoning 
that connect the adoption of their goals to the responses they generate. For too long the 
focus has been on techniques for achieving ill-defined or unspecified goals. We must probe 
more deeply than that. 
Toward modeling the respondent's goals 
Although this is the first effort to focus directly on the principles and processes by which 
cooperative respondents reason, adopt and pursue goals, it is not the first to recognize 
the necessity of modeling the respondent's goals. In the UCEGO system, Chin models 
the respondent's goals directly [Chin 88al. But as I argued in Section 2.3.3, Chin's foci 
were on identifying general categories of goals that participate in cooperative reasoning 
(themes, foreground and background goals, sub-gods, and meta-goals) and on showing 
how to model them uniformly using a single computational mechanism (the if-detected 
daemon). His selection of implemented goals, while intuitively plausible, was not based 
on any developed theory of interaction in the domain, and as a process model he used 
an unconstrained blackboard architecture. In contrast, the present dissertation aims to 
develop an initial outline of the process of cooperative reasoning as a step toward the 
formulation of a true theory of cooperative dialogue. 
Cohen and Perrault also advocate a respondent-based view in their plan-based theory 
of speech acts (see the review in Section 2.4.1). As I have discussed, however, the speaker 
goals modeled in that work are at  a level of detail that places them beyond most of the 
concerns of cooperative dialogue. In developing the respondent-based perspective, I am 
arguing that theories need to be developed both of the kinds of high-level goals that are 
called themes in UCEGO and of the process by which those goals are adopted and pursued. 
3.2.2 A respondent-based research program 
At the beginning of this chapter I raised the question, why do we in computational lin- 
guistics study cooperative response generation? I have long felt that this is an important 
question to which inadequate attention has been paid. When one surveys the relevant 
literature, only one answer (and it is an implicit one at that) comes to  mind, namely, to 
circumscribe and model distinct forms of cooperative response behavior. While some in- 
teresting and useful results have come from this line of inquiry, they have, as noted herein, 
generally suffered from a lack of comparability and compatibility. 
I suggest instead that research in CRG should have two separate but related goals: 
first, to develop natural-language dialogue systems that are more generally capable of 
cooperative communication, and second, to develop a principled understanding of what 
it means to be cooperative. The arguments in Section 3.1 were intended to show that 
the questioner-based research program does not lead to progress toward those goals. My 
claim is that in order to achieve them we must adopt the respondent-based theoretical 
perspective. 
Like the questioner-based perspective, the respondent-based perspective implies a re- 
search methodology. That methodology is suggested by the analysis of c o o p  discussed in 
the previous section. If we look carefully at  that analysis, we can identify five aspects of 
knowledge that participate in the process of cooperative reasoning: 
1. the goals the respondent is attempting to achieve by means of her response; 
2. the conditions of the conversation that motivate the adoption of those goals; 
3. the knowledge and inference mechanisms needed to detect and reason about those 
conditions; 
4. the principles of cooperative reasoning that connect detected conditions to response 
goals; 
5. the response strategies that are useful for achieving response goals. 
A respondent-based research program aims to deepen our understanding of these compo- 
nents of cooperative reasoning. The particular program I propose thus consists of these 
five elements: 
1. developing declarative definitions, in a consistent formal notation, of the kinds of 
cooperative response goals respondents attempt to achieve; 
2. identifying the conditions of conversations that may lead respondents to adopt their 
various possible response goals; 
3. identifying the knowledge and reasoning resources needed to analyze models of con- 
versations and determine what sets of conditions hold; 
4. developing models of the reasoning processes connecting conversation models to the 
adoption by respondents of their response goals; 
5. developing models of the strategies that are useful for achieving various response 
goals and specifying their conditions of applicability. 
I will explain each of these elements briefly in turn. 
Developing declarative definitions 
I have already discussed at length the concern that questioner-based CRG systems produce 
behavior intended to achieve response goals that are never defined in the associated theory. 
If we are to make progress toward more generally-capable cooperative dialogue systems, 
we need to develop precise specifications of those goals. For example, we need to define the 
goals that underlie misconception correction, the goals that underlie obstacle elimination, 
and the goals that underlie over-answering behavior. I conjecture that if we were to examine 
all the work on CRG to date, we would discover that many systems share at  an abstract 
level the same response goal, varying mostly in the conditions under which they adopt 
that goal, the machinery needed to detect those conditions, and the strategies applied in 
pursuit of the goal. 
Identifying conditions of conversations 
As I have suggested, there is a distinction between the response goals that a given CRG 
system might want to achieve in a given query situation and the conditions of the con- 
versation that motivate the system's adoption of each of those goals. For example, 
COOP'S misconception-correction goals are motivated by presumption-failure conditions- 
conditions arising from the detection of false presumptions of the user's query. The propo- 
sition that "query Q falsely presumes TRUE(P)" (for P a proposition of the form "the set 
S of Ts is non-empty") can be viewed as an abstract condition that may or may not hold 
in a given query situation; its actual truth value in a particular situation (as perceived 
by the respondent) may serve to fully or partially motivate the adoption of one or more 
response goals. In COOP'S case, I argued that the truth of such propositions motivates the 
adoption of goals to cause the questioner to believe FALSE(P). Therefore, I claim that in 
order to better understand CRG, research must aim to develop better specifications of the 
conversational conditions that influence respondents' choice of cooperative response goals. 
Identifying knowledge and reasoning resources 
Perhaps one of the more valuable contributions of prior research has been the identification 
of some of the knowledge and reasoning resources needed to detect the conditions that mo- 
tivate cooperative response goals. For example, Allen's plan-recognition theory [Allen 831 
can be viewed as partially defining the knowledge-knowledge about plans and actions- 
and reasoning resources-the plan-inference mechanism-that permit dialogue systems to 
detect knowledge obstacles. The presence of a knowledge obstacle then functions as a 
condition that might motivate a decision to provide information in the response intended 
to eliminate that obstacle. Research must continue on techniques for detecting conditions 
that motivate cooperative response behavior; it should, however, be more meticulous about 
developing general specifications and representations of those conditions. 
Principles linking conditions to response goals 
As I have tried to show, there is an important phase of reasoning and decision making that 
comes between the detection of goal-motivating conditions and the respondent's formula- 
tion and adoption of her response goals. The questioner-based approach has made this 
phase all too easy to overlook or trivialize; this is the phase that must be based on real 
principles of cooperative behavior. This is the phase during which the respondent must 
decide, based on her knowledge of the truth status of various goal-motivating conditions, 
which cooperative response goals can and should be adopted. 
As argued earlier, for example, the detection of a misconception-the condition corre- 
sponding to the respondent's perception that the questioner holds a misconception-may 
not always demand that a correction be made part of the response. Other considerations 
may come into play in the process of deciding whether to issue a correction. The principles 
of reasoning according to which such decisions are made constitute a body of knowledge 
distinct from both that of the goal-motivating conditions and that of the goals themselves. 
It is in this body of knowledge, more than in any other, that we will ultimately find a 
theory of cooperative behavior. Modeling it will be a difficult task, but it will be essential 
as the dialogues that systems engage in become increasingly complex. 
Modeling response strategies 
For a given cooperative response goal there may be different ways of achieving i t  in a 
particular question-answering situation. For example, the different questioner-based mis- 
conception-correction systems can be viewed as implementations of different strategies 
(whose conditions of applicability are functions of the misconception type) for achieving 
goals of correction. More than one strategy a t  a time may be useful for achieving a given 
response goal, and there may be non-trivial knowledge and reasoning processes required 
to  select the best strategy. Developing precise specifications of these goal-achievement 
strategies and their conditions of applicability will be a useful direction for further research. 
Summary 
In this section it was suggested that  research in cooperative response generation should be 
directed toward two separate but related goals: the development of dialogue systems that 
are more generally capable of cooperative communication, and the formulation of a theory 
of cooperative behavior. I discussed five aspects of knowledge that  I claim participate in 
the cooperative reasoning process, and outlined a general program of research aimed a t  
deepening our understanding of those aspects of knowledge. 
3.2.3 Some issues in the development of cooperative dialogue systems 
If we follow the general research program that I have outlined and try t o  develop dialogue 
systems that  are cooperative respondents and not just models of cooperative responses, we 
will encounter many complexities of cooperative interaction that  can be neither studied 
nor modeled in a questioner-based framework. Several of these will be considered next. I 
will not be attempting to propose any solutions; I am merely discussing some observations 
about a few interesting examples of cooperative behavior that  would be worth investigating 
further in a respondent-based framework. The following points will be discussed: 
A respondent may choose not only whether to  cooperate but also t o  what degree she 
will cooperate. 
A cooperative respondent may be able to  distinguish her obligations from her options 
in a given response situation. 
A respondent's ability to cooperate is a function of the breadth and depth of her 
domain knowledge. 
A respondent's choice of response may be influenced by her evaluation of the ques- 
tioner's goals and plans. 
A respondent's choice of response may be influenced by both the mode of communi- 
cation and the amount of effort required to convey information. 
A respondent's own goals may affect her choice of response. 
Taken together, the examples discussed in this section provide strong evidence for the 
hypothesis that  responses must be viewed as actions planned t o  achieve one or more goals. 
A matter of degree 
In the past, cooperativeness has been treated as a discrete concept. That  is, a respondent 
was said to be cooperative if in a particular query situation she performed a particular 
cooperative act (such as correcting a misconception or over-answering a question), and 
was considered uncooperative if she failed to  perform that  act in that  situation. 
But this is an  oversimplification that  is reasonable only in the restricted kinds of query 
situations treated by questioner-based models. First of all, a respondent not only may 
choose whether to  cooperate with a questioner a t  all but also to what degree she will 
cooperate. This fact is apparent to anybody who has ever dealt with a government agency 
or any so-called "customer service" department. A respondent's willingness to  c o o p e r a t e  
the degree to  which she intends to c o o p e r a t e m a y  affect: 
the amount of resources she chooses t o  apply in detecting the conditions that  moti- 
vate cooperative goals. For example, a greater willingness to cooperate may lead a 
respondent to  devote more resources to  the task of identifying the questioner's goals, 
plans, and needs. This may in turn uncover more conditions requiring attention in 
the response; 
r her decisions regarding what cooperative response goals to  adopt. For example, a 
U N I X  consultant might respond to a query like "What does the df command do?,, 
by referring the questioner to  the U N I X  manual rather than actually answering the 
question; 
r how much effort the respondent expends trying to achieve her cooperative response 
goals. For example, correcting a misconception could be achieved with a simple 
denial, or with a more elaborate response (like the ones that  R O M P E R  produces). 
Furthermore, a respondent's willingness to  cooperate appears to  be not an  independent 
variable, but a product of other variables, such as the respondent's attitude toward the 
questioner (e.g., a person is likely to be far more willing to  cooperate with her spouse than 
with a stranger encountered on the street), the amount of time available for the interaction, 
and so on. 
One might argue that factors such as willingness to  cooperate and its attendant vari- 
ables can be ignored in computer models of discourse without loss of functionality (although 
see [Hovy 881 for some discussion of how interpersonal considerations might affect language 
generation), suggesting instead that question-answering systems be designed to  be "max- 
imally cooperative", or "as cooperative as possible". But this begs the question, because 
determining the amount of cooperativeness (assuming that  such a thing can actually be 
quantified) that  is desired or appropriate in a given situation appears to  be part of the 
very task of cooperative reasoning itself. Moreover, systems cannot in general get around 
this problem by saying everything they can think of. As Grice observed via his Maxim of 
QUANTITY [Grice 751, speakers who are perceived as saying too much may appear t o  be 
uncooperative, or worse, their loquacity may lead to unwanted implicatures. 
My point is that  the concept of "willingness to  cooperate" makes sense only in a 
respondent-based framework, that is, in a theory defining what it means t o  be coopera- 
tive. Because questioner-based models simulate fixed situations, the respondent's decision 
regarding how cooperative to  be is essentially "hard-wired", non-varying, and thus factored 
out of the model. 
Minimal requirements 
Although respondents appear to have some flexibility in deciding how cooperative they 
want to  be in a given situation, this mostly seems to  involve choosing how far to  exceed 
the minimal requirements of cooperation demanded by the situation. That is, in any 
given question-answering situation, there seems to  be a sense that R has a set of minimal 
obligations to be met in her response. Failing to  satisfy any of these would cause her 
to  be perceived by Q as uncooperative. Consider the following example from the U N I X  
transcripts: 
(38) Q: For a while now, I have been trying to  use Unix by printing out a lot of 
"man" files. These, however, are unwieldy and hard to reference. Is there 
a book from which these are taken, and if so, where can I get it? 
R: You can purchase the UNIX manual in its entirety in the Comp Center 
library on the second floor of Evans. This will set you back 30+ bucks 
and will not be accurate in all cases. This is because CF&O doesn't like 
to change to new operating systems, while around here, we boot the latest 
version and hope that it works. If you're really looking for the last word, 
get friendly with someone who has the 4.2 version manual. 
Note that R's response might very well have been perfectly cooperative and acceptable 
to  Q if she had said no more than, "You can purchase the UNIX manual in its entirety 
in the Comp Center library on the second floor of Evans". I would argue that in the 
conversation above, R had a minimal obligation to  address Q's desire to  obtain a hardcopy 
of the U N I X  manual. In the research framework I outlined earlier, this might suggest that 
some cooperative goals are obligatory while others are optional. If R fails to  achieve her 
obligatory cooperative goals (or a t  least address the conditions that motivate them), she 
will appear uncooperative. The information that R adds above and beyond the minimal 
requirements reflects a decision she has made to expend more effort on Q's behalf than 
the situation requires-a decision that might follow from other goals that R has, such as 
improving her relationship with Q (if Q held some position superior to R), impressing 
Q with her helpfulness, causing Q to recommend her for a better job than as a U N I X  
consultant, and so forth. 
As a corroborating factor, apologies, explanations, or justifications seem to be required 
in a conversation when a respondent is unable to meet her obligations. For example, if R 
did not know where Q could buy a copy of the manual, she might be obliged to respond 
with something like: 
(39) R: I know there is such a manual, but I'm afraid I don't know where you could 
buy it. Have you tried the bookstore? 
Here, in order to make it clear that she is still trying to be cooperative despite her inability 
to  help Q obtain a copy of the manual, R implicitly apologizes for her lack of knowledge 
and goes on to  suggest an alternate course of action for Q to take. The point is that 
while a respondent-based theory of CRG can and should account for a respondent's degree 
of intention to cooperate, it should also account for R7s understanding of her minimal 
obligations to  a questioner in a conversation, and for how her inability to meet any or all 
of those obligations might affect her response behavior. 
The limits of knowledge 
Rather than being an absolute, cooperativeness varies with the quantity, quality, and degree 
of detail of a respondent's knowledge. This is not an issue in simple domains, but it becomes 
noticeable in the richer domains that realistic natural-language systems will eventually have 
to  deal with. Consider the following example from the U N I X  transcripts. 
(40) Q: How do you change mode for a dotted file (such as .login)? 
R: You would use the same method as for any other file you own. Basically, 
just type "chmod mode filenames" where mode is "a*b7' with "a" equal to 
any combination of "u" (user), "g" (group), and "o" (others). ""'replaced 
by "+" (add permission), "-" (remove permission), or "=" (set to specified 
permission). Finally, "b" is replaced by a combination of "r" (read), "w" 
(write), and "x" (execute). Read the manual page if you would like more 
explanation of exactly what everything means. 
The response seems to be a perfectly reasonable and cooperative one. Q appears to hold 
a misconception that there is a special way to change the access mode of dotted files, 
a way different from that for normal (non-dotted) files. R has detected that apparent 
misconception, since she begins her response by explaining that there is no such special 
method. But given that Q raised the question, i t  seems perfectly reasonable for R to 
suppose either that Q does not know how to change the mode of any file, or does not know 
the correct command syntax. Consequently, R goes on to carefully describe the use of the 
chmod command. 
For the CRG theorist, one of the most revealing features of the U N I X  transcripts is that 
they occasionally contain more than one response to the same question.' Such is the case 
with this example. A second respondent replies as shown in (41). 
(41) R: The problem might be that you don't own your .login file. To save space, 
most of the .login files are linked together (i.e., they're all one file). To fix 
this, type the following: 
cp .login .login.copy 
rm .login (or rm -f .login, if that doesn't work) 
mv .login.copy .login 
Then you can chmod it, edit it,  or whatever. 
Evidently the second respondent has a piece of knowledge that the first lacks, namely, that 
.login files on the particular computer system used by Q are typically linked together. 
'Since the users' queries were mailed to a distribution list, occasionally more than one consultant would 
choose to reply. Sometimes the different responses simply reflect the different views held by the various 
respondents. Other times, it appears that one response is meant to clarify, augment, or correct one of 
the other responses (since a copy of each consultant's response was sent to the distribution list, so all 
consultants saw all responses to all queries). 
This has certain consequences, one of which is that the file will not be owned by Q, which 
in turn prevents him from (among other things) editing it or changing its access mode. 
This special knowledge enables some deep reasoning on R's part. First, she can com- 
prehend the significance of Q's use of . log in  as a particular example. Hypothesizing that 
Q's question might be motivated by some difficulty he is having operating on the . log in  
file, R is able to identify the likely source of Q's problem-that he does not own his . log in  
file-and then produce the more helpful response of the two. This is very much in accord 
with the "explanation-based" reasoning approach advocated by Quilici et al. (see Section 
2.3.2). 
Obviously, the respondent's chain of inference in the second example is subtle and is 
enabled only by her possession of a piece of domain-specific knowledge. This suggests 
that the amount of knowledge a respondent possesses will affect her ability to  detect the 
conditions that motivate cooperative goals. In the first case, R's relative lack of knowledge 
only permits her to  conclude that Q has a misconception. In the second case, R's richer 
knowledge allows her t o  construct a detailed representation of Q's predicament and thus 
recognize that different cooperative goals (other than misconception correction) are well 
motivated. 
Another significant point is that both responses are cooperative. We certainly do not 
want to  fault the first respondent for not knowing an arcane policy detail. But even in 
the absence of that knowledge, she can still be cooperative, although her response may 
perhaps not be as helpful as Q needs or would like. On the other hand, if the second 
respondent, in full possession of her unique knowledge, had provided the same response as 
the first, we would be inclined, I think, to  fault her for being uncooperative. This suggests 
that any definition of cooperative behavior must be established relative to  the respondent's 
knowledge, that is, we need a notion of a respondent's acting cooperatively "within the 
limits of her knowledge". 
This pair of examples argues strongly that it is wrongheaded to define cooperativeness 
in terms of the kinds of acts that respondents perform in various query situations. Fur- 
thermore, it suggests that it will not be possible or useful to formulate an objective list of 
criteria according to which a response can be judged "cooperative". Instead, we need to 
model cooperative behavior as I have argued: in terms of sets of goals that respondents 
try to  achieve in their responses. 
Evaluating goals 
A respondent's experiences and opinions influence how she chooses to cooperatively respond 
to  questions. Let's consider another interesting pair of responses taken from the U N I X  
transcripts. We have already seen the first of the pair in example (38). In this example, Q 
has indicated a goal of obtaining a hardcopy of the U N I X  manual pages. R seems to consider 
this a perfectly reasonable goal and so she tells Q where to get the manual, including other 
pertinent details such as its price and accuracy. In fact, what she actually does above and 
beyond giving Q the information he needs to  achieve his goal is critique his plan. That 
is, Q has indicated he has a general plan for operating in the U N I X  environment: when he 
gets stuck, he wants to  be able to  refer to  a hardcopy of the manual. But R has evaluated 
this plan and found it to have some shortcomings: first, the manual is costly, and second, 
the information it contains will not always be accurate. R exceeds her minimal response 
obligations because she believes that Q might find her comments on his plan useful. 
Now compare the first response with one from a different consultant, as shown in 
(42). 
(42) R: I think you'll find that having a hardcopy of the manual might not be of 
too much help. If you are just starting out with UNIX, you might want to  
get "Unix for Beginners" or some other intro doc from the CF&O library 
(2nd floor). They have a list of the publications they sell in the library. 
You might also wish to purchase an intro doc to  vi, the text editor of choice 
around here. 
In this second case, R's beliefs about the utility and reasonableness of Q's plan (to refer 
to the U N I X  manual when he gets stuck) with respect t o  his more general goal (of learning 
how to use U N I X  and/or of accomplishing tasks in U N I X  effectively) suggest to her that 
there are better plans than the one Q has proposed. Her ability to evaluate plans in this 
way is one of her resources as a cooperative respondent-one of the ways she identifies 
conditions that motivate cooperative response goals. 
Once again, we would neither want to declare one response cooperative and the other 
not, nor want to rank one response "more cooperative" than the other. Rather, the 
examples suggest that in fulfilling their cooperative conversational goals, respondent-based 
dialogue systems may need to  be able to  question and take issue with the plans and goals 
proposed by questioners and choose responses accordingly. 
Mode and communicative effort 
The mode of communication affects how the response to a given query is formulated. Con- 
sider the distinction between what might be called real-time and delayed-response interac- 
tions. The dialogues recorded in the U N I X  transcripts are all examples of delayed-response 
interactions: the questioner formulates his query and transmits it to  the consultant, who 
reads and responds to it a t  some time in the future. There is a similar delay for the 
consultant, as her response also will be read at  some unknown time after it is sent. In 
interactions of this sort, we often see questions presented in detail, as the questioner ap- 
pears to  be including all the information that he or she believes could possibly be helpful 
to  or needed by the consultant in formulating a reply. The questioner's goal seems to be 
to  avoid lengthy exchanges where the consultant must request further information or ask 
for clarification. A typical example is shown in (43). 
(43) Q: What is "east"? Whenever I am logged on through a 1200 baud modem 
and do a "w" command the machine says that I am doing "east" but when 
I type "east" I am asked for a login name and password. It is apparently 
a host of some sort but why am I logged on through it when I call Cory? 
The questioner could simply have asked, "What does 'east' do?" but that might not be 
enough for R to be able to provide a useful reply, or the kind of reply that Q is interested 
in. But rather than take the chance that R might find it necessary to ask for clarification, 
Q transmits all the details he believes R might need, both to understand the question and 
to produce a relevant response. Responses are often equally elaborate, for the same reason: 
the respondent wants to avoid putting the questioner in the position of having to  request 
further information. This suggests that the respondent's knowledge of the cost associated 
with each turn of the conversation may influence which goals, and perhaps how many of 
them, she decides to  attempt in a single response. 
In contrast, real-time interactions (like those recorded in the EMACS transcripts) have 
the opposite characteristics. Since questions can be asked and answered relatively quickly, 
the cost of providing detailed, carefully explained and justified answers may be consider- 
ably greater than the cost of being concise and allowing one's interlocutor to  make specific 
requests for elaboration and clarification. Thus dialogue participants in real-time interac- 
tions tend to communicate in terse phrases and make more liberal assumptions about each 
other's knowledge, of both the world and the state of the conversation. This is particularly 
evident in the collaborative-task dialogues recorded in the EMACS transcripts; a typical 
example is shown in (44). 
(44) Q: Beginning of region. How? 
R: Type ESC-m. It should say mark set at the bottom of the screen. 
Q seems able to draw upon his beliefs about what is mutually believed about the state of 
the conversation when framing his query (which otherwise is nearly uninterpretable). 
Of course, the abbreviated nature of real-time interactions tends to increase the chance 
of miscommunication and the need to  enter "debugging dialogues", as the example in (45) 
illustrates. 
(45) R: Yes. At what point are you being kept? 
Q: I am at  the beginning of the text to  be edited. 
R: I mean, how much of the macro defn, [sic] have you finished? 
Q: I entered the search command and then closed the macro. 
In a delayed-response interaction, R would have had the time to plan a clearer, more 
specific request for information. 
Apart from the mode, the pure physical effort involved in carrying out acts of commu- 
nication seems to  affect how respondents formulate their replies. For example, rather than 
typing a description of how a particular U N I X  command works, a consultant might simply 
refer the questioner to  the appropriate manual page, as shown below. 
(46) Q: How do the 'history7 and 'alias7 commands work? There do not seem to 
be 'man' entries for them. 
R: Try "man csh". 
But if the communication medium permitted speech, the respondent might be more will- 
ing to  provide a verbal explanation. This seems to tie in with the issue of how much 
responsibility the respondent has to address the needs of the questioner in a given dialogue 
setting. 
The point of this discussion is that both the mode of communication and the effort 
involved in communicating are variables that affect cooperative behavior. But these vari- 
ables have no place in questioner-based models, since such models factor out the process 
by which a respondent chooses her method of response, the very process that would be 
influenced by those variables. 
Respondent's goals 
As shown in UCEGO [Chin 88a], if arespondent is allowed to  have her own goals in the world, 
separate from those of the questioner, then there is a possibility, if not a likelihood, that 
they will have an important influence upon how replies are chosen. Should her goals conflict 
with those she believes are held by the questioner, she might decide t o  be uncooperative or 
perhaps try to  persuade the questioner to  adopt different goals. On the other hand, if her 
goals complement those of the questioner, she might be motivated (subject t o  her sense of 
responsibility and willingness to  cooperate) to  modify her response (and perhaps her own 
goals) accordingly. For example, if Q were to ask R for directions to some particular place 
and it so happened that R was going there herself (or even just in that  direction), rather 
than giving the directions she might simply invite Q to  accompany her. 
3.3 Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter I have characterized two perspectives on cooperative response generation, 
distinguished on the basis of whether the point of view from which the principles of coop- 
eration are defined is the questioner's or the respondent's. 
The questioner-based perspective 
I characterized the questioner-based perspective as defining the principles of cooperative 
reasoning from the questioner's point of view, devising methods that  natural-language 
dialogue systems can use to  perform certain predefined kinds of "cooperative" behavior. 
Development of questioner-based models has followed a three-part research program: 
1. informally identifying the needs, desires, preferences, and expectations of questioners 
that are potentially relevant to the processing of a query in a given query situation; 
2. identifying response strategies that can be used to meet the needs, satisfy the desires, 
accommodate the preferences, and live up to the expectations of a questioner in a 
given query situation; 
3. developing representations of query situations and designing reasoning procedures on 
those models that  can enable dialogue systems in the modeled situations to  respond 
using the desired response strategy. 
I then claimed that  the systems resulting from this research program have attempted to 
achieve goals of one of the following three general types: 
1. avoiding adverse effects on the questioner; 
2. improving a natural-language interface's ease of use; 
3. adding useful functionality to a question-answering system. 
I argued that in no case were the specific cooperative goals that a given system was designed 
t o  achieve ever formally stated, and that as a result the reasons for adopting those goals 
were never defined. 
In exploring the computational consequences of the questioner-based approach, I de- 
veloped an abstract architectural model of previously-developed CRG systems. Using this 
architecture, I argued that the questioner-based approach has created an army of models of 
restricted question-answering situations in which predefined responses were generated and 
declared to be "cooperative". Because the approach permits the situation models to be 
defined inconsistently across theories, the resulting theories have turned out to be largely 
incompatible with one another. 
I claimed that the theoretical consequence of the questioner-based approach is that the 
resulting models have only described response behavior that seems to be cooperative. The 
models have given no guidance regarding the principles that drive cooperative behavior. 
Finally, I argued that more general cooperative dialogue systems will have to  integrate 
different forms of cooperative behavior in their responses. But questioner-based models 
have been developed in different domains with different implicit assumptions, have consid- 
ered different aspects of the response-generation process, and have focused on developing 
machinery to generate particular responses rather than on identifying the general reason- 
ing principles from which those responses are derived. These problems stand in the way of 
integration and so I conclude that the questioner-based approach is ultimately the wrong 
one to  take if we want to develop truly cooperative natural-language dialogue systems. 
The respondent-based perspective 
In opposition to the questioner-based perspective, I described the respondent-based per- 
spective as identifying and answering questions concerning why and how respondents 
choose the goals that give rise to behavior that is perceived as cooperative. At the heart of 
the respondent-based perspective is the view that responses reflect the respondent's goals- 
i.e., that the natural-language utterances of a response should be treated as realizing, in 
concert, a plan the respondent was using to achieve certain goals. 
Taking that view as a hypothesis, I distinguished five different elements of a respondent- 
based model of cooperative response generation: 
1. the goals that respondents adopt and try to achieve in their responses; 
2. the conditions of the conversation that motivate various response goals; 
3. the knowledge and reasoning resources needed to  determine the status of the goal- 
motivating conditions; 
4. the reasoning processes and principles by which response goals are actually adopted; 
5. the strategies that may be used to achieve a given response goal. 
My claim is that a consistent program of research aimed at fleshing out the details of these 
five theoretical elements will help us both to build more capable cooperative dialogue 
systems and to better comprehend the nature of cooperative behavior. In the rest of this 
dissertation, I will develop a theoretical framework within which we can explore problems 
in CRG from the respondent's perspective. 
Chapter 4 
Cooperative Response Planning 
Systems 
In Section 3.2, I introduced a new perspective-the respondent-based perspective-on coop- 
erative response generation and argued that it should be used as the theoretical foundation 
for the design of natural-language dialogue systems that  are to  function as cooperative re- 
spondents rather than serve as models of particular kinds of cooperative responses. At the 
heart of this new perspective is the language-as-action principle that  responses reflect the 
respondent's attempt to  achieve one or more high-level response goals. But if responses are 
to  be viewed as actions planned to achieve goals, it follows that  cooperative respondents 
should be viewed as planning agents. 
That  conclusion sets the stage for the rest of this dissertation. My goal is to  characterize 
the design principles and general structure of a cooperative response generation (CRG) 
system whose core component is an agent capable of forming and adopting goals and 
developing plans to satisfy them. Although this is only one of its components, I will 
nevertheless refer t o  the overall system as a Cooperative Response Planning System, or 
CRPS. 
In this chapter I will discuss a proposed architecture design for a CRPS. First I will 
consider its top-level structure and then examine the architectures of its critical process- 
ing elements, paying particular attention to  the organization of the planning component. 
Although my long-term goal is to identify the kinds of knowledge and reasoning processes 
needed to generate responses of the sorts found in naturally occurring help dialogues such 
as the U N I X  and EMACS transcripts, the particular CRPS design that  I will be describ- 
ing here is to  be seen only as a first approximation to  a theory of cooperative response 
planning. 
The principal contribution of the architecture is its decomposition of the CRG problem 
into subtasks with limited channels of communication. I will argue that  the divisions 
I impose are well motivated from naturally occurring data. Furthermore, I will show 
how the design illuminates theoretically-significant problems that from a questioner-based 
perspective would be overlooked. Identifying these problems is an important step toward 
the development of "truly cooperative" natural-language dialogue systems. Although much 
work remains to  be done before they can be solved, I believe that  simply posing them 
will provide insight into the complexities of CRG when the task is approached from the 
respondent's viewpoint. 
I will begin with a description of the overall architecture of a CRPS. Next, I will focus 
on the design of its first major processing element, the module that constructs the dynamic 
knowledge base from which the planner reasons. I then take up the examination of the 
planner and sketch its operation. 
4.1 Top-Level Architecture of a CRPS 
I distinguish three functional reasoning components comprising the top-level architecture 
of a CRPS: the Conversation Modeler, the Response Planner, and the Language Generator. 
The corresponding architecture diagram is shown in Figure 4.1. The arrows indicate flow 
of data and control between the components. Here I will describe them briefly. 
Conversation Modeler An important concern in the design of any planning system is 
the question of where its goals originate. A CRPS is different from other planning systems 
in that it does not acquire its goals from some external source but rather forms them itself. 
This is because choosing the goals that the system will pursue is itself one of the crucial 
stages of the process of cooperative response generation. 
The goals that a CRPS forms and attempts to  achieve are motivated at  least in part 
by its interpretation of the questioner's input utterances and by its understanding of the 
purpose and direction of the conversation in which it is participating (cf. Grice's statement 
of the Cooperative Principle, discussed in Section 2.1). This implies that a CRPS needs 
to  build and maintain some kind of model of the ongoing conversation. It is in this 
conversation model that the initial stimulus for the system's response-directed reasoning 
will be found. The conversation model is a dynamically-constructed augmentation of the 
planner's basic knowledge base, and is built by the Conversation Modeler. The conversation 
model's general role in cooperative response planning will be discussed in more depth in 
Section 4.2. 
Response Planner By reasoning from the conversation model, the Response Planner 
both forms the goals it will attempt to  achieve in the system's response and develops 
a corresponding response plan. During its operation, the Response Planner may extend 
the conversation model with data derived from its attempts to  form, adopt, and satisfy 
goals. The response is emitted as a collection of surface goals-goals specified in sufficient 
detail that they can be achieved directly using natural-language expressions. The Response 
Planner is the center of the system's cooperative response reasoning; the principles and 
general structure of its design will be considered in Section 4.3. 
Language Generator The Language Generator is the linguistic planning component of 
the CRPS. It takes the surface goals generated by the Response Planner and constructs 
natural-language text to realize them. While interesting, the design and operation of the 
Language Generator and the details of its interface with the Response Planner are con- 
cerns that are beyond the scope of the present enterprise. Instead, I will make the gross 
simplifying assumption that the surface goals emitted by the Response Planner can be 
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Figure 4.1: Top-Level Architecture of a Cooperative Response Planning System 
sufficiently well specified for the Language Generator to  realize them directly using expres- 
sions in the target language. For more detailed exploration of some of the complexities of 
the natural-language generation process, see (among many others) Appelt [Appelt 85b], 
Hovy [Hovy 881, Moore and Paris [Moore 891, and Rubinoff [Rubinoff 901. 
4.2 The Conversation Modeler 
In domains of realistic complexity, natural-language dialogue systems will necessarily have 
to  maintain general knowledge bases of substantial scope and detail. The beliefs they hold 
will be of many different kinds, including but not limited to: 
beliefs about the kinds of properties objects in the world may have; 
beliefs about the current (and possibly past) values of those properties; 
beliefs about the static or dynamic nature of those properties; 
beliefs about general characteristics of the world; 
beliefs about possible ways in which the world changes over time; 
beliefs about the ways in which actions in the world can alter states of the world; 
beliefs about other agents that operate in the world; 
beliefs about the system itself; 
beliefs about the ways in which linguistic actions can be used to  affect the mental 
states of other agents. 
How a CRPS acquires its general knowledge base is not of concern here. 
During the course of a conversation, a CRPS constructs a special database of beliefs that 
are relevant to the dialogue. This database, which I call the conversation model, contains a t  
least the system's interpretation of the questioner's utterances. However, I will argue that 
other reasoning resources may need to be invoked-augmenting the conversation model- 
before the Response Planner has enough data from which to  construct an adequate reply. 
(The conversation model may also be extended during the Response Planner's operation; 
some ways in which this occurs are discussed in Section 4.3.6.) 
In the architecture shown in Figure 4.1, the Conversation Modeler is the component 
that constructs the initial conversation model. It processes the natural-language input 
received from the questioner and builds a structure that represents those details of the 
question-answering context, derived both directly and indirectly from the input, that are 
relevant to the system's selection of a cooperative response. Note that the Conversation 
Modeler does not provide goals for the system; rather, i t  provides the data from which the 
Response Planner will reason to choose response goals. 
4.2.1 The conversation model 
Before a CRPS can begin to choose an appropriate and useful response, it must start with 
some kind of representation of the query that was posed to it. But a representation of 
the query alone is not in general sufficient to  support the range of response goals that 
cooperative respondents appear to  adopt. If a CRPS is to demonstrate the same flexible 
range of abilities that human cooperative respondents have, it must construct a richer, 
more detailed model representing not only its beliefs about the questioner that can be 
derived directly from his natural-language utterances, but also those beliefs whose deriva- 
tion requires the application of special reasoning procedures such as plan recognition and 
explanation generation.f 
I call this model the conversation model because it represents the relevant details of the 
"current conversation". However, despite the use of the word "conversation", I will not be 
considering the complexities of CRG that are a function of extended discourse. Rather, I 
will view the conversation model as derived from the processing of a single (possibly multi- 
sentential) input "turn" in isolation from previous discourse. Extending the model to 
cope with both discourse and mixed-initiative dialogue (such as clarification subdialogues 
[Litman 84bl) is a separable research problem. 
The conversation model is a kind of "relevant knowledge poolv-a dynamically-con- 
structed knowledge base containing all the information made explicit in or inferred from 
the questioner's utterances that is initially useful to the response-selection process. A is a 
set of beliefs, derived from the system's general knowledge store, which may motivate the 
system's initial response goals. (The use of the word initially here is significant, as the 
planner may change its goals during its operation-see the discussions in Sections 4.3.5 
and 4.3.6.) 
Identifying all the elements that must be part of the conversation model (and develop- 
ing adequate representation schemes for them) in order to support cooperative response 
generation remains an important ongoing research task. Among the reasonable candidates 
for inclusion are these: 
the questioner's query; 
intensional representations of entities referred to (as described in the questioner's 
utterances); 
evaluations of the well-formedness of referring expressions; 
referents, if they exist, of referring expressions and parts thereof; 
beliefs about the questioner's goals, plans, preferences, and constraints; 
other beliefs about the questioner's beliefs and intentions derived through explanation- 
based reasoning. 
This of course is not an exhaustive list. The point is to suggest that in realistic NLQA 
applications, the demands of cooperative response generation may require a conversation 
model that is quite rich indeed. 
- 
'I am using "explanation generation" here in the same diagnostic sense as in Quilici et 01. [Quilici 881, 
that is, a process of generating a plausible explanation (represented as a chain of beliefs) for why the 
questioner might hold a particular valid or invalid belief. 
4.2.2 Theoretical significance of the conversation model 
In separating "conversation modeling" from the rest of cooperative response planning, I 
am claiming that we can identify some set of knowledge-bearing reasoning resources that 
are routinely invoked prior to response planning. That is, there is a distinct stage of coop- 
erative response planning during which the system amasses a body of information which 
it then uses as a basis for forming its response goals. The richness of its conversation 
models critically affects a CRPS's ability to  provide useful and helpful responses; conse- 
quently, developing a theory of the conversation model involves making claims regarding 
the knowledge that cooperative respondents must have available or be able to derive in 
order to  function properly. 
Previous research efforts in CRG, in the course of modeling different manifestations of 
cooperative response behavior, have developed limited theories about the knowledge struc- 
tures that NLQA systems might require to produce particular forms of behavior under 
study. Certain structures have been proposed as part of the respondent's general do- 
main knowledge (for example, Mays's temporal axioms [Mays 84b], McCoy's perspective- 
enhanced domain model [McCoy 881, and the plan libraries that are required by most mod- 
els of plan inference), while others have been proposed as derived from or updated during 
a dialogue (for example, Carberry's context model [Carberry 881, Pollack's explanatory 
plans [Pollack 861, and the explanation chains constructed by Quilici et al.'s AQUA system 
[Quilici 881). 
But when one tries to envisage a system that will possess a repertoire of cooperative 
abilities, questions about both the theoretical status of and the relationships among all 
these knowledge structures become significant. For example, one might ask of a knowledge 
structure or knowledge-bearing procedure whether it represents an actual claim about the 
cognitive capacities of cooperative respondents or is instead a tool designed only to  make a 
particular response simulation work. Of particular interest is the question of how different 
structure-building operations participate in the response-planning process. Which ones are 
performed routinely prior to  response planning and which are invoked only when demanded 
by the response planner? These are challenging questions that arise only when the CRG 
problem is approached from the respondent's perspective. 
The Conversation Modeler is conceived of as comprising only those structure-building 
resources that are routinely invoked prior to  response planning. This gives rise to  the 
following question: how can we determine whether a given reasoning procedure is routinely 
performed prior to  response planning? I do not have a satisfactory answer to  that question; 
for the present, I offer the following pair of conditions as a first approximation to  an answer: 
( C l )  The procedure must produce information necessary for a CRPS to identify the range 
of goals it needs to satisfy in order to produce responses that are adequately cooperative. 
(C2) There is no reasonable way to decide invoke the procedure on the basis of other 
evidence that could be found in the conversation model. 
To grasp the intuition behind these two conditions, let us consider the process of goal 
inference. Research has shown that when deciding how to reply, respondents seem to 
require access to  beliefs about the goal or goals that underlie a questioner's utterances 
(see, for example, [Allen 831). Examples (47) and (48) demonstrate that  respondents will 
often request more information if they believe that  their comprehension of the questioner's 
goal (and plan) is inadequate for selecting a helpful reply. 
(47) Q: What are the rules concerning use of TELNET? Can I use it when the 
system is lightly loaded, or not at  all. Please advise me. 
R: The use of telnet t o  reach remote arpa sites is restricted t o  official arpa 
business only. What particular site to  do you want t o  get to? 
(48) Q: How do I erase the binding? 
R: You don't, but why would you want to? (You ought to always choose 
ctrl-H or some unused key to  bind it to  in the first place of course). 
In (47)) R can infer that  Q wants to connect (using TELNET) to  some remote computer. 
Her response can be interpreted as correcting an evident misconception that  permission to  
use T E L N E T  depends upon system load instead of upon the purposes for which the network 
is being used. This correction, however, does not address Q's desire t o  connect to a remote 
computer. But in order to  address that goal, R needs a specification of the machine to 
which Q wishes to  connect (so that she might determine whether it is reachable by means 
other than TELNET).  That  is, R needs a more precise understanding of Q's goal in order 
t o  provide an adequately cooperative response. 
In (48), it seems quite clear that R is attempting to  ascertain the goal that  Q aims 
t o  achieve by "erasing the binding". Once again, R seems to be motivated by a goal of 
ensuring that  her response has left Q in a position to  achieve his goal (or some reasonable 
substitute therefor). These two examples illustrate that  respondents reason both from and 
about their beliefs about questioners' intentions. 
Thus the ability of agents to  respond cooperatively seems to  depend upon the availabil- 
ity of knowledge about questioners' goals. Except in artificially-constrained domains, an 
agent who lacks (and cannot acquire) such knowledge will often find herself unable to  fulfill 
her responsibilities as a cooperative respondent. More importantly, as yet no procedures 
are known either for deciding whether the results of goal inference might be needed in 
order t o  produce an adequately cooperative response or for computing how many of Q's 
goals and the relationships between them R needs to  infer. (This is because questioner- 
based models never needed to  make such decisions.) Goal inference simply seems to  be 
one of the reasoning procedures that  respondents must a t  least at tempt before they have 
a sufficiently solid foundation for deciding how they ought to  respond. 
The two conditions stated above try to  capture the intuition that  there is some mini- 
mum set of reasoning procedures that  must be invoked t o  build a sufficiently solid knowl- 
edge foundation for a cooperative respondent's response-planning apparatus. Condition C2 
is intended to  restrict that set to  just those procedures whose invocation cannot be made 
conditional on the results of tests on the output of other elements of the Conversation 
Modeler's collection. 
To see how Condition C2 might justify excluding a procedure from the Conversation 
Modeler's collection, let us consider the addition of a plan synthesis procedure. We could 
expect a plan synthesizer (such as Luria's K I P  planner [Luria 881) to be called when the 
cooperative response planner decides that it needs to  construct a new plan for a goal. The 
need for such a procedure is suggested by examples such as (49): 
(49) Q: For a while now, I have been trying to use Unix by printing out a lot of 
"man" files. These, however, are unwieldy and hard to reference. Is there 
a book from which these are taken, and if so, where can I get it? 
R: I think you'll find that having a hardcopy of the manual might not be of 
too much help. If you are just starting out with UNIX, you might want to 
get "Unix for Beginners" or some other intro doc from the CF&O library 
(2nd floor). They have a list of the publications they sell in the library. 
You might also wish to purchase an intro doc to  vi, the text editor of choice 
around here. 
We might reasonably suppose Q's top-level goal to be something like, "Q is able to perform 
tasks in UNIX," and that Q believes that "having a hardcopy of the U N I X  manual" is a step 
toward that goal. Given such an analysis, R appears to question the usefulness of that 
step, suggesting what she considers to be a more advantageous approach. In order to  offer 
such advice, R presumably must be able to synthesize a plan that from her point of view 
is preferable to  the one inferable from Q's utterances. But does this imply that a plan 
synthesizer should be incorporated into the Conversation Modeler? 
Not necessarily. Consider the response provided by a different consultant, shown in 
(50). 
(50) R: You can purchase the UNIX manual in its entirety in the Comp Center 
library on the second floor of Evans. This will set you back 30+ bucks 
and will not be accurate in all cases. This is because CF&O doesn't like 
to  change to new operating systems, while around here, we boot the latest 
version and hope that it works. If you're really looking for the last word, 
get friendly with someone who has the 4.2 version manual. 
Ignoring the last sentence, this response gives no indication that R performed any plan 
synthesis a t  all. (The last sentence seems to  demand an explicit decision made later to 
invoke a planner.) That in itself is not sufficient to discount plan synthesis as a Conver- 
sation Modeler operation. However, there also seem to be reasonable bases for deciding 
whether or not to  invoke a plan synthesis mechanism. For example, the respondent might 
be able to evaluate the questioner's plan according to such metrics as simplicity or conven- 
tionality without resorting to the construction of a plan of her own. If that were possible, 
the response planner would be able to call the plan synthesizer on demand rather than 
routinely. Indeed, the decision to call a plan synthesizer might be heavily influenced by the 
degree to which the respondent is willing to commit resources on behalf of the questioner: 
if the questioner's plan looks workable, the respondent might simply decide not to  make 
the effort to determine whether a better plan exists. 
The point of this discussion, however, is not to argue against the routine invocation of 
a plan synthesizer when building the conversation model; whether it is or is not a routine 
computation is an open question. Rather, I am suggesting that conditions C1 and C2 
work in concert to provide at least a rough guideline for distinguishing the knowledge- 
bearing resources that function as part of a respondent's basic apparatus for perceiving 
and understanding language from those resources over whose application the respondent 
seems to exert conscious control. 
4.2.3 A simple version of the Conversation Modeler 
The discussion so far has examined the general role and theoretical status of the Conver- 
sation Modeler in a cooperative response planning system. In this section I will define a 
simple version of the Conversation Modeler. This should help t o  clarify some of the issues 
with which designers of response planning systems need to  be concerned. 
This limited version of a Conversation Modeler assumes the following subset of knowl- 
edge elements mentioned earlier: 
a representation of the questioner's query; 
a representation of the most general goal relevant to  the conversation2 that the 
respondent believes the questioner is trying to achieve (hereinafter referred to as the 
top-level goal); 
a representation of the questioner's plan that relates the query to  that goal; 
a set of comments representing the respondent's evaluation of the questioner's plan. 
I conjecture that conversation models must be at least this rich in order to  support CRG. 
A representation of the query is needed if only as a clue to  the information that Q 
believes he needs. Without access to some model of the query, the respondent would be 
unable to  provide an answer if she believed it would be useful. Strong arguments support- 
ing the need for knowledge of both Q7s plan and goal have been made by many others: 
such knowledge is the key to modeling responses that address the purposes underlying Q's 
query rather than just the query itself. Finally, Pollack convincingly argues [Pollack 861 
that inferred plans must be able to reflect questioners' underlying incorrect beliefs; conse- 
quently the conversation model must also contain annotations indicating the respondent's 
evaluation of the plan, noting the kind (and perhaps also the source) of any errors detected. 
The architecture of a Conversation Modeler capable of producing these elements is shown 
in Figure 4.2. 
As shown in the figure, the Conversation Modeler consists of three sequential processing 
elements: an input analyzer, a plan inference mechanism, and a plan evaluation mechanism. 
Input analyzer 
The input analyzer translates the input natural-language utterances into a suitable internal 
representation language. The design of this component is beyond the scope of this effort; 
an adequate design will be assumed. 
'The notion of the most general goal relevant to the conversation is a rather subtle one. Exactly how 
it might be mechanically identified is an open research problem. To the best of my knowledge, all current 
models of plan inference never have to determine the toplevel goal; it is always provided in the input or 
otherwise made explicit. Pollack's SPIRIT system, for example, is always given the questioner's toplevel 
goal [Pollack 861, and Allen's inference system works with a two-element space of possible top-level goals 
[Allen 831. 
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Plan inference mechanism 
The plan inference mechanism takes as its input the data generated by the input analyzer 
and constructs a model of the plan that the system believes the questioner is pursuing, 
based on its interpretation of his utterances. 
I will make the assumption that from the questioner's input utterances, the Conversa- 
tion Modeler can identify both a request for information and a top-level goal. The request 
represents the information literally requested3 by the questioner. The top-level goal is the 
3Although I will not consider the processing of indirect speech acts [Searle 751 here, it  is my position 
that queries do have context-independent, literal interpretations that must be retained somewhere in the 
system's model of the conversation (but cf. [Allen 89, Hinkelman 89, Hinkelman 901 for a different point 
of view). While respondents may ignore the literal interpretation of an indirect request when framing a 
reply, this reflects a choice that they have made. Moreover, a CRPS cannot be denied access to a query's 
literal interpretation because it may need to respond to the literal request if the indirect request cannot be 
satisfied, as shown in (51). 
(51) Q: Can you tell me the time? 
most general goal the questioner is pursuing that is relevant to  the current dialogue. 
I will assume that the plan inference mechanism can infer an unambiguous plan (cf. 
my discussion and analysis of the work of van Beek and Cohen on page 40). This does not 
seem to be a serious limitation, and it eliminates the complexities of reasoning involved in 
deciding what to  do when the system cannot determine exactly how the questioner plans 
to  achieve his top-level goal. 
Like Pollack, I will not make the valid-plan assumption [Pollack 861-the assumption 
that the questioner's plan represents a correct way to accomplish his goal-because recog- 
nizing and addressing the mistakes people make in forming their plans is an essential part 
of cooperative behavior. 
Plan evaluation mechanism 
Not only am I following Pollack in abandoning the valid-plan assumption, I am also fol- 
lowing her in making a plan evaluation procedure a required step in the process of building 
conversation models. The plan evaluation mechanism (or simply, the plan evaluator) takes 
as input the plan structure produced by the plan inference mechanism. It inspects that 
structure and annotates it in a variety of ways, indicating any and all errors it finds and 
their consequences. Interesting research problems include designing a plan evaluator (and 
especially exploring the relationship between plan inference and evaluation) and determin- 
ing a useful set of plan annotations. 
4.2.4 Consequences of incompleteness and incorrectness 
With respect to the beliefs comprising the planning agent's reasoning environment-both 
those held at the initiation of the dialogue and those that are derived from the questioner's 
utterances to  form the conversation model-at least two assumptions are possible: com- 
pleteness and correctness. The completeness assumption implies that the agent possesses 
exhaustive knowledge of her environment. By that assumption, if in the "real world" David 
Dinkins is the Mayor of New York City, the agent must also have that as one of her beliefs. 
The correctness assumption, on the other hand, implies that all of the agent's beliefs are 
"correct", that is, in accord with some notion of what might be called "objective truth". 
Thus if the agent holds a belief that "David Dinkins is the Mayor of New York City", and 
the agent's beliefs are assumed to  be correct, then in the "real world" the person denoted 
in the agent's belief space by "David Dinkins" must actually hold the office of Mayor of 
the City of New York. 
As a simplification, past models of CRG have assumed that the system's knowledge 
was complete and correct. It is understood that these assumptions must ultimately be 
abandoned. This section suggests that their abandonment will likely require that conver- 
sation models be able to  indicate which aspects of the system's incomplete and uncertain 
knowledge are relevant to  the response being planned. 
R: No, I left my watch at home. 
The point is that the response would be unacceptable had the question been, "What time is it?" Thus the 
reasoner cannot discard the literal request. 
The completeness assumption 
Only in artificially-constrained reasoning domains is the completeness assumption plau- 
sible. But the concession that a response planner's knowledge is likely to  be incomplete 
has important implications for the design of the Conversation Modeler and the models it 
constructs. 
As Examples (40) and (41) demonstrated (see page 70), the incompleteness of a respon- 
dent's knowledge may lead to an incorrect diagnosis of the questioner's problem, which can 
in turn affect the response provided. In that example, the respondent's apparent lack of 
knowledge that . login files are typically linked together (and thus not owned by the ques- 
tioner) leads her to analyze Q's utterances as manifesting a simple misconception (that 
"dotted" files are handled differently than regular files when changing their access permis- 
sions). This is a case in which R both does not know some proposition P and does not 
know that she lacks that knowledge. In Example (52) the problem is more obvious: 
(52) Q: Does UNIX support any sending or receiving files thru protocol transfers? 
R: UNIX supports TCPIIP. 
In this example, R's knowledge of "protocol transfers" appears to be incomplete, as it 
fails to include standard dialup-based file-transfer protocols as KERMIT and Z M O D E M .  (R's 
response gives no evidence that she knows of anything besides T C P / I P  that could be de- 
scribed as a "protocol transfer" .) Consequently she is unable to model "protocol transfers" 
as an expression having more than a single possible referent.4 
Incomplete knowledge of this sort, in which an agent lacks knowledge and does not know 
that she does, is an unavoidable fact of life, one that will affect natural-language dialogue 
systems as well. As in the case of Examples (40) and (41), such gaps may lead to responses 
that from the respondent's point of view are helpful, informative, and "cooperative", but 
which might be judged otherwise by the questioner (or by some other, better-informed 
observer). This is one of the reasons I have argued that, when modeled as a conversational 
goal, LLbeing cooperative" is best defined from the respondent's perspective. 
Analysis of naturally-occurring data also provides evidence that responding agents often 
are aware of the relevant gaps in their knowledge and that this knowledge influences the 
planning of their responses. We can see this reflected in Example (53). 
(53) Q: Do you know if there is any network link to ucbeuler? I want to send some 
mail over there. 
R: The network link is not up yet. Some time in the near future it will be 
connected to the Berknet, but I don't know exactly when. It is mostly a 
software change on ucbvax. 
Here R explicitly indicates both that she knows a description of a certain piece of in- 
formation that would be of interest to Q-the date when ucbeuler will be connected to 
*As an alternative analysis, R might be applying a strict interpretation to the verb "support." Network 
communication protocols such as TCP/IP typically require explicit support in the operating system kernel 
itself, whereas application programs such as KERMIT and ZMODEM require no particular accommodations. 
Under this analysis, R's response suggests that she failed to take into account differences in meaning and 
interpretation arising from differences in domain beliefs between the dialogue participants. Such failure 
might be due to a different sort of incompleteness of R's knowledge. 
the Berknet-and that  she does not actually have the knowledge so described. This ex- 
ample shows how R's incomplete knowledge and her awareness thereof might affect the 
information content of her response.5 
The most common form of incompleteness found in the U N I X  transcripts derives from 
the respondent's inability to  build a conversation model sufficient t o  support the planning 
of what she would consider a conclusive answer. This generally occurs when the questioner 
either fails to  supply enough detail with his question or uses expressions that  the respondent 
is unable t o  fully interpret. Consider Example (54): 
(54) Q: Have we lost the daemon? 
R: WHICH ONE?? The line printer daemon (lpr doesn't work)? The cron 
daemon (your a t  files don't get atrun)? The mail daemon (biff doesn't 
inform you of new mail)? 
Here Q employs a definite referring expression which R,  given her more detailed knowledge, 
sees as ambiguous. R is able to  recognize that  she does not have enough information to 
properly respond and goes on not only to request further details, but also to provide Q with 
a space of possible replies and criteria for selecting among them. It is significant that  even 
though R cannot directly address Q's question, her response is cooperative nevertheless. 
By using a definite referring expression, Q indicates that  he believes that  there is only one 
"daemon." In view of that ,  a response of "Which one?" alone would be uncooperative, 
since it provides no assistance to Q in answering a question that he clearly does not know 
how to  answer unaided. By knowing that more information is needed, and by being able to  
characterize the kind of information needed, R is able to  respond in a way that  advances 
the goal of the conversation-resolving Q's UNIX-related problem. 
The correctness assumption 
The issue of whether an  agent's knowledge is correct is also relevant to  the specification of 
the conversation model. Obviously, a respondent who holds incorrect beliefs but believes 
them t o  be correct (analogously t o  a respondent who does not know P and does not know 
that  she does not know P )  is likely to provide all manner of unhelpful, false, and confusing 
responses. Once again, there is very little that  can be done about this, except to  continue 
to  confine such people to  working on taxpayer-assistance hotlines. 
However, it is clear from available data  that ,  in planning their responses, respondents 
often attach less than complete certainty t o  some of their pertinent beliefs and indicate as 
much when making reply. Consider Example (55). 
(55) Q: I cannot find the manual for kermit. What is i t?  What does i t  do? Where 
can I find more information about it? As far as I know, i t  has something 
t o  do with data communication. 
R: So far as I know, there is no kernlit software on Cory. Do you know anything 
different? P.S. If we don't have the software, it is unlikely we would have 
the manual. 
51n a related vein, Mays's work demonstrated that  a respondent's belief t h a t  a certain event will or 
might possibly occur in the future could influence her choice of response [Mays 84b]. 
It's hedges So far as I know, Do you know anything diflerent? and it is unlikely all indicate 
that It is not certain of the correctness of her belief that there is no KERMIT software on 
cory. If we suppose that R's belief that "there is no KERMIT software on cory" is the result 
of a default inference [Reiter 801 of the form, "if R is not familiar with a piece of software, 
then assume it is not installed on the system," then the default nature of its derivation 
might be the source of R's uncertainty. Example (56), from the EMACS transcripts, provides 
further evidence for abandoning the correctness assumption. 
(56) Q: What is the character to  search for if I want to  locate a CR using a simple 
search? 
R: Normally you don't. I'm not 100% sure of this, but you may be able to  
"quote" a CR in a search. You'd do that by being in a search and typing 
ctrl-Q (for Quote the next character) CR (the actual return key). I don't 
guarantee this one. What do you want to search for? Normally there are 
other ways around this. 
The response plainly shows that R knew her belief of the ability to quote carriage-return 
characters while in search mode was less than certain. She felt that the information was 
useful enough to contribute, but also required a disclaimer. 
Summary 
As we develop natural-language dialogue systems that are capable of increasingly sophisti- 
cated techniques of cooperative interaction, we will have to  recognize that their knowledge 
of the domain of discourse is likely to  be incomplete, and that some of it may be uncertain 
as well. To the extent that assumptions of completeness and correctness are avoided, con- 
versation models should be able to indicate both what knowledge pertinent to  the response 
might be absent and which beliefs might be held with less than full certainty. As we saw 
from the examples discussed in this section, both R's knowledge and her meta-knowledge 
play important roles in the planning of cooperative responses. 
4.2.5 Concluding remarks on the Conversation Modeler 
This section characterized the general role and theoretical status of the Conversation 
Modeler in a CRPS. The Conversation Modeler builds the conversation model, a spe- 
cial database of beliefs relevant to  the conversation providing the evidence that motivates 
the formation of the system's initial set of cooperative response goals. In defining the 
Conversation Modeler I am claiming that the process of building this database is separable 
from response planning. 
The Conversation Modeler comprises only those structure-building resources that are 
routinely applied prior to response planning. Although determining the necessary and 
sufficient set of such resources is an open research problem, I offered the following pair of 
conditions as a rough decision procedure: 
(Cl )  The procedure must produce information necessary for a CRPS to identify the range 
of goals it needs to satisfy in order to  produce responses that are adequately cooperative. 
(C2) There is no reasonable way to  decide invoke the procedure on the basis of other 
evidence that could be found in the conversation model. 
While conversation models may ultimately need to  contain a wide variety of beliefs, I 
suggested that they must contain at  least the following elements in order to support CRG: 
a a representation of the questioner's query; 
a a representation of the top-level goal the questioner is pursuing that is relevant to  
the exchange; 
a a representation of the plan of action that the system believes the questioner intends 
to  execute; and 
a a set of comments representing the system's evaluation of that inferred plan. 
In natural-language dialogue systems of realistic size, the conversation model will be a 
repository for many different sorts of beliefs. The extent to  which those beliefs are assumed 
to  be complete or correct will profoundly affect the system's ability to  provide useful and 
appropriate responses. I have argued that, to  the extent that completeness and correctness 
assumptions are abandoned, conversation models will need to be able to indicate both what 
knowledge pertinent to  the response might be absent and which beliefs might be held with 
less than full certainty. 
4.3 The Response Planner 
Once the dynamically-constructed portion of the CRPS's environment has been generated 
by the Conversation Modeler, control is passed to  the Response Planner. This component 
of the CRPS has three main responsibilities: 
1. Using evidence it finds in the conversation model, i t  identifies high-level response 
goals for the system to consider pursuing. 
2. It applies context-dependent appropriateness filters to choose a subset of those goals 
to adopt and plan to  satisfy. 
3. On the basis of its success a t  acquiring necessary information and finding methods 
to satisfy its chosen goals, it constructs a response plan aimed at  conveying the 
information that was found or inferred.6 
The terminal nodes of the response plan-called the surface goals (see Section 4.3.2)- 
constitute the data from which the Language Generator computes the natural-language 
response. 
The Response Planner is the center of cooperative reasoning and decision making in a 
CRPS. It is not yet possible to develop a fully fleshed-out specification of this component 
because, as we will see, such an effort would require a prescriptive theory of cooperative 
response behavior as its foundation-the very sort of theory that has yet t o  be formulated 
(and whose formulation the present work hopes to  foster). Instead, arguing from a number 
of observations about the properties of naturally-occurring cooperative response data, I 
will describe an architectural framework that seems to  capture the gross computational 
6We will also see that the Response Planner's goals may change over the course of its operation. 
characteristics of the process of cooperative response planning. The architecture necessarily 
leaves much room for refinement, and raises many questions. I will summarize the major 
open research problems in Section 6.2. 
An overview of the Response Planner's architecture is presented in the next section. 
Subsequent sections will elaborate the theoretical concerns driving its design and sketch 
its components and their interactions. 
4.3.1 Response Planner architecture 
The architecture of the Response Planner is shown in Figure 4.3. Arrows indicate data flow 
among its components. The boxes labeled Conversation Model, Response Goals, and 
Response Plan represent shared knowledge bases that are conceived of as b lackb~ards .~  
The shaded elements labeled Response Goal Proposer and Strategic Planner rep- 
resent the two active components of the Response Planner. A brief summary of these 
elements follows. 
Conversation Model This knowledge base initially contains the collection of beliefs de- 
rived from the questioner's utterances by the Conversation Modeler. During the Response 
Planner's operation, new beliefs may be added to this collection by the Strategic Planner. 
Response Goal Proposer The Response Goal Proposer is the source of the Plan- 
ner's goals. Drawing on a database of rules, it uses the contents of the Conversation 
Model blackboard as evidence for response goals the planner should adopt and pursue. 
The resulting set of goals is written to  the Response Goals blackboard. Updates to the 
Conversation Model by the Strategic Planner may cause the Response Goal Proposer 
to  modify the contents of the Response Goals blackboard. The operation of the Response 
Goal Proposer will be discussed in more detail in Section 4.3.4. 
Strategic Planner The Strategic Planner attempts to  find methods by which the 
goals proposed by the Response Goal Proposer could be achieved in a natural-language 
response. Its output-the response plan (Section 4.3.3)-is written to the Response Plan 
blackboard. Through a process called reflection (Section 4.3.6)' results of the Strategic 
Planner's operation may be fed back into the Conversation Model database, enabling the 
Response Goal Proposer to decide to modify the system's set of adopted goals. Issues 
pertaining to the design of the Strategic Planner will be discussed in Section 4.3.5. 
4.3.2 Surface goals 
Before explaining the Response Planner's architecture, I would like to  further examine the 
goal-based character of natural-language responses. This section presents a theory in which 
responses are modeled as sets of surface goals: goals that responses attempt t o  achieve by 
way of their particular linguistic form and content. I will argue in the next section that if 
we are to  develop accounts that explain why particular surface goals are adopted in a given 
query situation, we must attempt to connect the surface goals to  more general response 
7A survey and discussion of blackboard architectures and blackboard-based systems can be found in Nii 








Figure 4.3: Architecture of the Response Planner 
goals whose adoption is motivated by principles of cooperation. This theoretical model of 
responses is fundamental to the Response Planner's design. 
Data obtained from studies of naturally-occurring question-response pairs has provided 
a foundation for the development of numerous models of cooperative interaction. In the 
analyses performed over the course of the research being reported here, the notion of 
a surface goal has served as a useful abstraction. I will develop a characterization of 
surface goals with the aid of Example (53)-repeated below as (57)-taken from the U N I X  
transcripts. 
(57) Q: Do you know if there is any network link to ucbeuler? I want to send some 
mail over there. 
R: The network link is not up yet. Some time in the near future it will be 
connected to the Berknet, but I don't know exactly when. It is mostly a 
software change on ucbvax. 
The view that response generation is a planning process means that a respondent forms a 
reply with certain desired effects (alterations to  the questioner's belief space) in mind, and 
that bringing about those effects is the driving force behind her choice of the particular 
linguistic content and form of the response's constituent utterances. Given that, it is 
reasonable to  conceive of the response that is actually provided as indicating what the 
respondent believed to have been her most reliable means (given the constraints on the 
planning process and considerations of diminishing marginal returns) of achieving her ends 
in the particular context of utterance. 
As a research method, it makes sense to  examine naturally-occurring response data 
and hypothesize the effects that different responses might have been intended to  achieve. 
The most reliable sorts of hypotheses are those that are based on the literal meaning of 
the constituent utterances of a response. For example, we could decompose the response 
in (57) into the following four  utterance^:^ 
1. "The network link is not up yet." 
2. "[Ucbeuler] will be connected to  the Berknet sometime in the near future." 
3. "I don't know exactly when [ucbeuler will be connected to  the Berknet]." 
4. "[Connecting ucbeuler to  the Berknet involves] mostly a software change on ucbvax." 
We might then model the literal meaning of these utterances in this way (where the rep- 
resentation is meant only to be suggestive): 
2. occur(connect (ucbeuler , berknet) ,near-future) 
4. enables (upd-sof tware (ucbvax) , connect (ucbeuler , berknet ) ) 
- -  - 
'Brackets are used either to indicate replacements of pronouns by their intended referents or to surround 
text realizing concepts that appear to have been elided in the original response. 
If we assume that R's assertion of a proposition P constitutes sufficient evidence for ascrib- 
ing to  R an intention that Q believe P-an entirely reasonable assumption in the context of 
the U N I X  consultant dialogues-then for each P above, we could ascribe to  R an intention 
that BEL (q , P). I will label these intentions the surface goals, for they are the goals that 
the constituent utterances of a response will represent attempts t o  achieve. It  should be 
borne in mind that surface goals represent only attempts to  affect the questioner's mental 
state. A respondent can have no assurance that her utterances will actually achieve her 
surface goals. (Misunderstandings arising from failures of this sort may cause questioners 
to  initiate clarification subdialogues.) 
Other goals besides surface goals will typically participate in the choice of a response's 
particular linguistic content and form. At the stylistic level, unusual conciseness of expres- 
sion might be used to convey an air of expertise, superiority, or impatience. 
(58) Q: Where have the online messages gone? 
R: They've been fixed. 
Recondite lexical or grammatical choices might be employed to suggest erudition. In this 
vein, Hovy has investigated different kinds of interpersonal goals that influence natural- 
language generation [Hovy 881, and Rubinoff is exploring the thesis that the language 
generation process should be viewed as an attempt to  satisfy goals a t  multiple levels 
[Rubinoff 901. But computational accounts of how language can be used to  achieve goals, 
by subtle means or blatant, have as yet barely scratched the surface. 
I am therefore restricting surface goals to include only those desired alterations of 
the hearer's mental state that can be effected straightforwardly by the linguistic form 
and content of the utterances of the response. I consider the development of principled 
accounts linking properties of query situations to  decisions to  attempt to  achieve particular 
surface goals to be the greatest concern of the respondent-based program of research on 
cooperative response g e n e r a t i ~ n . ~  
4.3.3 Response goals and response plans 
The Response Planner's architecture design represents an attempt to  characterize the com- 
ponents and organization of the reasoning process that connects features of the conversa- 
tion model to selected surface goals that are the basis for the system's natural-language 
responses. I will now further analyze the structure of that reasoning process, arguing for 
a distinction among a respondent's general response goals, her response plan for achieving 
those goals, and the surface goals she finally adopts and attempts to achieve by utterance 
acts. This three-way division is embodied in the Response Planner's design. 
Acting and thinking about acting 
People demonstrate the capacity to both act and think about acting. In traditional models 
of planning, agents search for actions or action sequences they can execute in order to 
achieve certain goals. Their goals originate from outside the system, for example, from 
commands given by a user. "Thinking about acting" in this context means reasoning 
'In the remainder of this thesis, I will exclude from consideration all physical elements of responses, 
such as physical actions, gestures, facial expressions, and intonation. 
only about how actions can be used to bring about desired effects in a given execution 
environment. 
Cooperative response planning systems, unlike more conventional planners, reason not 
only about how to satisfy their goals but also about what goals they ought to satisfy. That 
is, they "think about acting" at more general levels than conventional planners are required 
to. For example, given a questioner's request for information, cooperative respondents are 
able to  reason about whether to satisfy the request. This is a decision process qualitatively 
different from either identifying the information that would have to be provided in order 
to  satisfy the request or computing a set of utterance acts that would serve to convey that 
information to the questioner. 
To elaborate on this point, let us return to Example (57) and consider a possible account 
for R's decision to  adopt the first surface goal: 
BEL(Q,l (connected(ucbeu1er ,berknet))) 
Suppose we were to treat the act of satisfying this goal as corresponding roughly to the 
act of giving the direct answer to Q's query-the information explicitly requested ("Do 
you know if there is any network link to ucbeuler," ignoring its interpretation as a request 
for information about R's knowledge state).'' We might envisage the process by which R 
decides to adopt this goal as proceeding through the following steps: 
Step 1: R determines that Q wants to know if there is a network link (from the current 
machine) to ucbeuler; 
Step 2: R adopts a goal g that Q know whether there is a network link to ucbeuler; 
Step 3: To satisfy that goal, R consults her own knowledge base and finds that she 
believes that there is no network link to ucbeuler; 
Step 4: R decides that she can satisfy goal g by satisfying goal g' = Q believe that there 
is no network link to  ucbeuler; 
Step 5: R decides that she can satisfy goal g' by satisfying goal g" = Q believe that 
ucbeuler is not connected to the Berknet." 
Step 2 is the step of primary interest here. I will use the term response goal to denote 
such general goals as "Q know whether proposition P is true." They are abstract goals, 
motivated by evidence in her conversation model (in this case, her interpretation of the 
intentions underlying Q's question), that R adopts and plans to  achieve. As a result of 
that planning activity (partially illustrated above), R selects surface goals which are then 
used to guide the construction of a natural-language response. 
My claim is that such general goals must be explicitly represented and reasoned about 
during the planning of cooperative responses. The primary theoretical inadequacy of 
questioner-based models is their failure to model these goals and connect them in principled 
ways to  the utterances that are used to achieve them. 
In contrast, one of the central concerns for a respondent-based account of CRG is 
modeling the decision process that takes place between the first and second steps above. 
'OR'S use of "yet" in the actual d a t a  suggests tha t  a proper analysis is more complicated than this, but 
a more detailed analysis would not invalidate the  point. 
''Uttering "The network link is not up yet" is viewed (roughly) as a linguistic act chosen as a method 
for achieving t h e  (surface) goal decided upon in Step 5. 
That is, we must answer the question: why does R choose to adopt response goal g, and in 
particular, how does the decision to adopt that goal follow from principles of cooperation? 
Clearly, the mere fact that Q asked the question does not in general constitute suf- 
ficient justification for R's decision to  adopt a goal of answering it. Rather, it can only 
provide a basis for a decision by R to  consider adopting that goal. This idea is supported 
by Pollack's research demonstrating that respondents' beliefs about the well-formedness 
and executability of questioners' domain plans serve as an appropriateness filter on direct 
answers [Pollack 861. 
Other appropriateness filters exist as well. Suppose, for example, that R believed Q's 
plan to  be ill formed, for example, she believed that it was unnecessary for ucbeuler to 
be connected to  the Berknet in order for Q to send mail there.'' In such a situation, R 
might very well be inclined to disregard the question. In a similar vein, the response below 
provided by a different consultant suggests that R was able to  decide that the issue of 
whether euler is connected to the Berknet was largely irrelevant to the task of helping Q 
send mail to users there. 
(59) R: Just do this: mail ruby!euler!(login name). Let us know if i t  doesn't work. 
Euler is only reached thru the ruby machine. 
The above response sidesteps the question of euler's network connectivity entirely, focus- 
ing instead on how Q might send mail to  users at euler. All this argues strongly for 
the claim that cooperative respondents must be able to  distinguish response goals under 
consideration from those they actually adopt and attempt to satisfy. 
Differences like those between the two responses in (57) and (59) pose a challenge 
for models of cooperative response generation. If we assume that both respondents were 
behaving "cooperatively" to the best of their respective abilities, then the difference in 
response ideally should be traced to differences in their respective beliefs rather than 
differences in their competence as cooperative dialogue participants. For example, in (59) 
we would like to  claim that R responded as she did because she had knowledge of a way 
to  help Q achieve his goal, which enabled her to focus on that in her reply. We do not, 
however, want to ascribe that same knowledge to R in (57), for in that case her response 
would appear to be uncooperative, as i t  would then be ignoring Q's desire to send mail. 
The challenge is to  devise a single model of CRG, sensitive to  these differences in belief, 
that accounts for both responses. 
Distinguishing a level of reasoning about general response goals promises to  help us 
meet this challenge. For example, to reach a unified model of the responses in (57) and 
(59) we might hypothesize that both respondents, in virtue of their respective models of 
the conversation, choose to  consider the same two response goals: the first, to provide an 
answer to Q's query, and the second, to  enable Q to send mail to euler. The first respondent 
finds that she cannot satisfy the second goal, and thus plans a response that provides an 
elaborate satisfaction of the first goal. The second respondent, however, recognizes that 
not only can she satisfy the second response goal, but in so doing she need not satisfy the 
first (or, alternatively, satisfying the second will indirectly satisfy the first). 
Once a respondent adopts a response goal, she must proceed through a planning process 
to  compute how to  achieve it in a natural-language response. In the framework I am 
lZPollack would call this an incoherent plan [Pollack 861. 
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developing here, this process results in the selection of a set of surface goals which the 
Language Generator can use t o  pick appropriate natural-language expressions. I will use 
the term response plan to  refer to the structure linking response goals to  the surface goals 
that together should bring about their satisfaction. Building this structure is the Response 
Planner's function. In the next section, I will look more closely at  the process of proposing 
response goals. Section 4.3.5 will then consider how a CRPS might construct response 
plans. 
Summary 
I have developed a three-tiered theory of response structure that distinguishes the re- 
spondent's high-level response goals, her response plan for achieving those goals, and the 
surface goals that are the terminal nodes (the executable actions, in some sense) of that 
plan. Analysis of naturally-occurring response data suggests that a theory of cooperative 
response planning ought to  account for the apparent capacity of respondents to  reason 
about and select among different potential response goals. For example, respondents must 
be able to decide not only how to answer a question, but also whether to  answer it. Explic- 
itly embodying such a distinction in a framework for cooperative response planning should 
help researchers to  develop accounts of alternative responses to  queries while maintaining 
consistent sets of assumptions about the respondents' basic cooperative competence. 
4.3.4 Choosing response goals 
In the architecture shown in Figure 4.3 (page 92), the Response Goal Proposer (RGP) 
is the component responsible for providing response goals for the system to pursue. Its 
primary source of input is the Conversation Model, a shared knowledge base whose initial 
contents consist of the data generated by the Conversation Modeler. (The "reflection" 
feedback loop, to be discussed in Section 4.3.6, may lead to  updates of the Conversation 
Model during the response planning process.) Its output, a set of response goals, is written 
to  the Response Goals panel, another shared knowledge base. 
Principles of operation 
Response goals are proposed by way of a two-step procedure, as follows: 
1. Features of the conversation, as recorded in the Conversation Model, provide evidence 
for the consideration of one or more response goals. 
2. For each response goal under consideration, context-dependent screens of adnaissi- 
bility (to be discussed in this section) are used to decide whether the goal should be 
adopted. 
Response goals that satisfy all applicable screens of admissibility are written to  the Re- 
sponse Goals blackboard. At that point, they become the system's adopted response goals. 
Although they will all be motivated by features found in the conversation model and will 
have passed all applicable screens of admissibility, they will not necessarily have been tested 
for achievability. (I will elaborate on this point shortly.) 
In the previous section, I argued that a computational model of cooperative response 
planning should incorporate a notion of high-level response goals distinct from surface 
goals; I did not, however, actually define what response goals are. In fact, this is very 
difficult to do without a better-developed theory of cooperative behavior than we have at 
present. The intuition is that response goals are high-level goals t o  bring about certain 
desired changes to  a questioner's beliefs. Specific conditions of a conversation provide 
evidence for the adoption of various general goals; once adopted, plans tailored to the 
context must be devised to  achieve them. 
To clarify this point, we once again consider the case of misconception correction. We 
might imagine in the context of a particular CRPS application assigning response-goal 
status to the general activity of "correcting an object-related misconception" [McCoy 881. 
McCoy never addressed this issue, but there is presumably some well-defined set of de- 
tectable features of a conversation that indicate whether the questioner has an object- 
related misconception. Suppose tests on the model of a particular conversation were to  
reveal that Q holds a misconception of the form (ISA X Y) for some discourse entity X 
and domain concept Y. This could serve as evidence for R to consider a response goal of 
correcting that misconception, which might be modeled as the goal (BEL Q (NOT (ISA 
X Y))). In this simple view, misconception-correction behavior is seen as following from 
a goal of causing the questioner to  believe 1P for some proposition P such that both R 
believes that Q believes P and R believes T P .  
In order to  accomplish this general goal in a particular discourse setting, R might have 
to  provide an extended response along the lines of those that McCoy's ROMPER constructs. 
The response acts of denying that X is a kind of Y, conceding their similiarities, and 
asserting their differences might all play important roles in achieving the high-level goal of 
belief alteration. But the decision as to  whether to use those acts or others will in general 
be sensitive to such factors as variations in discourse context and R's beliefs about the 
questioner's domain goals. Thus R o M  PER illustrates one method for achieving a general 
goal of misconception correction under a particular set of conversational circumstances. 
I envisage the RGP as having access to  a library of response goal "templates", each 
capturing the planner's knowledge about a general class of goal-driven cooperative response 
behavior. Besides goals having to do with misconception correction, other examples of 
possible response goal classes could include: 
a give the direct answer to a yes/no or wh-question; 
a explain how to perform a particular step in a plan; 
a cause the questioner to believe his plan is unexecutable; 
a explain why the questioner's plan is unexecutable; 
a cause the questioner to believe his goal cannot be achieved at the present time; 
a suggest an alternative course of action; 
a describe a new plan of action. 
Determining an appropriate level of detail for the definition of response goal templates 
in general is a research question; the examples above are meant only to  be suggestive. 
In fact, defining the space of response goal classes-if such a space is indeed finite-will 
prove to be a critical step in the effort to formulate a theory of cooperative behavior 
within the architectural framework I am proposing. However, for the purposes of using 
this architecture as a foundation for the implementation of a practical natural-language 
dialogue system, it should be possible to derive a reasonable set of response goal classes 
from the domain of discourse. 
Each response goal template must have associated with it a set of tests on the con- 
versation model to be used to determine when an instance of the response goal should be 
considered for adoption. I will henceforth call these the response goal's activation condi- 
tions. Response goal templates are essentially descriptions of high-level actions that the 
planner knows how to plan to achieve. Activation conditions, however, are not exactly 
analogous to action preconditions; preconditions characterize states of the world in which 
a particular action is actually executable, whereas activation conditions only characterize 
states of a conversation model (representing the respondent's understanding of the ques- 
tioner's utterances) in which a particular high-level goal is considered to be worthy of 
adoption. 
During the first step of the RGP's operation, it scans through its library of response 
goal templates and identifies all the goals whose activation conditions are satisfied. These 
goals are then instantiated (receiving appropriate bindings from the conversation model) 
and become the RGP's potential response goals. 
The potential response goals are not written to the Response Goals blackboard, but 
rather are held internally by the RGP for use during its second step of operation. As I 
argued in Section 4.3.3, the fact that a response goal's activation conditions are satisfied is 
not in itself sufficient grounds for a respondent to decide to  actually adopt that goal, e.g., 
the detection of a misconception need not necessarily lead to a correction in the response. 
Rather, there appear to be sets of what I will henceforth refer to as screens of admissibility 
that are used to rule out the adoption of activated response goals whose achievement 
in a given discourse context would lead to conflicts with either the respondent's higher- 
level discourse goals or the general principles of cooperative interaction that underlie her 
behavior. 
For an example of a conflict with the respondent's higher-level discourse goals, we recall 
Example (35)-repeated below as (60)-in which we saw that a respondent might decide 
not to adopt a goal of misconception correction because it interfered with the achievement 
of other more important goals. 
(60) Q: Do I want a mark at the beginning and at the end of the block? 
R: For right now, just go ahead and set a mark any old place. (Just to see 
how it works.) 
In explaining this example, I hypothesized that R was focusing on her pedagogic goal of 
teaching Q how to set the mark in EMACS; in virtue of that she might have decided that 
a misconception correction at this stage of the dialogue would not be helpful. 
With respect to conflicts with principles of cooperation, I have observed that Pollack's 
research implies that respondents seem to have the ability to  make decisions to omit direct 
answers based on their beliefs about the well-formedness and executability of the ques- 
tioner's domain plan [Pollack 861. In this case the respondent's decision might be driven 
by some underlying principle of parsimony; in the circumstances studied by Pollack, the 
answers to the queries are rendered relatively useless by the ill formedness or unexecutabil- 
ity of the corresponding explanatory plans. That is, satisfying the goal of answering the 
question might be seen as conflicting with the principle that the respondent not provide 
information that does not in some way advance one of the questioner's goals. 
Finally, some screens of admissibility may involve the consideration of possible interac- 
tions between potential response goals. For example, in trying to account for R's response 
in Example (591, it may be necessary to propose that R be able to perform the following 
inference chain: Q asked his question (requesting information on the state of network con- 
nectivity to  euler) in order to find out how to  send mail to euler. If R is able to  satisfy 
the (potential) response goal of enabling Q to send mail to euler, then it would not be 
necessary to also satisfy the goal of answering the query. That is, R may have to evaluate 
how the successful accomplishment of one response goal affects the need to attempt others. 
Clearly, there is much work remaining to be done to develop a good characterization 
of screens of admissibility. If cooperative respondents can truly be modeled as selecting 
response goals based on their general understanding of the questioner's utterances, then 
examples of naturally-occurring responses seem to indicate that respondents do not always 
act on all the goals that appear to be well motivated given the questioner's utterances. 
Understanding cooperative response behavior demands that we understand both why some 
goals are chosen and why others are disregarded. 
Fleshing out the notion of screens of admissibility, understanding how they are related 
to activation conditions, and understanding how both are connected to (or derived from) 
principles of cooperation must be left for future work. For the present, it is useful to 
recognize these problems as arising from the attempt to reformulate cooperative response 
behavior in a goal-based framework. 
Testing the achievability of response goals 
I mentioned earlier that the RGP does not necessarily verify that the response goals it 
proposes are in fact achievable. That is, the theory underlying the architecture permits 
the RGP to suggest goals that the system might later find to be unachievable. I will 
motivate that idea now, arguing that it is supported by examples such as (61)-(63). 
(61) Q: Could someone please tell me where I might get on-line documentation on 
the EMACS editor? 
R: I know of no online documentation. 
(62) Q: I tried to send mail to someone in "lll-mfe" and mail said that the service 
was not available. Why not? 
R: What was the exact mailing address you used? You may have used the 
wrong syntax for the network you wished to use, or you may need to specify 
intermediate site names. 
(63) Q: For some reason, my /tmp write permission seems to have been lost in the 
wind. Help! I can't do anything without! Would you know what's wrong? 
R: I'm sorry but I can see no reason why. Can you be more specific? The 
only case like this I've seen is someone who set his umask to 700. Did you 
do this? 
I have claimed that a respondent-based view of cooperative response planning demands 
that the respondent be able to form high-level response goals and evaluate the appropri- 
ateness of adopting them in a given query situation. In (61), for example, R could be 
supposed to  form and consider adopting a response goal that is something like "enable Q 
to  have access to on-line EMACS documentation". The motivation for this goal would come 
from R's model of the conversation indicating Q's desire for EMACS documentation.13 In 
this case, however, R discovers that, although it would certainly be appropriate on grounds 
of cooperativeness to  satisfy that goal, she finds that she cannot. It is her awareness of her 
inability to  satisfy the proposed response goal that leads her to  adopt new goals (by means 
of reflection-Section 4.3.6), in this case, to  indicate (indirectly) that she cannot help. 
In Example (62), we might hypothesize that R was attempting to satisfy a response 
goal of the form, "Q understand why mail to  Ill-mfe failed". In trying to satisfy that 
goal, R discovered she did not have enough data to construct an adequate explanation. 
Her recognition of this situation then led her to adopt and pursue goals having to  do 
with acquiring the needed information from Q (and explaining her reasons for asking). 
Example (63) is similar, where R's apology may be taken as evidence that she recognized 
her inability to satisfy a response goal adopted on Q's behalf. 
The important conclusion to  be drawn is that naturally-occurring data suggests that 
respondents carry out diverse reasoning activities in the pursuit of their response goals. 
They focus on particular tasks they need to  accomplish, and their knowledge of their 
success or failure in performing those tasks influences their subsequent reasoning and the 
choices they make in forming their responses. The Response Planner architecture design 
attempts t o  model these activities. 
The principle that RGP-proposed goals are not guaranteed to  be achievable suggests 
the following view of goals on the Response Goals panel: they are general goals whose 
satisfaction in the current query situation is warranted on the basis of principles of coop- 
erative interaction. A respondent's inability to  fully or partially satisfy any or all of them 
may provoke her to adopt new goals. 
Summary 
This section outlined the general theory of the Response Goal Proposer, the source of goals 
in a Cooperative Response Planning System. The process of proposing goals proceeds in 
two steps. First, drawing on a library of response goal templates, the RGP identifies po- 
tential response goals whose activation conditions are satisfied. The resulting set comprises 
all response goals for which features of the conversation provide minimal justification for 
adoption. More general sets of appropriateness tests, called screens of admissibility, are 
then used to  decide which potential response goals actually ought to  be adopted and which 
can or should be disregarded. Determining the relationship between activation conditions, 
screens of admissibility, and principles of cooperation is a challenging task for future re- 
search. Potential response goals that pass all applicable appropriateness tests are written 
to  the Response Goals blackboard and are thereby adopted. The RGP does not test these 
goals for achievability, and it may later be discovered that some or all of them cannot be 
I3Note t h a t ,  if Q had provided additional information that  suggested an answer t o  the query was not 
useful, e.g., "I typed 'emacs' and got the message 'Permission denied"', then the  answer-query response 
goal could b e  eliminated from consideration. 
reached. A feedback process called reflection (Section 4.3.6) exists to  permit the RGP to 
modify the system's set of adopted goals during the response-planning process. 
4.3.5 Planning to achieve response goals 
When the RGP completes its work, the Response Goals blackboard of the Response Planner 
will contain a set of high-level response goals that have been judged to  be worth pursuing 
based on information found in the conversation model. The task of the Strategic Planner 
(SP) is to  compute a set of surface goals whose achievement through the system's natural- 
language response would have the effect of satisfying the system's high-level response goals. 
In trying to  design a working prototype of the SP, researchers will be forced to con- 
front a plethora of difficult research problems all related to  this question: How do agents 
use language to achieve their goals? While it has long been a widely accepted principle 
that language use is a form of action, only recently have researchers begun to  investi- 
gate the planned nature of natural-language generation [Appelt 85b, Hovy 88, Moore 89, 
Rubinoff 901. Because our comprehension of both the planned nature of language and the 
nature of high-level response goals is currently quite limited, the discussion in this sec- 
tion must be confined to a few general observations about the issues that a design for the 
Strategic Planner ought to address. 
Based on the analyses from which the overall architecture was derived, the two most 
important considerations in the SP's design are these: 
1. The SP is a conjunctive goal planner, that is, it computes plans that are intended to 
satisfy multiple goals. 
2. The SP may be unable to  find a plan that satisfies some or all of the system's adopted 
goals. The overall Response Planner needs to  be able to adjust its behavior in some 
appropriate way when that occurs. 
I examine these issues next. 
P l ann ing  for mult iple  goals 
Through the analyses of naturally-occurring response data that have been discussed so far, 
I have tried to argue that rich responses of the sorts that we find in the U N I X  and EMACS 
transcripts are best seen as derived from plans to satisfy several high-level response goals. 
In one analysis of Example (57), for example, I suggested that the conversation model 
could provide evidence for the adoption of a t  least two high-level goals: (1) that Q know 
whether a network link exists between the current machine and ucbeuler, and (2) that Q 
know a plan for sending mail to users on ucbeuler. It would be illuminating at this point 
t o  describe the analytic process that led me to  this hypothesized pair of goals. 
We begin by sketching a model-the conversation model-of the beliefs that R could 
reasonably be expected to ascribe to  Q on the basis of the observed utterances. For the 
present example, R could be expected to  attribute at least the following beliefs to Q: 
1. Q's top-level goal is to  send mail to (unspecified) users of ucbeuler; 
2. Q wants to  know if a network link exists between his machine and ucbeuler; 
3. Q believes that the existence of a network link between his machine and ucbeuler is 
an enabling condition on the action of sending mail to  users at ucbeuler; 
4. Q's goal in asking the question is to determine whether there exists a valid plan for 
sending mail to  users at ucbeuler. 
R gives no indication in her response that she believes any of the beliefs ascribed to Q to 
be incorrect. Because she focuses on the state of the network link, we may deduce that 
she held the following beliefs prior to the conversation: 
1. In order to send electronic mail between machines A and B, a network link must 
exist between A and B. 
2. No network link exists between Q's machine and ucbeuler. 
3. The state of network connectivity between two machines may change over time. 
4. Plans are afoot to establish a network link between Q's machine and ucbeuler. 
The question that remains to  be answered is this: how might a cooperative agent reason 
from all these beliefs to  arrive at a set of response goals? 
Since we lack a theory of cooperation from which to rigorously derive a choice of high- 
level goals, the best we can do at this point is make some reasonable assumptions. For 
whatever goals we pick, the principles underlying their selection should reflect some general 
characterization of cooperation, even if rough and incomplete. It is crucial that we avoid 
the trap of allowing our theories to be strongly influenced by the details of particular 
responses: that would only lead us to  pick goals that reflect the state of R's reasoning 
after most of the important cooperation-based decisions have been made. The point of 
this exercise is to  develop a better understanding of R's reasoning process, not to model 
particular responses as sets of goals. Thus we want to  choose goals that are grounded in 
some independent theory of cooperative behavior. 
An oft-repeated characterization of cooperative agents is that they act to  enable ques- 
tioners to  achieve the questioners7 goals. UCEGO, for example, upon detecting that the user 
wants to  perform an action A, adopts the goal of enabling the user to  do A [Chin 88al. In 
[Cohen gob, p. 2291, Cohen and Levesque characterize cooperative agents as "sincere and 
helpful. . . adopting someone else's beliefs and goals else as [their] own". The claim behind 
Allen's thesis, that "many instances of helpful behavior arise because the observing agent 
recognizes an obstacle in the other agent's plan, and acts to remove the obstacle" [Allen 83, 
p. 1081, is an extension of this basic idea. As a theory of cooperation, goal-enabling agency 
is a simplistic one and suffers from the same deficiencies of questioner-based theories that 
were discussed in Chapter 3. The fact that cooperative agents often seem to act in this 
way is surely epiphenomenal. Nevertheless, such a theory does have broad explanatory 
power and is useful at least as a jumping-off point to  more satisfactory accounts. 
If cooperative agents act to help questioners to achieve their goals, then we may assume 
that should R determine that answering Q's query might help him to reach his goal, she 
would adopt the high-level goal of providing that answer. This leads to the first response 
goal, that Q know whether there is a network link between Q7s machine and ucbeuler. 
Cooperative respondents also seem to be able to recognize when an answer by itself 
would be inadequate as a response. If R had reason to  believe that Q knew how to send mail 
between network-connected machines and thus was only querying ucbeuler's connection 
status, she might be able to decide that just a direct answer is required (although this 
decision is affected by whether the answer is yes or no). But in the absence of such a 
belief, more general goal-enabling behavior may be required. I accommodate this idea by 
positing R's adoption of a second explicit goal of enabling Q to achieve his stated goal. 
Analyses of this kind that I have performed on other examples from the transcripts 
(assuming a Conversation Modeler as capable as the one described in Section 4.2.3) have 
generally supported the conclusion that in most query situations, several high-level re- 
sponse goals can usually be derived from general cooperative principles (even simple ones). 
This tells us that the Strategic Planner should be able to devise plans to  achieve multiple 
goals. 
Conjunctive goal planning has always been of interest to  the planning research commu- 
nity (see [Chapman 871 for one formalization of the general problem). This is a considerably 
more complex task than single-goal planning, and engenders many difficult problems. Two 
important questions for future research regarding the SP's design are: Could the RGP ever 
propose goals that "conflict" in some sense, and if so, what sorts of conflicts might arise, 
and how could the SP detect and deal with them? 
Unachievable or abandoned goals 
I argued in Section 4.3.4 that it is reasonable to  expect the RGP on occasion to  propose 
goals that later turn out to be unachievable. That idea is both reinforced and refined by 
a comparison of the reasoning processes that seem to  be needed to  produce the responses 
in Examples (57) and (59). 
R focuses in (57) on ucbeuler's network connectivity; in contrast, her focus in (59) is 
on providing information that enables Q to achieve his top-level goal. My contention is 
that, under certain assumptions, both responses can be considered cooperative. In (57) we 
must assume that R does not know of any way for Q to get mail to  euler, because if she 
did, her response would violate our intuitive conception of cooperative behavior. In (59), 
we must assume that R determines it is unnecessary to  respond to  the question of euler's 
network connectivity in view of her ability t o  satisfactorily address Q's top-level goal. 
Our identification of these assumptions exposes important dimensions of cooperative 
agents' reasoning abilities. In devising an account for the response in (57), we would like t o  
understand the role that R's awareness of Q's top-level goal plays in her decision-making 
process. Similarly, we would like t o  understand the role that R's awareness of Q's explicit 
request in (59) plays in her decision making. Of course, I am assuming here that R does 
in fact explicitly reason about these matters, but any other view seems unmotivated. 
With these considerations in mind, I have proposed an analysis in which R's underly- 
ing principles of cooperation lead her to  adopt the same pair of high-level goals in each 
situation, one that would give rise to  some form of direct answer and the other that would 
give rise to  some form of goal-enabling behavior. This analysis then forces us to  examine 
how R might proceed from these two goals to reach either of the two actual responses. 
While it is useful to tease apart the steps of R's reasoning process in this way, my 
analysis nevertheless raises computational difficulties. Consider that a satisfactory account 
of (57) needs to answer at least these questions: 
a How precisely does the SP determine that it cannot help Q to achieve his goal? 
How could this determination affect decisions that are made in the planning for 
the other goal? For example, might R have decided to provide an elaborate response 
focusing on euler's soon-to-be-established network connection in order to compensate, 
in some sense, for her inability to help Q reach his goal? 
For what reason(s) could R have decided that it would be of interest to Q to know 
that a network connection would be established "in the near future"? 
An account of (59) must answer a different set of questions, the primary one having to 
do with how R could decide that an explicit answer would be unnecessary under the 
circumstances. 
The conclusion to be drawn from the preceding discussion is that the goals placed 
on the Response Goals blackboard by the RGP should only be regarded as the system's 
initial selection. As the Strategic Planner operates, it may find that some goals must be 
abandoned and others modified. This idea will be expanded upon in the discussion of 
rejlection in Section 4.3.6. 
Summary 
This section has discussed the two central issues in the design of the Strategic Planner: 
(1) it must be able to compute plans that satisfy more than one high-level goal, and (2) 
it must be able to cope with the fact that not all the goals it is given will necessarily turn 
out to  be achievable. This second concern suggests that a channel of communication from 
the SP to the RGP is required. I take up that matter next. 
4.3.6 On the need for feedback during response planning 
It is between the Response Goal Proposer and the Strategic Planner that we may draw the 
line separating issues of cooperation from those of language generation. In the framework I 
have laid out, principles of cooperation guide the system's choice of its high-level response 
goals. Once the goals are selected, the problem becomes one of constructing natural- 
language expressions that could be uttered as a means of achieving those goals. However, 
analysis of naturally-occurring data suggests that the processes of goal selection and plan 
formulation are not as independent as this division implies. 
I argue in this section that the goals proposed by the RGP on the basis of data found 
in the conversation model are not necessarily the only high-level goals that a CRPS will 
attempt to achieve through the system's response. Rather, knowledge acquired during the 
Response Planner's operation may lead to the adoption of new goals or to a revision of the 
system's set of adopted goals. 
These insights have led me to propose a feedback channel connecting the Strategic 
Planner to the Conversation Model blackboard. This channel enables the SP to dynam- 
ically inform the RGP of the results of its operations. This in turn makes it possible 
for the RGP to update the contents of the Response Goals blackboard as needed in light 
of new information that becomes available to it. Of course, feedback of this sort poses 
difficult computational problems that must ultimately be faced. (I will discuss some of 
these problems briefly at the end of this section.) For the moment, I can discuss only the 
observations that imply feedback is necessary. 
Dynamic adoption of new goals 
One observation implying feedback from the SP to  the RGP is that some elements of 
naturally-occurring responses appear to be triggered not by evidence in the initial con- 
versation model but rather on the basis of reasoning about other response elements. The 
planner seems to  have the ability to  keep track of its history of response decisions in com- 
puting the current response and to  make new decisions "on the fly", driven by reasoning 
about the consequences of its earlier decisions. 
For example, decisions to  provide clarifications or justifications may depend on rea- 
soning about other things the planner has already decided to  say. This is illustrated in 
Example (64).14 
(64) Q: Is there a way to  send mail t o  ucbeuler from ucbcory? 
R: Yes, it is letter y on the Berknet. So mail user@y.CC. If you have further 
problems with it, mail to sergeQcory. He is the euler system manager. 
After processing Q's utterances and building a conversation model, R could reasonably 
be expected to  adopt such high-level response goals as "Q know whether a plan exists for 
sending mail from Cory to euler" and "Q know a plan for sending mail from Cory to  euler". 
But how are we to explain the appearance of utterances "If you have further problems 
with it, mail to sergeQcoryV and "He is the euler system manager"? 
R's use of the word further makes analysis of her utterance of "If you have further 
problems" difficult. It might be that she inferred or knew a priori that Q had been having 
trouble sending mail. For example, she might have interpreted the fact of Q's request as 
evidence that he had tried and failed to  send mail to  euler. On the other hand, R might have 
been uncertain regarding whether "userQy.CC" was really the correct address; in this case, 
her reference to  "further problems" might mean something like "further problems getting 
mail t o  euler, including problems related to  the possible inaccuracy of my response". 
In contrast, it is quite clear that R's utterance of "He is the euler system manager" is 
an attempt to  justify her suggestion that Q send mail to sergeQcory in case of difficulty. R 
could not have decided to  provide that justification without having first decided to  mention 
sergeQcory. In other words, R first made the high-level decision of telling Q what to do in 
case of trouble. When that decision was played out-that is, a plan was formed to  carry 
it out-R saw that it was necessary to mention serge@cory. In view of that, she then 
decided that it was important to tell Q who sergeQcory is so that Q would know why it  is 
reasonable t o  send requests for help to serge. 
Note that R's decision to provide justification is a considered one. An act of justifica- 
tion would not have been necessary, for example, if R believed that Q already knew who 
sergeQcory was (if provided in that case it would be better viewed as a kind of reminder 
rather than as a justification). Decisions of this sort, however, are the responsibility of the 
RGP; the SP is only the effector, finding linguistic methods of achieving goals provided by 
the RGP. 
In view of that, the RGP needs to  have access to the SP's output. If the RGP were 
able to  inspect the response plan being built by the SP, it could notice that a decision had 
been made to  refer to sergeQcory. Then, if so motivated by its rules of cooperation, it 
could decide to  adopt a new goal of providing justification. 
14This is also Example (37) on page 60. 
Dynamic goal revision 
I have argued that characteristics of naturally-occurring responses such as apologies, at- 
tempts to redirect questioners to other information sources, and requests for elaboration 
or clarification indicate that cooperative respondents, in the course of planning their re- 
sponses, sometimes adopt goals that during the planning stage are discovered to be either 
unachievable or only partially achievable. Human cooperative respondents obviously do 
not "fail" under these conditions; rather, they notice the problem and adapt their behavior 
accordingly. In order for cooperative response planning systems to have this same ability 
to notice and adapt to planning failures, a feedback channel is needed between the goal 
planning and goal selection components. 
Let us explore this idea further with the aid of Examples (65) and (66). 
(65) Q: Can I find out coral's load average from ucbcory? 
R: You would have to  login to find it out. They do not broadcast the info to 
our net. 
(66) Q: Is there a way to find out who's on other systems using a modified "f" 
command? Or, how would you do it? 
R: "f," "finger7' on onyx are only local. Other machines, like bugs, can finger 
people on some other machines. 
In (65), Q wants to  obtain a plan (i.e., be informed of a U N I X  command sequence) that he 
can execute on ucbcory to obtain information about the system load of another machine, 
in this case, coral. When R attempts to compute such a plan, she finds that one does 
not exist. But R does not simply say, "NO, that is not possible." Instead, she seems to 
alter her reasoning strategy, presenting Q with a less desirable (indeed, the only) plan and 
explaining why Cory does not have access to coral's load status. 
We see similar behavior in Example (66). R presumably begins her cooperative rea- 
soning activity looking for a command that, when executed on the local machine (onyx), 
provides local users with lists of active users on remote machines that the users specify. 
When she fails to find such a command, she alters her response goals to focus instead on 
the fact that the local machine (onyx), unlike other machines, lacks the facilities to perform 
remote finger operations. 
Precise details of how a respondent might actually compute the responses above remain 
to be worked out; it is clear, however, that as we decompose the process of cooperative 
response planning into more finely grained, deliberately chosen reasoning steps we will 
discover that high-level goals assumed to be achievable may later be found not to be. This 
strongly suggests that cooperative response planning crucially demands an ability to react 
to  planning failures. That is, in the course of cooperative response planning, a respondent 
might adopt what appears to be a worthwhile goal, then later discover that she cannot 
achieve it. But such discoveries cannot lead to the breakdown of the overall planning 
process; rather, the respondent must be able to  react to and reason about these internal 
planning failures and alter her goals appropriately. Furthermore, it is likely that as a side 
effect of internal planning failures, new knowledge will be identified that will be helpful, 
if not critical, to the selection of an appropriate recovery strategy. For example, in (65) 
above, R's belief about coral's load average not being transmitted to ucbcory might have 
been made salient as an effect of her failure to find a plan for obtaining coral's load average 
from ucbcory. In planning her recovery, R could then have decided to  use that information 
to explain to  Q why no such plan exists. In laying out the Response Planner's architecture, 
I have used a feedback channel to accommodate the system's need to  react to planning 
failures. 
Theoretical problems 
The addition of a feedback channel from the Strategic Planner to  the Response Goal Pro- 
poser-thus allowing the RGP to modify the system's high-level response goals during 
the planner's operation-leads to difficult theoretical problems. For example, what is 
to  prevent the Response Planner from looping indefinitely, changing its goals each time? 
What is to keep the system from overgenerating, that is, adding so many goals through 
feedback that the overall system produces so much output as to violate Grice's maxim of 
Quantity (see Section 2.1)? 
Overgeneration, of course, is a general problem that has never been addressed-and 
never really can be satisfactorily addressed-by questioner-based systems. When the focus 
is on reproducing fixed forms of behavior, concerns about prolixity have no place in the 
research. In fact, in all of the literature that I have studied, I found only two attempts 
at proposing constraints on cooperative response behavior. One proposal was by Wahlster 
et al. [Wahlster 831, the other by Joshi et al. [Joshi 84bl. The first was offered primarily 
as an implementation technique, the second as a conjecture. Neither proposal has been 
evaluated in any depth. 
Grice's maxim of Quantity reflects the fact that people can and do make judgments 
about how much information is necessary or appropriate to  include in a reply. Our compu- 
tational models of CRG should be able to do the same. Looking at the problem from the 
respondent's point of view has the advantage of forcing researchers to consider what over- 
generation really means and to investigate principled constraining methods. Of course, 
this engenders many difficult and challenging questions, and while the framework I am 
proposing does not make them any less difficult or challenging, it provides a reasonable 
foundation for recognizing them as problems and confronting them directly. 
4.4 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has examined the design principles and general structure of a CRG system 
whose core component is an agent capable of forming and adopting high-level response goals 
and developing plans to satisfy them. I have called such a system a Coopemtive Response 
Planning System, or CRPS. The CRPS was divided into three reasoning components: a 
Conversation Modeler, a Response Planner, and a Language Generator. I discussed the 
theory and operation of the first two of these components. 
The Conversation Modeler is the component that builds the derived knowledge base- 
called the conversation model-from which the Response Planner initially reasons. The 
Conversation Modeler is conceived of as comprising only those inference mechanisms that 
must be routinely invoked prior to response planning. 
Initially driven by beliefs found in the conversation model, the Response Planner iden- 
tifies well motivated high-level response goals for the system to adopt and develop plans to 
satisfy. Rather than receiving its goals from an external source, it forms them itself. Once 
the goals are selected, a plan must be found to satisfy them. The adopted goals might not 
always be achievable, and so there is a need for feedback from the planning component to 
the goal-selection component. 
In the next chapter, I will discuss the processing of two examples of cooperative response 
behavior within the Cooperative Response Planning System framework developed here. 
Chapter 5 
Analyses of Examples 
This chapter analyzes the processing of two examples of cooperative response behavior 
within the Cooperative Response Planning System framework developed in Chapter 4. 
The first (considered in Section 5.1) is a COOP-style response [Kaplan 821 generated when 
the questioner's query is found to presume the truth of a proposition that the system 
believes to be false. The second example (considered in Section 5.2) is the now-familiar 
dialogue, taken from the U N I X  transcripts, centering on the questioner's goal of sending 
electronic mail to  (some unspecified user or users of) ucbeuler. 
5.1 Correcting a False Presumption 
The following query-response pair exemplifies the kind of exchange that Kaplan's coop 
system was developed to handle: 
(67) Q: Which COBOL programmers are in department 67? 
R: I don't know of any programmers in department 67. 
Our interest here is in examining the reasoning process by which a cooperative respondent 
might first detect and then decide to  correct Q's false presumption that there exists a 
set of programmers in department 67, rather than simply responding with a truthful but 
misleading answer of "None". 
The COOP system demonstrated the feasibility of one technique that database-query 
applications could employ to  provide "cooperative" answers to  questions, namely, detecting 
and correcting false presumptions indicated by extensional query failures. The research 
was aimed a t  improving these applications' question-answering competence as perceived 
by their users. As such, it was not necessary to  develop more than a relatively superficial 
analysis of the reasoning processes that might give rise to  the desired output behavior. 
But if we want to  develop a respondent-based planning model of the behavior that coop 
produced, those reasoning processes must be analyzed and understood at a deeper level. 
I begin by characterizing the conversation model that a respondent could be expected to 
derive on the basis of Q's utterances (Section 5.1.1) and then consider how the response 
might be planned using that model (Section 5.1.2). 
5.1.1 Building the conversation model 
Crucial to the evident cooperativeness of the response is R's ability to reason about conflicts 
between her own beliefs and those she ascribes to  Q regarding extensions in the current 
database of various set descriptions. 
Basic definitions 
I will first define six sets that participate in the reasoning underlying the production of 
the response in Example (67).l I will refer to these sets using the symbols P, V, C,  D67, 
PV6,, and CV6,. The symbol P will be used to denote the set of all known programmers, 
V to denote the set of all known departments: 
Obviously, we can assume that P and V denote disjoint sets. Next, C denotes the subset 
of P of COBOL programmers: 
C = {x E P 1 proglang(x, COBOL)) 
D67 denotes the referent of the description "department 67": 
In this expression, LX P(x)  means "the unique x such that P(x)".  Finally, we define the 
sets PV6, of programmers in V67 and CV6, of COBOL programmers in V67. 
Of particular importance to  an understanding of how the response is computed are the 
set-theoretic rules governing how set emptiness "propagates". For example, since C c P ,  
C will be empty whenever P is empty. The relevant axioms are shown below. 
As we will see shortly, knowledge of these inference rules can be assumed to  be shared by 
Q and R. 
Elements of the conversation model 
The "conversation model" from which COOP worked consisted of these elements: 
'1 will make the simplifying assumption that 
Vx[programmer(x) + 3y : department(y) /\ in(%, y)] 
That  is, every programmer must be in a department. Thus we need not worry about the sets "programmers 
in departments" and "COBOL programmers in departmentsn. 
a a representation of the query (in the MQL representation language); 
a the answer to the query according to the database. 
If the query result was zero or "nil", COOP analyzed the query into its constituent sets and 
checked each one for an empty extension. 
A respondent-based account of the reasoning process leading to the response demands 
a greatly-enriched conversation model. I now consider the elements that should be part of 
such a model. The respondent should proceed through at least these steps: 
1. constructing intensional descriptions of referring expressions used explicitly or im- 
plicitly by Q; 
2. determining, for each intensional description, whether it is well formed (i.e., whether 
all constituent relations xRy are valid with respect to the database schema; cf. Mays 
[Mays 801); 
3. determining, for each well-formed intensional description, its extension as recorded 
in the current database (if any); 
4. identifying the information or action that Q has requested; 
5. identifying Q7s beliefs about the world as indicated by his query; 
6. evaluating Q7s beliefs against R7s own model of the world. 
Note that COOP had no access to  beliefs about "higher" goals that Q might be pursuing 
and therefore did not model Q7s plans. Instead, Q7s goal was restricted to having R satisfy 
the request. 
Intensional descriptions The symbols P, V, C, 2367, Pv677 and CV6, will be used to 
denote the intensional descriptions that R constructs and uses t o  represent and reason 
about Q's query. These symbols will have their set-theoretic definitions. 
These descriptions become part of R's conversation model for the exchange. That is, I 
am suggesting that although the query explicitly mentions only the set of COBOL program- 
mers and the entity "department 67", and implicitly evokes only the set denoted by Cv6,, 
R nevertheless builds and adds to  her conversation model the intensional representations 
corresponding to  P, V,  and PDS7 .2 
Checking well-formedness The next step in constructing the conversation model con- 
sists of checking the well-formedness of the intensional descriptions. For the present ex- 
ample, all descriptions will be assumed to be well formed, that is, R7s model of the world 
(the database schema) contains the concepts "programmer", "COBOL programmer", "de- 
partment", and so forth. I will represent this situation using the following axiom: 
'1 do not, however, offer this as a cognitive claim, since I have no data to support it. As I have noted, 
COOP does not perform such analyses until after a null query result has been obtained. But I will assume 
that all required set descriptions are built as a routine matter, in order to avoid the details involved in 
modeling the process by which R might explicitly decide to undertake further analysis of Q's query, alter 
her response strategy based on the results of that analysis, and so forth. 
This axiom states that R believes it to be mutually believed between herself and Q that 
all the referring expressions are well formed. 
Finding extensions When R tries to determine the extensions of the intensional de- 
scriptions she has built and placed in her model of the conversation, she will find a set 
of programmers, a smaller set of COBOL programmers, a set of departments, and a refer- 
ent for "department 67". She will not, however, find any programmers in department 67. 
Consequently, CV6, will turn out to be empty as well. This will cause the following facts 
to  be added to R's conversation model: 
P = {PI, ~ 2 ,  ~ 3 7 . .  .) 
c = {p3, p5, p44,. . .) 
D = {dl,  d2, d3, . . .) 
D67 = d67 
p ~ 6 7  = 0 
C ~ 6 7  = 0 
Representing the query R's conversation model must also contain some representation 
of Q's query. As uttered, the query literally requests that R identify the members of C 
satisfying the predicate Xzin(x,Ds7). That set is exactly CV6,, so I will represent the query 
simply as 
request (9 , R ,  inf ormref (R ,  Q ,CV6,) ) 
That is, Q has REQUESTed that R INFORM him of the REFerent of the description 
corresponding to  CV6, .3 
Modeling Q's beliefs Next, we consider the beliefs that R ascribes to Q on the basis 
of the observed utterance (the request). Since Q has asked a question of the form Which 
Xs P(X), R can reasonably infer that Q believes that there is a set of Xs. That is, 
More significantly, Q can be expected to believe not only that C has a non-empty extension, 
but also that all generalizations of C (cf. Motro [Motro 841) have non-empty extensions. 
In particular, R can infer that Q believes P has a non-empty extension. 
As I have suggested, Q's query implicitly invokes-and causes R to build representations 
of-the two sets "programmers in department 67" (PV6,) and "COBOL programmers in 
department 67" (Cv6,). Following Motro once more, we note that while Q need not believe 
that CV,, has a non-empty extension, he surely would believe that any generalization of 
that set would be non-empty. In particular, 
'The operators REQUEST, INFORM, INFORMREF, and so on, are not new, of course. Allen, for example, 
used them in developing his model of plan recognition [Allen 831, as did Litman in her model of clarification 
subdialogues [Litman 84b]. Both requesting and informing acts have been formalized by Cohen and Perrault 
[Cohen 791, and, although the semantics of IYFORMREF remain largely unexplored, Appelt has modeled the 
planned use of definite referring expressions [Appelt 85a]. 
BEL(Q ,not(Pv,, = 0)) .  
This is the belief that drives the respondent's reasoning leading her to provide a corrective 
response. 
Modeling R's beliefs Each proposition in the conversation model represents one of 
the respondent's beliefs. But if we are to develop precise models of cooperative response 
behavior, we must carefully distinguish at least these kinds of belief: 
R's private beliefs; 
a R's beliefs about Q7s private beliefs; 
R's beliefs about mutual beliefs. 
In the context of Example (67), R has a private belief that Pv,, = 0. This belief is private 
in the sense that R does not ascribe this belief to Q. More precisely, we can say the following 
about R's beliefs: 
These propositions state that R holds the belief P (where P corresponds to "Pv6, = fly'), 
but believes Q to  believe not(P). The second proposition represents one of R7s beliefs about 
Q's private beliefs. Given that there is a disagreement between R's and Q's private beliefs 
about P, we can straightforwardly deduce that P i s  not believed mutually believed between 
Q and R: 
Note, however, that the inference rule 
Pv,, = 0 =+ cv,, = 0 
can be assumed to be mutually believed. That is: 
BMB(R,Q,%,, = 0 + Cv,, = 0) 
In other words, R should be able to infer that if Q believed PV6, = 0, he would be able to 
infer Cv6, = 0 from that belief. 
Conversation model for coop example 
We now have enough conceptual machinery to state the conversation model from which R 
will reason to plan a cooperative response. The complete model is shown in Figure 5.1. 
The model is divided into several parts; these are briefly summarized next. 
Definitions of intensional descriptions The intensional descriptions are "definitional" 
in the sense that they define sets referred to  explicitly in or evoked by Q's query. They 
must be part of the conversation model because other beliefs about the conversation are 
defined in terms of them. In effect, they represent the respondent's beliefs about sets of 
entities to  which the questioner intends to refer. 
Definitions of intensional descriptions: 
P = {x I programmer(x)) 
V = {x 1 department(x)} 
C = {x E P I proglang(x, COBOL)} 
2)67 = LX E Z) : dept-no(x, 67) 
P ~ 6 7  = {X E P 1 in(x,v67)) 
C ~ 6 7  = p ~ 6 7  
Inference rules about set relationships: 
BMB(R,Q,P = 0 =+ C = 0) 
BMB (R, Q ,Z) = 0 =+ undefined(Vs7)) 
BMB (R,  Q , ~nde f ined (2 )~~)  + PV6, = 0) 
BMB(R,Q,Pv~~ = 0 =%Cv67 = 0) 
BMB(R,Q,C= 0 =+Cv6, = 0) 
Well-formedness beliefs: 
V i  E { P , Z ) , C , D ~ ~ , P V ~ ~ , C V ~ ~ )  BMB(R,Q,wf (i)) 
Model of Q's request: 
~~~(~,~,request(Q,R,informref(R,Q,Cv~~))) 
Beliefs ascribed to  Q: 
BEL(Q ,not (C = 0 ) )  
B ~ L ( Q , n o t ( p  = 0))  
B E L ( Q , ~ o ~ ( P v ~ ,  = 0) )  
BEL(Q ,not  (CV,, = 0)) 
R's private beliefs: 
P = { ~ 1 , ~ 2 , ~ 3 , .  . .I 
c = (p3, p5, p44, . . .) 
2, = {dl,  d2, d3 , .  . .) 
v67 = d67 
P ~ 6 7  = 0 
' ~ 6 7  = 0 
not  (BMB(R, Q ,Pv,, = 0) 
not(BMB(R,Q,Cv,, = 0) )  
Figure 5.1: R's Conversation Model for coop Example 
Inference rules about set relationships For this example, we can assume that Q 
and R share all (set-theoretic) beliefs about how emptiness of various sets "propagates". 
If, for example, R did not believe that Q could infer the emptiness of the set of COBOL 
programmers from belief of the emptiness of the set of programmers, she might be inclined 
to  augment her response with an appropriate explanation or justification. 
Well-formedness beliefs For the response to be appropriate, we must assume that both 
dialogue participants believe all referring expressions to be well f ~ r m e d . ~  As Mays showed, 
ill-formed intensional descriptions may demand special response strategies [Mays 801. There- 
fore, we require that R's beliefs about well formedness be part of her model of the conver- 
sation. 
Model of request Both the questioner and the respondent can be assumed to believe 
that a request has taken place, where the object of the request is an act by R of informing 
Q of the referent of the description "COBOL programmers in department 67". If the con- 
versation model were not to reveal any other conditions for R to address in her response, 
she could use her belief about the request to plan a response that would satisfy it. 
Beliefs ascribed to Q While many beliefs might be inferable from Q's query, at least 
four are crucial. First, Q believes that there is a non-empty set of COBOL programmers (in 
the world represented by the database). Similarly, he also believes there is a non-empty set 
of programmers. Third, Q believes that restricting the (non-empty) set of programmers 
to those in department 67 yields a non-empty set. He has a similar belief regarding the 
restriction of the set of COBOL programmers to  those in department 67. 
R's private beliefs The respondent, having access to the knowledge recorded in the 
database, is able to determine the extensions of the intensionally-defined sets. Through 
this process she acquires particular beliefs, including, for example, the belief that the set 
{pl,  p2, p3,. . .) is the extension of the set represented by 'P. Of particular importance here 
is the belief that R acquires when she restricts 'P to those programmers in department 67. 
An empty set results, which leads to the emptiness of the set denoted by Cv67. These two 
beliefs disagree with related beliefs ascribed to Q, so R can infer that her particular beliefs 
about PD6, and Cv6, are not shared by Q. 
5.1.2 Response goals proposed and adopted 
Much work remains to be done, of course, before we can truly say that we have developed 
a complete and precise specification of the conversation model that R builds on the basis 
of Q's query in Example (67). In particular, more attention needs to be paid to questions 
concerning which beliefs are private and which are believed mutually believed. Figure 5.1 
is only a first approximation to such a model. Nevertheless, the model is instructive in 
that it provides insight into the kinds of rich knowledge bases that might be needed to 
support cooperative response planning. 
'It would, however, be interesting to consider the consequences of weakening this assumption from 
one-sided mutual belief to a private belief of R. 
Developing a model of the respondent's goals in producing the response shown in the 
example demands that we address these two questions: 
1. What principles motivate the decision to offer a corrective response? 
2. What principles explain R's decision to omit the correct, albeit misleading, direct 
answer? 
Adopting the respondent-based perspective means acknowledging the relevance of these 
questions. Finding satisfactory answers to them is an open research issue; for the present, 
I will discuss some proposals. 
The decision to provide a corrective response must be related to  the respondent's 
reasoning about the disagreement she has discovered between her own beliefs and those 
she has ascribed to Q. Given our view of the conversation model as circumscribing all 
those beliefs that are believed relevant to  the current conversation, perhaps we might be 
able to use the principle of "squaring away" mutual beliefs as discussed by Joshi [Joshi 821 
to motivate the corrective response behavior. We might reformulate that principle in the 
following way: 
Maximize mutuality of beliefs in the conversation model. 
This principle reflects the theory that at least one goal of cooperative interaction might 
be to reach agreement on all beliefs that have been stated or implied over the course of a 
dialogue. 
Bearing this principle in mind, we note that the conversation model proposed for the 
present example shows that there are two propositions over which Q's and R's beliefs differ 
(the emptiness or non-emptiness of the sets Pv6, and CV6,). This state of affairs might 
lead R to adopt the following high-level goals: 
BMB(R,Q,Pv,, = 0) 
BMB (R, Q ,Cv6, = 0) 
(Note that I am making what Pollack has labeled the "correct knowledge assumption" 
[Pollack 861, that is, I am assuming that R's beliefs are always correct.) In other words, 
the principle of maximizing mutuality of belief in this case motivates R to adopt the goals 
of causing her private beliefs about the sets %,, and Cv6, to become mutually believed 
between herself and Q. These, then, are at least two of the goals that the Response Goal 
Proposer might add to the Response Goals blackboard. 
Devising a principled account of the omission of the direct answer is considerably more 
difficult. One way to look at it might be to have the respondent adopt a "satisfy request" 
goal, and then later decide to drop it. Deciding to drop such a goal would entail reasoning 
about the possible effects on the questioner of providing a direct answer. For example, 
R might have to determine that a reply of "None" would have the effect of permitting 
Q to maintain his (incorrect) belief that the set PV6, has a non-empty extension. This 
is a non-trivial reasoning process. On the other hand, perhaps a better way to  view the 
response is not as omitting the direct answer, but rather as providing it implicitly. That 
is, R might be able to  reason that Q can infer the direct answer from her assertion that 
the set %, is empty. 
Both accounts entail a complicated reasoning process wherein the respondent (1) chooses 
a set of response goals, (2) plans utterances to achieve those goals, (3) models the effects 
of those utterances on (her model of) the questioner's beliefs, and then (4) reasons about 
the results, possibly iterating through these steps several times, changing or modifying her 
response plan on each iteration. This seems to be the correct approach in the long run, 
but there are many technical details that remain to be worked out. 
5.1.3 Strategic planning 
For the sake of discussing strategic planning, we will take R's adopted goals to be: 
Looking at the response actually provided in the example, it appears that R's surface goal 
is: 
That is, R's surface goal is, roughly, to inform Q that R does not believe that the set of 
programmers in department 67 is non-empty. 
According to the theory developed in Chapter 4, the Strategic Planner is responsible 
for computing the plan that links the respondent's adopted high-level response goals to 
the surface goals. In the context of the present example, this raises the question of how 
exactly an agent might plan to cause a proposition P to become mutually believed. For 
simple propositions like those underlying the response in Example (67), it is probably safe 
to assume that an assertion of P by R will cause P to become mutually believed. This is 
reasonable because: 
r It will be mutually believed that R is sincere. 
r It will be mutually believed that R has correct knowledge. 
Given that Q will have no reason to believe either that R is dissembling or is herself 
misinformed, R can assume that her assertions will lead to mutual belief. Even so, the two 
goals proposed above lead to the question of why R does not then respond as in (68). 
(68) R: I don't know of any programmers in department 67. I don't know of any 
COBOL programmers in department 67. 
Clearly, the second proposition logically follows from the first. The corresponding inference 
rule is, in fact, part of the conversation model. This suggests that another principle is 
needed. Consider the following proposal: 
Make explicit i n  a response only those propositions that the hearer cannot easily 
infer. 
The point here is that R believes that Q can deduce the emptiness of the set of COBOL 
programmers from knowledge about the emptiness of the set of programmers in general. 
R should be able to exploit this knowledge in order to produce a concise response. 
Of course, the fact that we have had to propose a general principle in order to under- 
stand the Strategic Planner's operation suggests that there are principles of cooperation 
operating at all levels of the response-planning process. The architecture design may thus 
provide assistance in identifying different classes of rules of cooperative dialogue. 
5.1.4 Summary 
In this section I sketched the steps involved in computing the response shown in Example 
(67), and considered some of the issues that will have to be resolved before the model can 
be implemented. In developing a conversation model for the example, we saw that even 
for such a "simple" example, in a highly-restricted database-query domain, the kind of 
conversation model that a principled account of the response demands the respondent to  
possess will need to  be very rich indeed. 
Two principles were proposed in order to motivate goals that the respondent could 
plausibly have adopted: 
a Maximize mutuality of beliefs in  the conversation model. 
a Make explicit in a response only those propositions that the hearer cannot easily infer. 
It remains an open question as to how such principles could be declaratively encoded in a 
cooperative response planning system and used to  determine the system's behavior. 
5.2 Sending Electronic Mail 
As a second exploration of response planning in the theoretical framework developed in 
this dissertation, I will sketch the processing of the following example (seen several times 
earlier) culled from the U N I X  transcripts: 
(69) Q: Do you know if there is any network link to ucbeuler? I want to  send some 
mail over there. 
R: The network link is not up yet. Some time in the near future it will be 
connected to the Berknet, but I don't know exactly when. It is mostly a 
software change on ucbvax. 
The reasoning underlying the response in Example (69) is significantly different from that 
underlying Example (67). This is primarily because COOP had no access to, and thus could 
not reason about, Q's goals and plans in the world, whereas reasoning about Q's goals and 
plans in the world is an important component of any computational model of R's reply 
above. 
Section 5.2.1 examines the conversation model that R must build before planning her re- 
sponse. Section 5.2.2 discusses the high-level response goals that are proposed and adopted, 
and Section 5.2.3 considers the process of selecting surface goals to  achieve the adopted 
response goals. The results of this investigation are summarized in Section 5.2.4. 
5.2.1 Building the conversation model 
I begin by outlining the conversation model that R can reasonably be expected to  build 
on the basis of Q's utterances. This model will contain at least: 
a a representation of Q's explicit request; 
a a representation of Q's explicitly-stated goal; 
a representation of Q7s domain plan, which relates his request to  his goal; 
an evaluation of that plan. 
These elements are discussed in the following subsections. 
Modeling the request and goal 
I will model Q7s first utterance ("Do you.. . t o  ucbeuler?") as an explicit request, and treat 
his second utterance ("I want.. .over there") as an explicit statement of the most general 
goal t o  which Q intends the conversation to be related. That is, I am suggesting that Q 
utters "I want to send some mail over [to ucbeuler]" so as to provide R with a clearly- 
defined goal on which Q would like the conversation to focus. Consider, for example, how 
different the response would be if the second utterance were to  be replaced by any of 
(70)a-c. 
(70)a. "I want to transfer some files from there." 
b. "I want to see if my friend Joe is logged on there." 
c. "My friend Joe has been having trouble sending e-mail to me from there." 
Each of the above substitute utterances would serve to  identify a different reason-and 
thus lead R to infer a different domain plan-that motivates Q7s making of the request. 
Thus R's model of the conversation surely must contain a representation of both Q7s 
request and his goal statement. I will use the following notation for these elements: 
request(Q ,R, 
inf ormif (R, Q ,3x :netwk-link 
connects (x , current-machine,ucbeuler) ) ) 
goal(9, do(Q , sendmail (current-machine,ucbeuler) ) ) 
Q's first utterance is modeled as a request from Q to R that R perform an act of informing 
Q of the truth status of the proposition "there exists a network link between the current 
machine and ucbeuler", where the "current machine" refers to  the machine on which the 
dialogue is being held. (Note that to  reduce the complexity of the analysis I am ignoring 
the indirect nature of the request; see, for example, Allen [Allen 831, Allen and Hinkelman 
[Allen 891, and Hinkelman [Hinkelman 901 for work on the problem of understanding indi- 
rect requests.) Q7s goal will be modeled simply as the performance of an act of sending 
mail from the current machine to (some unspecified user or users of) ucbeuler. 
Plan recognition 
Once R7s model of the conversation has been initialized with the representations of Q's 
request and goal, her next processing step is to apply a plan-recognition procedure to that 
model in order to  identify the underlying domain plan motivating Q7s two utterances. In 
a sense, plan recognition is used to generate an "explanation", in terms of goals and plans, 
of the relationship between Q7s request and his goal statement. Through this process R 
should acquire a t  least these beliefs: 
Q's goal is to send (or be able to  send) electronic mail to  (some unspecified user or 
users of) ucbeuler. 
r Q has formed a plan to achieve that goal and is considering executing it.5 
r Q believes that a network link must exist between the current machine and ucbeuler 
in order for the plan to  be executable. 
Q does not know whether such a link exists, and thus does not know whether his 
plan is executable. 
r Q believes that R knows (or at least might know) whether such a link exists. 
r Q has made his request of R in order to determine whether his plan is executable. 
The most significant result of this process is that R acquires the belief (noted in the third 
item above) that Q believes the existence of a network link between the current machine 
and ucbeuler is an applicability condition on his plan for sending mail to ucbeuler. This 
state of affairs could be represented using the following notation: 
acond(3x : netuk-link connects (x , current-machine ,ucbeuler) , 
do (9,  sendrmail (current-machine,ucbeuler) ) ) 
As used in the literature (see, for example, Litman and Allen [Litman 84a]), applicability 
conditions are like preconditions in that they are conditions that must be satisfied in order 
for an action to be executable. They differ from preconditions, however, in that they 
are conditions over which the planning agent (typically) has no control; thus the planner 
should not try to form subplans to change the status of applicability conditions. Because 
the condition "a network link exists between the current machine and ucbeuler" is one 
that users typically cannot affect, I model it here as an applicability condition rather than 
as a simple precondition. 
Plan evaluation 
Once a plan has been inferred, R must evaluate that plan with respect to  her own beliefs. 
As Pollack argued [Pollack 861, this involves, among others, the following sorts of activities: 
r for each precondition (or applicability condition) P of each action A in the plan, 
checking whether R believes that P is actually a precondition (or applicability con- 
dition) of A; 
r for each precondition (or applicability condition) P of each action A in the plan, 
checking whether R believes that P will hold at  the intended execution time of A; 
for each effect E of each action A in the plan, checking whether R believes that E is 
actually an effect of A. 
Judging from the information conveyed in the response, we can infer that R believed Q7s 
plan to  be completely well formed, but unexecutable. That is, R determined that Q7s 
plan was a perfectly reasonable one, but simply could not be executed because one of its 
applicability conditions (the existence of a network link) was not satisfied. Consequently, 
her response focuses on the status and pending establishment of a network link to  ucbeuler. 
Consider how the response might differ if R7s evaluation of Q's plan were different: 
'See Ramshaw [Ramshaw 911 for related work on a theory of dialogue that permits dialogue systems to 
distinguish between plans that are actually intended and those that are merely under consideration. 
(71) R: Just do this: mail ruby!euler!user. Let us know if it doesn't work. Euler 
is only reached thru the ruby machine. 
The response in (71)' a response from the U N I X  transcripts that was provided by a different 
respondent to  the query in (69)' focuses on describing a method Q can use to  achieve his 
sendrmail goal, rather than on the existence of a network link. This behavior could be 
explained by assuming that in this second case R determined that Q's plan was not only 
well formed but also executable. In other words, R concluded that both Q's plan and 
query were reasonable. However, once those facts were established, R was able t o  reason 
that the answer to  the query would be rendered irrelevant to Q's stated goal if she could 
instead provide information that would directly enable Q to  carry out his plan. Providing 
the necessary U N I X  command line serves that goal, hence the response. 
In modeling the planning of the response shown in Example (69)' I will assume that 
the following beliefs, generated by the plan-evaluation mechanism, are added to  R's con- 
versation model: 
Q's plan is well formed. 
The applicability condition "a network link exists between the current machine and 
ucbeuler" on Q's plan will not hold at the intended time of execution of the plan. 
Due to  the failure of one of its applicability conditions, the plan will be unexecutable 
at its intended execution time. 
We now have enough knowledge in the conversation model to  consider how the response- 
planning process might proceed. Figure 5.2 summarizes the model. 
5.2.2 Response goals proposed and adopted 
If we analyze the response into the propositions that it conveys, we get a set roughly like 
the following: 
"A network link between the current machine and ucbeuler does not exist a t  the 
present time." 
"A network link between the current machine and ucbeuler will be established at  
some time in the near future." 
"[R does] not know a more precise specification (than in the near future) of the time 
at which the network link to  ucbeuler will be established." 
"Establishing the network link primarily involves making a change to  software on 
ucbvax." 
A respondent-based model of the response should provide a principled account of the 
reasoning that connects the beliefs contained in R's model of the conversation to the 
propositions conveyed in the response's constituent utterances. I discuss the general outline 
of such an account here. 
Model of Q's request: 
request  (Q,R, 
informif(R,Q, 
32: netwk-link 
connects (x , current-machine,ucbeuler) )) 
Model of Q's goal: 
goal(Q ,do (Q , s e n d a a i l  (current-machine ,ucbeuler) ) ) 
R's private beliefs (derived using plan recognition): 
Q's goal is to send (or be able to  send) electronic mail to  (some 
unspecified user or users of) ucbeuler. 
Q has formed a plan to  achieve that goal and is considering 
executing it. 
Q believes that a network link must exist between the current 
machine and ucbeuler in order for the plan to be executable. 
Q does not know whether such a link exists, and thus does not 
know whether his plan is executable. 
Q believes that R might know whether such a link exists. 
Q has made his request of R in order t o  determine whether his 
plan is executable. 
R's private beliefs (derived using plan evaluation): 
Q's plan is well formed. 
The applicability condition "a network link exists between the current 
machine and ucbeu1er"on Q's plan will not hold at  the intended 
time of execution of the plan. 
Due to  the failure of one of its applicability conditions, the plan 
will be unexecutable at  its intended execution time. 
Figure 5.2: R's Conversation Model for U N I X  Example 
Satisfying the request On the basis of the beliefs in R's conversation model, it is 
reasonable to  expect the respondent to  initially adopt a high-level response goal of satisfying 
Q's explicit request. This is because the conversation model contains the following beliefs 
about Q: 
a Q has a well-formed plan under consideration. 
a In order to  decide whether or not to put the plan into execution, Q needs to  know 
whether the proposition "a network link exists between the current machine and 
ucbeuler" holds. 
a Determining the truth value of that proposition is Q's reason for making the request. 
We can think of these beliefs as together providing evidence that Q's request is a "reason- 
able" one, i.e., a request for which R can find no reason to  choose not to  satisfy it. (Thus 
we may want to consider whether "satisfying reasonable requests" should be an axiom of 
a theory of cooperative response generation.) 
In order to  satisfy the request, the respondent must determine for herself whether she 
believes a network link exists. That is, she must adopt a (sub) goal of checking whether 
she believes that the proposition "there exists a network link between the current machine 
and ucbeuler" is satisfied. Judging from the response, we can infer that R acquired at  least 
the following beliefs through this process: 
1. R does not believe that the proposition "there exists a network link between the 
current machine and ucbeuler" holds at the time of the dialogue. 
2. R believes that the truth value of the proposition "there exists a network link between 
the current machine and ucbeuler" will change from FALSE to T R U E  at some time 
point t which falls within the temporal interval describable as the near future. 
These constitute new beliefs that are added to  R's conversation model as a side effect of 
her efforts to acquire the information she needs to carry out her response goal of satisfying 
Q's explicit request. Note that now the conversation model contains information that was 
not available when the respondent originally began selecting response goals. What is of 
interest is how this modification affects the respondent's subsequent response planning. 
Adding relevant information The bulk of the response focuses on the time at which 
R believes a network link will be established. This raises the question of what general 
principle (or principles) might be driving this behavior. One hypothesis is that respondents 
always try to  provide some information related to the questioner's goal in their responses 
if they cannot actually help directly. In Example (69), R knows that she cannot offer any 
information that will immediately help Q achieve his goal. She believes, however, that Q's 
goal will be achievable relatively soon. She judges that knowing this might be of interest 
to Q, and since it is the best she can offer, she decides to convey her belief to Q that 
the network link will be established "in the near future". (Thus we see the importance of 
reasoning about the questioner's goals.) 
In summary, a reasonable step-by-step account of the respondent's goal-selection pro- 
cess is as follows: 
1. Based on her beliefs as recorded in the initial conversation model, R adopts the goal 
of satisfying Q's explicit request. 
2. As a step towards achieving that goal, R adopts a god  of determining whether she 
herself believes that a network link exists between the current machine and ucbeuler. 
3. R carries out the reasoning necessary to achieve that goal, discovering in the process 
that she believes (1) there is no network link at present, and (2) a network link will 
be established soon. Her conversation model is updated accordingly. 
4. Reasoning over this new conversation model, R recognizes that she can satisfy Q's 
request, but that this would leave his domain goal (of being able to  send mail to 
ucbeuler) unsatisfied. 
5. In an effort to at least provide some information judged relevant to  Q's domain goal, 
R adopts another response goal of conveying to Q her beliefs about the time at which 
a network link will be established. 
Thus the two goals ultimately provided to  the Strategic Planner are (1) satisfy Q's explicit 
request, and (2) inform Q when a network link between the current machine and ucbeuler 
will be established. 
5.2.3 Strategic planning 
Once the planner's goals have been established by the Response Goal Proposer, the Strate- 
gic Planner must compute a plan for achieving them using utterance acts. 
Developing a plan t o  satisfy the first goal might at first glance appear to  be relatively 
straightforward. But the response shown in the example suggests it is actually a rather 
complex process: note the use of the temporal adverbial "yet". This indicates that the plan 
to  satisfy the first goal is influenced by the system's beliefs about the temporal nature of the 
existence of the network link. Rather than planning to use a simple declarative INFORM 
utterance act, e.g., "The network link is not up" or "There is no network link", it would 
seem that the system must instead be able to reason about how the performance of such 
an act would support or undermine other goals that i t  would like to achieve. It could, of 
course, select such an act, but this would most likely demand the later use of constructions 
like "However.. . " in order to block the questioner's possible conclusion that the situation 
is not going to change. This, however, takes us beyond issues of cooperation and into the 
domain of planning for natural language generation. 
The two propositions conveyed by the next utterance- "A network link to  ucbeuler 
will be established in the near future" and "I do not know a more precise specification (than 
in the near future) of the time at which the network link to ucbeuler will be established7'- 
can be treated as being offered in an attempt to  "approximately" satisfy the (second) goal 
of informing Q when the link will be established. What is interesting here is that R has 
adopted a goal that she cannot fully satisfy, due to insufficient knowledge. 
Finally, the question arises concerning how we might account for R's concluding ut- 
terance: "It is mostly a software change on ucbvax". This utterance has nothing to  do 
with satisfying the request, nor does it directly follow from a goal of informing Q when a 
network link will be established. It seems to be offered in a spirit of suggesting that not 
much work is needed to  establish the link (it is "only a matter of a software change") and 
so Q's goal is likely to  be achievable sooner rather than later. 
One possible approach to  modeling this behavior would be to take advantage of the 
architecture's capacity for reflection. For example, once the Strategic Planner has formed 
its plan to  (1) satisfy Q's request, and (2) communicate the system's available knowledge 
about the time at  which a network link will be established, this plan could be added 
to  the conversation model, representing an intermediate stage of R's planned response. 
This could allow the Response Goal Proposer to reason about that plan and generate new 
goals. In this example, the RGP might reason that, if the system carries out its current 
response plan, Q might then be interested in any information concerning factors that might 
accelerate or inhibit establishment of the network link. Although there is good reason to 
believe that such forms of reasoning will be necessary to account for such examples, it 
remains a challenging problem to find a satisfactory computational model of this process. 
5.2.4 Summary 
This section sketched a model of the processing of a reasonably complicated naturally oc- 
curring example culled from the U N I X  transcripts. We saw that building a conversation 
model demanded the invocation of mechanisms for plan recognition and for plan evalu- 
ation. Although the response-planning process was described only in general terms, the 
exercise nevertheless provided further insight into the kinds of issues that respondent-based 
modeling of cooperative response phenomena forces theorists to address. 
5.3 Concluding remarks 
This chapter outlined respondent-based models of two examples of cooperative response 
behavior. In the first example, we saw how taking the respondent's perspective in coop- 
erative response generation led to the specification of a rich and detailed model of the 
respondent's beliefs prior to her response-planning activity. This model then served as a 
starting point for stating and evaluating principles of cooperative behavior that might be 
governing the response. The analysis of the second example, a naturally occurring exchange 
in the richer domain of U N I X  advising, demonstrated the significance of both plan inference 
and evaluation knowledge in the respondent's model of the conversation. Furthermore, we 
saw how a detailed account of response planning might require that respondents be able 
to adopt, pursue, and later revise their high-level response goals. 

Chapter 6 
Conclusions and Directions for 
Further Work 
This dissertation has examined research and design issues pertaining to the development 
of natural-language dialogue systems intended to be able to  provide cooperative responses. 
In this chapter, I will discuss both the broad conclusions that can be drawn from this work 
and the specific results that have been obtained, and will outline some interesting avenues 
for further exploration. 
6.1 Thesis Contributions 
The research I have presented herein constitutes a top-down re-evaluation of efforts t o  
develop computational models of cooperative response behavior. The work began as an 
effort in the engineering of natural-language dialogue systems. After over a decade of work 
by others on cooperative question answering, it seemed logical to  examine the problem of 
extending and combining-or integmting-those efforts into a single, more generally capa- 
ble cooperative dialogue system. But difficulties encountered during this effort suggested 
that individual projects, while identifying interesting regularities in human cooperative 
response behavior, had made assumptions about their domains and tasks that were suffi- 
ciently dissimilar as t o  call their integrability into question. 
6.1.1 General conclusions 
The re-evaluation that was started in response to  these problems yielded the first conclusion 
of the present work, namely, that without scientific advances in understanding the nature 
of cooperation and cooperative response behavior, continued work on engineering solutions 
will not lead us to "truly cooperative" dialogue systems. 
Building on past work, studying both the methods that have been used and the results 
that were obtained, I identified a paradigm that captures the essence of previous accounts of 
cooperative responses. I found that researchers had been developing models that implicitly 
adopted the questioner's viewpoint in their conceptions of the notion of "cooperativeness". 
In any given system, the definition of what actually made its responses "cooperative" 
was either left to intuition or stated in terms of some desired effect on the questioner 
(e.g., preventing him from drawing an incorrect conclusion from the system's answer). 
Consequently, I termed this research paradigm the questioner-based perspective. 
I developed a detailed characterization and critique of the questioner-based perspective 
and showed that, when cooperative responses are modeled in that theoretical framework, 
it naturally follows that the abstract principles driving a system's behavior can be over- 
looked. Furthermore, the questioner-based approach makes it possible to model different 
responses-and even different kinds of responses to the same query-in non-uniform ways, 
directly impeding integration efforts. I concluded that the questioner-based paradigm 
ought to be abandoned since it supports neither scientific nor engineering progress. 
The insights resulting both from the characterization of the questioner-based perspec- 
tive and from numerous analyses of naturally-occurring request-response pairs gave rise 
to the formulation of a new research paradigm, which I have called the respondent-bused 
perspective. According to this paradigm, responses are viewed as the observable result of 
the respondent's plan to achieve one or more goals. It demands that cooperative responses 
be modeled in terms of, e.g., the general reasoning principles that drive the respondent's 
behavior. Most importantly, the respondent-based paradigm holds that it is the process 
of cooperative reasoning, rather than the manifestations of that process, that should to be 
the object of study. 
Using examples drawn from transcripts of naturally-occurring dialogue, I discussed sev- 
eral dimensions of cooperative response behavior, such as knowledge-dependent response 
variations and notions of responsibility and willingness to cooperate, that cannot be prop- 
erly accounted for within the questioner-based paradigm. Modeling the respondent's rea- 
soning process, however, should make it possible to accommodate these ideas. 
Adopting the respondent-based perspective focuses attention directly on the scientific 
problem: What are the principles of a theory of cooperation and cooperative dialogue? 
Research along these lines promises to lay the foundation for real engineering progress 
toward integrated cooperative dialogue systen~s, and so I conclude that it is time for a 
paradigm shift from the questioner's to the respondent's perspective. 
Carrying through such a shift poses many difficult problems. In the third major portion 
of this dissertation (Chapter 4), I used analyses of naturally-occurring data to motivate 
the general structure of a planning system for respondent-based cooperative response gen- 
eration. I outlined the system's top-level organization, and then explored the designs of its 
two most important processing elements. The resulting architecture is useful primarily for 
the way it partitions what has been a poorly-understood general reasoning task. In going 
through the exercise of developing the architecture, several significant unsolved theoretical 
problems have been identified, thus pointing the way to future progress. Some of these 
problems will be summarized in Section 6.2. 
6.1.2 Specific results 
Besides the general conclusions presented above, my investigations into the problem of 
generating cooperative responses have produced several specific results. 
One such result is my identification of five elements of a respondent-based model of 
CRG. I distinguished: 
1. the goals that respondents adopt and try to achieve in their responses; 
2. the conditions of the conversation that motivate various response goals; 
3. the knowledge and reasoning resources needed to  determine the status of the goal- 
motivating conditions; 
4. the reasoning processes and principles by which response goals are actually adopted; 
5. the strategies that may be used to achieve a given response goal. 
Research effort spent on the first, second, and fourth elements should directly advance our 
comprehension of the principles of cooperative interaction. Those principles will define the 
kinds of tests that respondents apply to the representations they derive from questioners' 
utterances (the second element), the connections between those tests and the high-level 
goals whose adoption they motivate (the first element), and the more general processes of 
deciding when well-motivated goals should be pursued in a given response situation (the 
fourth element). Knowing the kinds of conversational conditions that influence response- 
goal decisions will provide grounding both for the design of computational mechanisms 
that produce the supporting data, like plan inference procedures, and for the actual tests 
on that data, like obstacle detection and belief checking. Once we understand the kinds of 
high-level goals that cooperative respondents adopt, analysis of naturally-occurring data 
should provide clearer insight into the methods people employ to achieve those goals. 
These are elements that participate in a general reasoning process, and the architectural 
model discussed in Chapter 4 represents a first attempt at characterizing their roles in that 
process. I partitioned that process into three subtasks: a stage of building a model of the 
conversation, a stage of selecting response goals and developing a plan to satisfy them, and 
a language generation stage. 
In developing the structure of the planning component of a CRG system, I explored 
two important architectural properties. First, the system must be able to  formulate its 
own goals, rather than receiving them from an external source. This process breaks down 
into a phase of identifying well-motivated goals and then applying more general "screens 
of admissibility" to  select a subset of those goals to  adopt and pursue. Second, there is a 
need for some kind of internal feedback loop in the planning stage. Analysis of naturally- 
occurring data suggests both that the respondent may adopt high-level goals that are later 
found to  be unachievable and that during the process of computing a plan to  satisfy one or 
more high-level goals, new information may become available that motivates the adoption 
of new high-level goals. 
In carrying out the various analyses upon which much of this dissertation work has 
been based, I discovered the importance of comparative study of cooperative response 
data. Past work on cooperative response generation has usually been restricted t o  simu- 
lating some small set of (often hand constructed) examples. But just as one needs many 
different examples of a word's use to  ascertain the range of its senses, it is essential to 
consider many different examples of cooperative response behavior to  gain insight into the 
principles of reasoning that might underlie cooperative discourse. The U N I X  transcripts 
were particularly useful in this regard in that they contained several examples in which dif- 
ferent respondents provided different responses to  the same request. These examples create 
an important challenge for investigators of cooperative phenomena: to develop compatible 
models that account for such response variations. 
6.2 Some Open Questions 
This section summarizes the major open questions that are raised by the Cooperative 
Response Planning System (CRPS) architecture I outlined in Chapter 4. 
Identifying response goals 
Bearing in mind the five elements of a respondent-based CRG model, I characterized the 
Response Goal Proposer (RGP) as applying tests against the conversation model to  identify 
high-level response goals that are well motivated in the response situation in focus. 
It has never been clear, however, exactly how to identify a principled set of such high- 
level goals. To the extent that UCEGO reasoned from high-level goals, Chin sin~ply chose 
a set that seemed reasonable in the context of the domain and that fit the needs of the 
responses he wanted the system to generate [Chin 88al. 
It seems clear that if we restrict our attention only to small sets of hand-picked ex- 
amples, it will be easy to define high-level goals in ad hoe ways. Large corpora, such as 
those I have examined over the course of this work, provide much better insight into the 
underlying principles of behavior, but they are difficult to deal with, identify patterns in, 
and extract solid conclusions from. That is perhaps what makes the respondent-based 
approach tricky: the only reliable source of insight into cooperative discourse is naturally- 
occurring data, but the standard approach of searching for and modeling regular patterns 
of behavior tends to lead one away from those insights. 
Proposing and adopting response goals 
I have argued that it makes sense to separate the task of identifying the high-level re- 
sponse goals that are well motivated based on the conversation model from the process of 
reasoning about the resulting set and choosing some subset of goals to actually adopt. I 
suggested that the RGP might have access to a library of abstract high-level goals, where 
each element of that library would have a set of activation conditions associated with it. 
When a particular goal's activation conditions were satisfied (according to tests against 
the conversation model), it would be instantiated and added to the RGP's internal list of 
potential response goals. When all such goals had been identified, some set of screens of 
admissibility would be employed to select the goals for the system to adopt. 
Although there are arguments to support the distinction between activation conditions 
and screens of admissibility, it is not clear what methods could be used to define them, 
especially the latter. Activation conditions, at least, might be abstracted from previous 
research. Screens of admissibility, however, were proposed in acknowledgment of the fact 
that realistic response planning systems will likely have to reason about multiple goals. 
Since such possibilities were never allowed in the past, no one ever considered the idea 
that goals that were well motivated individually might have negative interactions with 
each other or might conflict with other goals the respondent could hold. 
Ultimately, of course, the question that will have to be answered is this: What is 
the connection between activation conditions, screens of admissibility, and principles of 
cooperation? 
Interaction of RGP and S P  
There is evidence t o  support the hypothesis that some kind of feedback connection must 
exist between the component that suggests goals for the system to pursue and the compo- 
nent that attempts to compute plans to  satisfy them. But the properties of that feedback 
process are not well understood. For example, what information does the SP send back 
to  the RGP? Could the RGP ever decide to discard its original set of adopted goals and 
propose a new set? How would that affect the SP's design? Many issues with respect to  
the RGP/SP interface need to be investigated. 
6.3 Some Directions for Future Research 
During my investigations of general cooperative response phenomena, a few more narrowly- 
focused research questions were identified which might serve as interesting directions for 
future study. I sketch them here. 
6.3.1 A theory of question asking 
It is worth noting that no computational theory yet exists that explains how the questioner 
selects the two utterances (72)a and (72)b (the example is taken from Pollack's dissertation 
[Pollack 861). 
(72)a. Q: I want to talk to Kathy. 
b. What's the phone number of the hospital? 
(73)a. R: Kathy has been discharged 
b. and is a t  home now. 
c. The phone number there is 222-1234. 
Related research includes some early work on the planning of requests [Cohen 78, 
Cohen 791, more recent work on the planning of referring expressions [Appelt 85a], and 
some work on phrasing questions understandably in the context of cooperative problem- 
solving tasks [Webber 841. However, the general problem concerning how a questioner 
identifies his information-seeking goals and then acts to achieve them has so far remained 
unaddressed. Yet I suspect that we will ultimately require a better model of this pro- 
cess in order to understand the kinds of inference and reasoning abilities that cooperative 
respondents must possess. 
We can at least partially describe the events leading up to  Q's utterances using a 
conventional, commonsense model of Q as a goal-driven planning agent. It is reasonable 
t o  conjecture that the behavior of agents in the world is at least partially explained by 
their pursuit of rational goals. That is, agents identify desirable states of the world as 
their goals, and then proceed to  form and execute plans that they believe will bring about 
those goals.' At least one of the reasons why agents interact with one another is to obtain 
information they perceive as needed to carry out their plans. For example, when an agent 
discovers that he is blocked from further progress in a plan, he will adopt a sub-goal to 
'I am glossing over many details here because they do not contribute to the discussion. One such detail 
concerns the role of intentionality in rational planning behavior. For an excellent, rigorous analysis of the 
interrelationship of plans, goals, and intentions, the reader is referred to [Cohen goal. 
eliminate the obstacle, then form and execute a plan t o  that end. As Allen has observed 
[Allen 831, the lack of a particular piece of information can be one kind of impediment to  
an agent's progress. Q's goal in the present example is t o  speak to  Kathy; his plan involves 
calling the hospital, since he seems to  believe that Kathy is there (R can only determine 
this through the process of plan recognition). But Q has found himself blocked because he 
does not know the telephone number of the hospital where Kathy is staying. 
Q might be able to  obtain the telephone number in various ways, e.g., by looking in 
the telephone directory. But for whatever reason (convenience perhaps, or the absence of 
a telephone book), Q decides in this case to  try to obtain the information from R. At this 
point Q must find a way to cause R to  give him the desired information. In the example, 
Q has chosen to use linguistic acts to  that end. Of course, this still does not tell us exactly 
how Q plans his two-utterance request given that he has recognized his need to  know the 
hospital phone number. This is an open problem worthy of study. 
The question of interest here concerns Q7s purpose in uttering (72)a and the intended 
relationship of that utterance to  (72)b. It seems that Q is stating the top-level goal of 
the plan he is pursuing. Assuming that Q's utterance was intended to cause R to  believe 
that Q intends t o  talk to Kathy, what reason did Q have for trying to  communicate that 
intention? Why did he not simply ask the question in (72)b and leave it a t  that? 
There are various explanations one might consider. For example, Q might be trying 
to  prevent R from jumping to any unwarranted conclusions. He might have reasoned that 
if he were to just ask the question and provide no motivation for it,  she might become 
worried, supposing Q to be in need of hospitalization. Alternatively, what appears to  be a 
goal statement might actually be the product of some very clever communicative planning. 
Notice that Q uses the definite noun phrase "the hospital." Assuming that Q and R share 
knowledge that Kathy was recently admitted to some particular hospitalY2 Q, in mentioning 
Kathy, could be trying by association to make that hospital salient in the conversation, 
thereby providing a convenient referent for the noun phrase. This is a particularly handy 
linguistic device, and would be especially useful if Q did not know the hospital's name or 
could not come up with a reasonably concise referring expression. 
Other accounts are undoubtedly possible. However, to  the extent that this issue has 
been considered at all, it has generally been assumed that Q chooses his utterances at  least 
partly intending to  make his underlying plan (the plan in which he is currently blocked) 
recognizable to R. Corresponding to this assumption, the process by which R infers Q's plan 
has been called intended recognition: recognition under the condition that Q is actively 
trying to  make his plan recognizable to R [Cohen 811.~ 
The theory of intended recognition raises questions concerning both why and how ques- 
tioners circumscribe the portions of their plans that they want respondents to  know about. 
These are important questions worthy of careful study, and I believe that better models 
of the reasoning processes of questioners will be helpful in understanding the obligations 
and responsibilities of a cooperative respondent. That is, a better understanding of how 
questioners plan requests to  support their goals in the world will surely help us develop 
better theories of cooperative responses. 
'This was in fact the case in the real-life situation that gave rise to the dialogue. 
3This is as opposed to keyhole recognition, in which the inferring agent deduces an actor's plans by 
observing the actor's actions as if through a keyhole. The actor is unaware that he is being observed, and 
hence makes no effort to assist the recognition process. 
6.3.2 Mutual beliefs and cooperative responses 
Theories of cooperative behavior will ultimately have to  recognize the subtle role that 
mutual belief plays in the formulation of cooperative responses.4 Consider the following 
scenario: A is attending a dinner party at B's home, and the two of them are together 
in B's kitchen (both A and B are female in this example). The other dinner guests, A's 
husband among them, are out in the dining room. It  is dessert time and B is busy slicing 
up a cake and putting the pieces on plates. The following exchange  ensue^:^ 
(74) A: What's in the cake? 
B: Don't worry-he can eat it. 
Of critical importance to  an understanding of this exchange is B's knowledge that A's 
husband, for religious reasons, will not eat foods containing certain proscribed ingredients. 
One question is whether A actually intended (i.e., whether she was making an effort to 
cause) B to  recognize her higher purpose of determining whether the cake conformed t o  the 
requirements of her husband's religion. Why, for example, did she not simply ask, "Can 
my husband eat it?" This choice of query seems to at least partly depend upon whether 
A believed it was mutually believed that  B knew that A's husband observed those dietary 
restrictions. The felicity of B's response would seem to depend upon her belief that  i t  was 
mutually believed that she knew what those restrictions were and was able t o  evaluate for 
herself whether A's husband could in fact eat the cake. A complete account of the beliefs 
and inferences on both sides of this exchange would be most interesting indeed. 
6.3.3 Correcting misconceptions 
We saw in Chapter 2 that several researchers have studied misconception-correction tech- 
niques. Their efforts were concerned either with developing methods for detecting mis- 
conceptions (e.g., Kaplan [Kaplan 821, Mays [Mays 80]), or with characterizing corrective 
response strategies (e.g., McCoy [McCoy 851, Quilici [Quilici 881). 
A more principled, respondent-based approach would be to investigate the planned na- 
ture of misconception correction. Begin by assuming that the respondent has ascertained 
that  the questioner incorrectly believes some proposition P. What constitutes a "correc- 
tion" of that false belief? What knowledge and reasoning procedures are used by the 
respondent to compute a set of utterance acts that  achieve the goal of correction? Several 
kinds of knowledge have been identified so far: 
beliefs about the "type" of the misconception (e.g., relating to  some domain concept, 
or connected in some way to  an intended plan); 
beliefs about entities that are salient in the discourse; 
beliefs about the (possibly erroneous) justifications that Q might have for believing 
p; 
Joshi has investigated the role of mutual belief in formulating answers to  requests for descriptions of 
the referent of a referring expression [Joshi 821. 
5This is a naturally-occurring exchange reported t o  me by Robert Rubinoff. 
a beliefs about some related true proposition P' whose truth implies the falsehood of 
p; 
beliefs derived as a side effect of identifying P as a misconception. 
In short, the research problem is to develop a model of the planning process that shows how 
R reasons about the discourse context, her private beliefs about the static and dynamic 
properties of the domain, her beliefs about Q's model of the world, and her beliefs about 
beliefs shared in common with Q, to select a set of linguistic acts that together function 
to  correct Q's misconception. 
6.3.4 Distinguishing cooperative reasoning from responding 
In order to  develop a better understanding of cooperative behavior, it may prove useful 
to  try t o  separate two dimensions of a respondent's goal-driven behavior. The naturally- 
occurring examples considered in this dissertation provide evidence that respondents adopt 
goals to  carry out various reasoning activities in support of their response goals; this 
behavior might be usefully distinguished from the processes of conveying some or all of the 
information so acquired to  the questioner. 
For example, in the course of planning a response, a respondent might decide to  try to 
compute an alternative plan for a given goal, in order to  compare it with the plan she has 
ascribed to the questioner. Since reasoning agents act by adopting and pursuing goals, that 
decision would be implemented by having the respondent adopt the goal of synthesizing a 
new plan. If that goal is achieved, the respondent might next adopt a goal of comparing 
the newly-computed plan with the questioner's plan. Ultimately, the respondent would 
have to  decide what information to actually communicate t o  the questioner. The point 
is that we might want to separate the principles of cooperation that drive respondents to 
reason in the various ways they do from the principles that guide their choice of response 
content. 
6.3.5 Alternative architectures 
It may be worthwhile to  consider alternatives to the model of high-level goal adoption 
I have proposed in this dissertation. According to my model, high-level response goals 
are adopted using a two-step process: first, goals that are well motivated on the basis of 
specific evidence found in the conversation model are proposed, becoming the Response 
Goal Proposer's potential response goals. Then other general reasoning procedures-which 
I have termed screens of admissibility-are brought to bear on that set of goals to select a 
subset to  actually adopt. In proposing the use of screens of admissibility, I am attempting 
to  accommodate both data and research results that suggest that respondents may, on the 
basis of other beliefs derived from or pertaining to the interaction, find general reasons 
for disregarding otherwise well-motivated response goals. For one example, recognition 
that the questioner's plan is ill formed may justify disregarding goals that have to  do 
with providing information Q needs to instantiate one of its constituent actions. For 
another, a respondent may choose not to  answer an explicit question if she can determine 
that providing that answer would conflict with one of her higher-priority goals (e.g., to  
maintain system security). 
However, different goal-adoption strategies might be equally plausible. For example, 
there might be a way to order potential response goals according to some measure of 
importance. Then, rather than explicitly eliminating particular goals from consideration, 
the system could instead simply adopt the highest-ranked goal and attempt to  satisfy it. 
Depending upon the results of that process, the remaining goals could be re-ranked and 
the new top-priority goal selected. This process could be repeated until some resource 
allotment was exceeded. While such a model could certainly be used, its consequences for 
response generation are unclear. In particular, it is not clear whether such an approach 
would provide a principled account for the omission of direct answers in the kinds of 
situations examined by Pollack and others. Nevertheless, the point is that until procedures 
are developed for evaluating CRG system architectures, it might be useful to explore the 
consequences of alternative designs to  the one I have proposed. 
6.4 Closing Remarks 
Although I have focused my attention in this dissertation on the very general problem of 
producing cooperative responses to natural-language requests, the fundamental question 
of what actually makes a response "cooperative" remains murky. The many examples 
that were considered herein have demonstrated the profound complexity of cooperative 
dialogue. If this work has succeeded only in sharpening some of the research questions, a 
small but useful step forward has been achieved. 
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